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The theory of academic capitalism provides a cogent explanation of the actors, 
organizations, and networks that initiated a shift in U.S. higher education from a “public 
good knowledge/learning regime” to an emerging “academic capitalist 
knowledge/learning regime.” In the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime, the 
claims of entrepreneurs, administrators, and corporations—amidst amplified market 
forces—have come to supersede the claims of the public. Research thus far has not 
analyzed the process by which the multiple levels of higher education institutions adopt 
values and norms of the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime. 
Using case study methodology, this dissertation empirically examines the 
development and dissemination of an institutional ethos that, consistent with the theory of 
 
 
academic capitalism, has attributed great importance to innovation and entrepreneurship 
at a public doctoral/research-intensive university in the United States between 1998 and 
2013. Specifically, I am interested in explaining why this ethos was initiated and 
supported by university leaders and how it has been translated into incentives for faculty 
members and academic opportunities for undergraduate students. Therefore, this 
dissertation traces academic capitalism as a multi-level process at one higher education 
institution. 
 The findings demonstrate that meanings ascribed to innovation and 
entrepreneurship vary across the campus. However, there is a preponderance of language 
and examples derived from the for-profit sector. The individuals on campus instrumental 
in crafting the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos were central administrators, 
particularly presidents and provosts. The main motivations for supporting the ethos were 
generating revenue in the future, continuing a land-grant tradition of service to the state, 
and attempting to keep pace with institutional peers and garner prestige. Efforts to 
translate the ethos into incentives for faculty have been limited in scope and mainly cater 
to disciplines in sciences, engineering, and technology. However, there is clearly 
emphasis placed on developing the entrepreneurial mindset in undergraduate students. 
The implications of these incentives and academic opportunities are analyzed, suggesting 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Introduction  
Sheila Slaughter and Gary Rhoades’ (2004) theory of academic capitalism
1
 
provides a cogent explanation of the actors, organizations, and networks that, starting in 
the 1970s, initiated a shift in U.S. higher education from what they called a “public good 
knowledge/learning regime” to an emerging “academic capitalist knowledge/learning 
regime.” In the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime, they argued, the claims of 
academic entrepreneurs and corporations—amidst amplified market forces—supersede 
the claims of the public. Profit taking and knowledge privatization are prioritized over 
democratic citizenship education or social justice. However, the institutional creation and 
transmission of values and norms that sustain this regime was conspicuously absent from 
the theory’s elaboration, which focused upon market-based behavioral responses to 
external—often structural—pressures. Although these responses are vital in 
understanding the nature of change in higher education over the past four decades, they 
do not fully illustrate the means and motivations through which academic capitalist 
values and norms are created and subsequently transmitted to university actors. 
This dissertation empirically explores one facet of these means and motivations. It 
critically examines the development and dissemination of an institutional ethos that, 
consistent with the theory of academic capitalism, attributes great importance to 
innovation and entrepreneurship at a public doctoral/research-intensive university in the 
United States. By “institutional ethos,” I mean the values that are appropriated and 
                                                 
1
 As I discuss later in the chapter, Sheila Slaughter and Larry Leslie (1997) first conceptualized academic 
capitalism as part of a four country comparative study. However, Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) noted that 
this initial work did not attempt to develop a theory, prompting them to undertake the subsequent volume 





cultivated by key university planners and decision-makers to coordinate and normalize 
the activities of faculty and undergraduate students, as well as practices and policies that 
perpetuate the ethos. Specifically, I am interested in explaining why this ethos was 
initiated and supported by university leaders (e.g., chancellor, presidents, provosts, deans, 
and program directors) and how it has been translated into incentives for faculty and 
academic opportunities for undergraduate students.  Therefore, this dissertation traces 
academic capitalism as a multi-level process at one higher education institution. 
Research on all things “entrepreneurial” in academe has been steadily growing in 
recent years (Mars & Metcalfe, 2009). This study departs from the burgeoning literature 
in several ways. First, its focus is not the behaviors of specific actors like faculty 
members or graduate students, nor does it concentrate on certain disciplines in science, 
engineering, and technology. Rather, it looks at how and why a collection of individuals 
across one campus developed and constituted values, norms, and practices in a certain 
historical moment and political-economic context. Second, this study does not stress the 
pursuit of money as the sole explanation for the promotion of entrepreneurship in 
academe, giving attention to tradition, legitimacy, prestige, and accountability as 
additional explanatory variables. Third, this study attempts to understand how the 
translation of an innovation and entrepreneurship ethos into incentives and academic 
opportunities strives to shape faculty members’ and undergraduate students’ conduct and 
subjectivities. Through this institutional case study, I explore one of the ways in which 






In the chapter that follows, I lay the groundwork for this study. I paint in broad 
brushstrokes a depiction of public higher education’s shifting political-economic 
landscape since the 1970s. This landscape is marked by two tectonic shifts: 1) higher 
education became inextricably linked to efforts to build a national innovation system; and 
2) university education became increasingly viewed as a private good. Central to these 
shifts were a series of federal policies that introduced greater institutional competition for 
students and allowed universities to profit from their research discoveries. The 
aftershocks of these shifts reverberate in the present, as schools nationwide orient their 
missions to research, seek to control costs through technology-based solutions, cultivate 
new sources of income, and answer to accountability expectations, especially after the 
2008 financial crises (Kerr, 2002). Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) captured many 
implications of public higher education’s political-economic landscape in their theory of 
academic capitalism, the main proposition of which is introduced in this chapter.  
With this background in place, I provide an overview of the dissertation’s 
methodology, delineating its problem and purpose; scope and significance; research 
questions; theoretical foundations; and empirical strategy. I conclude the chapter by 
summarizing this discussion and reviewing the contents of the remaining chapters. Before 
describing public higher education’s shifting political-economic landscape, I define a few 
key concepts that are frequently employed in the dissertation. 
Key Concepts 
 Underlying this project is the idea that American higher education has 
fundamentally changed in response to political-economic conditions. These changes are 





university actors. In order to understand the political-economic framing of this study, as 
well as the theory of academic capitalism, it is worth briefly discussing four paired 
concepts: market/marketization, privatization/corporatization, informational/knowledge-
based economy, and neoliberalism/the neoliberal state. As is often the case in social 
scientific research, these concepts resist simple definition. Nevertheless, I provide a basic 
overview of each paired concept, reserving elaboration and application to subsequent 
sections. 
The market/marketization. In higher education literature, the market is 
frequently construed as an actor itself. Borrowing from Clark (1983), I conceptualize the 
market not as an actor, but as a context of interaction within which presumed rational 
actors pursue self-interest. According to Gumport (2005), in higher education there are 
“several markets at work—not only for obtaining students, but for placing graduates, 
hiring and retaining faculty, obtaining research funding, establishing collaboration with 
industry and other organizations, maintaining endowments, sustaining and extending 
alumni giving and other fundraising sources” (p. 118). Lindblom (1977) conceptualized 
three main markets in higher education: consumer, labor, and institutional. The consumer 
market involves the exchange of money for desired goods and services, with consumer 
choice as a requisite feature. In the labor market, employees compete with their 
capabilities and energies for compensation. Lastly, the institutional market coordinates 
the way enterprises interact, with reputation or prestige as the main commodity of 
exchange.  
It should be recognized, then, that many higher education institutions create 





of self-interest. In fact, the pursuit of self-interest among faculty members, specifically, 
promotes the type of work that signals expertise, generates prestige, and results in 
promotion. This provides incentive to powerfully advance the store of knowledge and, 
therefore, spark creative answers to demanding problems. A significant point that applies 
throughout the remaining chapters is that competition and self-interest in some form have 
long factored into aspects of the academic life and nest rather naturally within higher 
education’s tradition of meritocracy.  
It is the case that markets in higher education sometimes fail to achieve socially 
efficient outcomes. Individuals’ pursuit of self-interest can lead to results that are 
inefficient and could be improved with intervention. Parents and students, for example, 
tend to underinvest in higher education because they focus upon the private versus social 
returns to receiving a degree. In response to market failures, governments intervene 
through public policy, usually in the form of subsidies to institutions and students 
(Paulsen, 2001). However, the view that market failures necessitate state intervention has 
been subverted over time. The market is now viewed as a solution to ineffectiveness and 
inefficiency produced by government bureaucracy (Morrow, 2006). A major reason that 
the market has been celebrated is because of neoliberalism, a political-economic doctrine 
whose ascendance is described below.  
Consequently, many public universities have undergone marketization, defined 
here as a process of increasing market coordination or market interaction as state 
intervention has waned or transformed to extend the reaches of consumer sovereignty. 
Manifestations of this process are numerous and described throughout this dissertation, 





market opportunities for private gain. Concomitantly, public universities have established 
closer ties with private industry in order to address funding shortfalls from state 
withdrawal or to display their relevance to economic competitiveness and growth. In light 
of marketization and greater private industry influence in academe, several scholars have 
observed—and others bemoaned—that higher education has undergone privatization or 
corporatization. 
Privatization/corporatization. The American higher education system consists 
of public, private non-profit, and private for-profit institutions. The main difference 
between public and private non-profit institutions is most clearly understood by reference 
to governance, not funding. This is the case because, at many public institutions, the 
share of funding from the state has been in decline for several decades, while privately-
sourced contributions (e.g., tuitions, donations, etc.) are on the rise (Selingo, 2013). 
Moreover, many private non-profit colleges and universities receive public tax 
exemptions and subsidies (Lombardi, 2006). In terms of governance, the state, county, or 
city controls or coordinates public institutions via a governing board appointed, at least in 
part, by the executive and/or legislative branch of government. By contrast, private 
institutions are governed by a board whose constitution and operations are largely 
independent of the government. As follows, private non-profit institutions are not as 
beholden as public institutions to state regulations or bureaucracy. Public universities 
must answer to state expectations regarding enrollment, credentialing, and contributions 
to the economy.   
Recent changes in higher education have prompted several scholars to suggest 





non-profit institutions increasingly operating like for-profit enterprises (Bok, 2003; 
Gould, 2003; Johnstone, 1999; Kirp, 2003; Reading, 1996; Schrecker, 2010; Washburn, 
2005). These scholars argue that public universities are undergoing privatization and/or 
corporatization. Johnstone (1999) proffered a comprehensive definition of privatization 
as it relates to higher education: 
Privatization…refers to a process or tendency of colleges and universities (both 
public and private) taking on characteristics of, or operational norms associated 
with, private enterprises. Although the term is not a precise one…, privatization 
connotes a greater orientation to the students as a consumer, including the concept 
of the college education as a “product”; attention to image, competitor institutions 
and market “niches”; pricing  and the enhancement of net earned revenue; and 
aggressive marketing. Privatization also suggests the adoption of management 
practices associated with private business, such as contracting out, or 
"outsourcing"…, aggressive labor relations and minimization of payroll 
expenditures, decisive decision-making and "top down" management, widespread 
use of audits and accountability measures, and an insistence that each 
unit…contribute to profitability. (p. 1) 
This definition roughly equates to what Robertson and Dale (2013) usefully called 
“privatization in education,” or the introduction of market mechanisms and norms and 
practices from the private sector in public education. They distinguished this process 
from “privatization of education,” which refers to state liberalization of the public 






Some scholars (e.g., Schrecker, 2010; Washburn, 2005) have focused not on the 
nebulous public/private dichotomy of non-profit postsecondary education, but rather the 
influence of corporations or corporate culture among institutions. University 
corporatization is covered fully in chapter two, but for the purposes of this introduction 
can be defined as the combination of greater private industry influence in higher 
education governance and the belief that universities are businesses that can benefit from 
practices and norms that are utilized by corporations. Both privatization and 
corporatization have become popular concepts in the context of political-economic 
conditions attendant upon public universities since the 1970s. These conditions have been 
described through two concepts, the knowledge-based economy and neoliberalism.  
Informational/knowledge-based economy. There has been much talk recently of 
the need for public higher education to prepare “knowledge workers” and harness 
university research capacities to capitalize on the economic possibilities of information 
technology (Crawford, 2010; Etzkowitz, Webster, & Healey, 1998). The assumption 
driving this call to action is that the U.S. economy has fundamentally changed, becoming 
“post-industrial,” “post-Fordist,” and “knowledge-based” (Bell, 1973; Castells, 1993). 
There is still scholarly debate surrounding the material existence of the knowledge-based 
economy (e.g., Meyer, Ramirez, Frank, & Schofer, 2007), but the influence of the 
concept and related discourses on education policy is beyond dispute (Jessop, 2008). 
Indeed, there has been no shortage of monographs on the challenges and opportunities of 
the knowledge-based economy to higher education (Carnevale & Desrochers, 2002; 
Duderstadt, 2000; Temple, 2012). In the words of Temple (2012): “while the university 





center of scholarship and creativity, a repository of national culture and values, and a 
means of social mobility…, its relationship with the knowledge-based economy is recent 
and striking” (p. 1). 
This study understands the knowledge-based economy through the pioneering 
work of Castells (1993), who outlined five features of what he called the “informational 
economy.” The first feature is that, although knowledge has always been vital in 
coordinating economic activities, the capacity to create and apply new knowledge 
increasingly dictates the pace of productivity and economic growth. Not all knowledge is 
valued in this arrangement, as the development of science and technology-related 
products and services carries the best prospects for wealth generation. Second, in the 
knowledge-based economy, there has been transference from material production to 
information management, requiring not a cheap, unskilled, and abundant labor force, but 
rather a smaller number of educated workers familiar with the manipulation of data, 
supplemented by a larger number of flexible laborers (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). 
Third, non-standardized production from horizontally networked economic organizations 
has replaced Fordist production. Fourth, the knowledge-based economy is global, with 
capital, labor, markets, and management all moving and occurring across national 
borders. International trade, of course, is not new, and nation states are not irrelevant, as 
they enforce the global economic infrastructure. Lastly, the preceding transformations in 
economic organization have been dependent upon the concurrent revolution in 
telecommunications, “transforming the material basis of our world in fewer than twenty 





discussion is that it has been used to explain new market opportunities for producers of 
knowledge and knowledge workers, such as public universities. 
Neoliberalism/the neoliberal state. These new market opportunities have been 
emphasized in an era marked by neoliberalism and the education policies it has inspired. 
Neoliberalism is a constellation of practices based on the idea that “human wellbeing can 
best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an 
institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and 
free trade.” (Harvey, 2005, p. 2). Neoliberalism, to borrow from Peck (2010), has 
“always been about the capture and reuse of the state” (p. 9). The neoliberal state has 
been described at length by a number of scholars (Jessop, 1993; Ong, 2006; Peck, 2010). 
Jessop (1993) provided one of the most comprehensive accounts of the neoliberal state 
through his conceptualization of the “Schumpeterian workfare state.”  
Among the core objectives of the Schumpeterian workfare state is “the 
subordination of social policy to the demands of labor market flexibility and structural 
competitiveness” (p. 9). More explicitly, the neoliberal state looks to redefine or 
dismantle “big government,” positioning itself in negative relation to the bureaucratic 
welfare state apparatus and its perceived inefficiency (Morrow, 2006). This is one reason 
why Jessop viewed the nation state as increasingly hollowed out, as the neoliberal state 
has transferred many centralized governmental powers to supranational organizations and 
devolved others to the local level. Such hollowing out, however, does not mean the 
neoliberal state is disinterested in the lives of its citizens. Ong (2006) suggested that there 
is an interventionist aspect to the neoliberal state. Citizens are encouraged to think of 





self-manage according to market principles of discipline, efficiency, and 
competitiveness” (Ong, p. 4).  
Peck (2010) contended that it is useful to study neoliberalism as a process, or as it 
“actually exists,” rather than an “ideational essence” (p. 9). He proposed breaking 
neoliberalization into two categories: “roll-back” and “roll-out.” The first category, roll-
back neoliberalization, is often the first phase of the process and entails “attacks on labor 
unions, planning agencies, entitlement systems, and public bureaucracies, by way of the 
now familiar repertoire of funding cuts, organizational downsizing, market testing, and 
privatization” (p. 23). The administration of President Ronald Reagan in the early 1980s 
exemplified roll-back neoliberalization through deregulation of finance and 
telecommunications, cuts to federal agencies, and attacks on unionized labor. The second 
category, roll-out neoliberalization, is a creative process, reconstructing trade and finance 
regulatory regimes at the global level. Roll-out neoliberalization responds to the costs of 
dismembering the social safety net and disciplining those marginalized by a leaner state. 
It creates schemes for extending and normalizing market ideology to citizens and 
penalizes those who are non-compliant (Peck & Tickell, 2002). Examples of such 
schemes include welfare-to-work programs and school vouchers. In higher education, 
neoliberalism is most relevant to explaining funding cuts, escalating user fees, and 
marketization. The next section traces the roots of these decisions and processes. 
Higher Education’s Shifting Political-Economic Landscape  
A multitude of scholars have noted that unprecedented political-economic 
conditions have had profound effects on higher education institutions since the 1970s 





2010; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997; Washburn, 2005). Although schools across the 
postsecondary sector have experienced (and co-created) these conditions, public 
institutions, in particular, have been challenged by them. For this reason, public 
universities receive the bulk of the attention in the discussion that follows. I refer to new 
political-economic conditions attendant upon public universities as tectonic shifts, 
figuratively referring to the strength and range of movements, collisions, and erosions 
that continue to influence institutions today.
2
 Two shifts since the 1970s are relevant to 
the development of the theory of academic capitalism and, therefore, this dissertation. 
The first shift is that higher education became inextricably linked to efforts to build a 
national scientific and technological innovation system in the wake of a crisis in Fordist 
manufacturing and concerns over America’s economic competitiveness. The second shift 
is that, with the rise of neoliberalism, university education became increasingly viewed as 
a private good, buoyed by notions of individual returns to investment in one’s own 
human capital. 
 Public universities and the national innovation system. Throughout much of 
the postwar era, production strategies in the United States were organized around 
assembly-line, or Fordist, manufacturing. During this era, competitiveness and growth in 
real terms were based upon standardized production of material goods by vertically 
integrated, large scale organizations (Carnoy, Castells, Cohen, & Cardoso, 1993). For 
several decades, this organization of production flourished, propelling the United States 
to an undisputed position of economic dominance (Jessop, 2008). The state operated 
within and constituted this economic milieu, creating policies that projected a democratic 
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 This phrasing was inspired by Kerr’s (2002) allusion to “shockwaves” to describe major changes to the 





vision at the same time that it nurtured an environment suitable to socially uneven capital 
accumulation. The tension between this democratic vision and the inequalities inherent to 
capital accumulation represents what Torres (1995) called the advanced capitalist state’s 
“legitimacy deficit” (p. 273). Both the organization of production and state objectives 
transformed gradually in the first decades of the postwar era, but changes accelerated in 
the face of fiscal crises in the 1970s. Concerns over America’s competitiveness yielded 
initiatives to spur economic growth through a national system of innovation. 
 Industrialized countries experienced low growth rates in the 1970s, exacerbated 
by oil crises in 1973 and 1979. In the United States, unemployment and inflation steadily 
increased, resulting in an economic phenomenon known as “stagflation.” Meanwhile, 
economic productivity decreased until the late 1980s (Harvey, 2005). By contrast, 
Japan’s economy grew throughout the 1970s, and competition from Pacific Rim states 
encouraged markets to become increasingly global (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997). The 
United States fared poorly in the face of such competition, running a trade deficit for the 
first time in almost a century and losing shares of the world market (Cohen, 1993). 
Starting in the early 1980s, the U.S. government pursued a policy agenda around 
innovation for economic competitiveness (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). President Reagan 
launched in 1983 what became the Council of Competitiveness, which produced regular 
reports and provided a variety of policy recommendations to reorganize higher education, 
promoting investment in the “critical fields” of science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics (Jessop, 2008). Additionally, the government started to support applied and 





state project, but rather involved a new contract between government, private industry, 
and higher education institutions. 
This new contract was developed at a time when many public universities were 
confronting greater scrutiny from the public. In the words of Geiger (1993), many 
institutions in the 1970s “faced a need to articulate a fresh and compelling rationale for 
their basic role as guardians of advanced knowledge and rational inquiry” (p. 269). At the 
same time, multinational corporations turned to investment in university research related 
to new technologies as a response to declining shares of the world market. Within the 
government’s supportive policy environment, a partnership was born, such that ivory 
tower aloofness gave way to more collaborative research with private industry: 
“Economic competitiveness and technology transfer became the cornerstones of an 
emerging consensus on university research” (Geiger, p. 305). The proportion of 
university research money coming from private industry doubled between 1972 and 
1990, with the greatest period of growth between 1979 and 1986 (Berman, 2007). It is 
worth noting, however, that the percentage of research funding from private industry still 
pales in comparison the percentages coming from the federal government and institutions 











Figure 1: Sources of Academic Research and Development Funding, 1972-2000 
Source: National Science Foundation/Division of Science Resources Statistics, Survey of Research and Development Expenditures at 
Universities and Colleges 
 
Collaboration transformed into business ventures, as public universities 
“[oriented]…research toward areas relevant to industry” and “[promoted] mechanisms 
for conveying discoveries to industry for commercial development” (p. 305). Thus, the 
1980s marked the beginning of a new relationship between public universities and private 
industry. It was during this decade that the majority of public research universities 
established intellectual property offices, research parks, and administrative infrastructure 
to support transfer of technology to private industry (Geiger & Sá, 2008).  
America’s economy, both discursively and materially, transformed in light of 
technological improvements and concomitant changes in the nature of work and 
composition of the labor force. In a matter of two decades, the knowledge-processing 
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Snydman, 2005). The value of knowledge creation, preservation, and transmission was 
evaluated in terms of its contribution to economic competitiveness and growth 
(Etzkowitz, Webster, & Healey, 1998). In addition to bringing research products and 
processes to market, public universities were called upon to prepare well-educated 
workers and technology-intelligent consumers (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). The 
landscape of higher education shifted in such a way that public universities became key 
ingredients in a national scientific and technological innovation system in the eyes of 
corporate and political leaders, enabling myriad behavioral manifestations to take 
advantage of newly minted market opportunities. Codifying this political-economic shift 
were several policies at the federal level that fostered commercialization of research.  
The most illustrative policy to this end was the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act. Prior to this 
landmark piece of legislation, few universities sought to patent intellectual products. 
With the passage of Bayh-Dole, both small businesses and universities were able to claim 
rights of ownership over inventions discovered with the help of federal research money.
3
 
Faculty and the institutions that employed them were now able to see the commercial 
possibilities of research. One indicator of commercialization of research is the number of 
patents awarded to universities, which tripled between 1984 and 1994. Put another way, 
fewer than 100 patents were issued to universities by the 1960s, but by 1999 the total 
number had risen to 3,300 (Berman, 2012).  
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 In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Stanford v. Roche that inventors, not institutions, have primary 
ownership over inventions. This has not reduced the influence of Bayh-Dole, as universities simply altered 
contracts and policies to ensure that their claims were legally sound. However, organizations like the 







Table 1: Indicators of Commercial Activities of U.S. Universities, 1993-2003 
 Indicator 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Patents awarded to all academic 
institutions 
86 95 100 115 130 168 178 165 171 174 174 
Academic start-up companies formed  NA 104 100 109 153 165 163 218 238 215 206 
New academic research funding from 
licenses 
NA 94 100 138 121 113 132 164 201 189 189 
Academic equity licenses/options NA NA 100 114 205 212 183 299 331 377 319 
Academic invention disclosures received 89 90 100 109 122 129 135 145 152 170 185 
Academic new U.S. patent applications 
filed 
84 85 100 115 154 174 205 237 244 274 304 
Academic revenue-generating 
licenses/options 
80 83 100 116 132 141 156 177 181 199 260 
Academic new licenses/options executed 81 96 100 103 126 144 154 167 154 171 180 
Source:  National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators 2006, volume 2 (NSB 06-01A): appendix tables 5-68 and 5-69.  
 
Subsequent policy provided the legal infrastructure for universities to partner with private 
industry and better protected government-industry-university ventures and consortia from 
antitrust litigation. In addition to intellectual property rights, federal policies also made it 
easier for universities to protect trademarked logos, names, and mascots. Starting in the 
1990s, universities were able to copyright digital information (e.g., databases) and 
various services and products (e.g., courseware) that could then be traded internationally. 
In the words of Slaughter and Rhoades (2004), “although universities were not the focus 
of this legislation, they restructured to intersect the new policy thrust. Networks within 
universities…began developing intellectual property, technology transfer, and economic 
development offices, bringing their institutions into closer alignment with the new 
economy” (p. 56). 
The rapid growth of the field of biotechnology, or the applied science of 
molecular biology, illustrates university efforts to intersect with new market opportunities 
and contribute to the national innovation system. In 1973, the discovery of techniques for 





namely in the creation of drugs. Accordingly, pharmaceutical firms were intensely 
interested in biotechnology research, and they invested in universities, effectively 
outsourcing the lengthy process of drug development (Berman, 2012). Blumenthal et al. 
(1996) found that spending on university research by biotechnology companies increased 
from around $121 million in 1984 to almost $1.5 billion in 1994—a nearly eightfold 
increase in real terms. Geiger (1993) observed that, if the estimate for 1984 is correct, 
biotechnology firms accounted for 42 percent of all industry-supported research that year. 
In addition to receiving money from large pharmaceutical companies, many academics 
with expertise in biotechnology served as consultants or created their own start-up firms. 
For example, in 1976 venture capitalist Robert Swanson partnered with Herbert Boyer 
and his laboratory at UC San Francisco, a leader in recombinant DNA research, to form 
Genentech. As many as 200 similar biotechnology firms were created between 1980 and 
1984 (Geiger, 1993). The field of biotechnology renewed confidence in the ability of 
universities to translate research into products with appreciable market value, paving the 
way for growing public acceptance of closer academy-industry relations. Many university 
leaders embraced this relationship, enamored with the idea of contributing to economic 
vitality, supporting scientific breakthroughs that could impact many people, and 
redressing pressing financial problems (Geiger & Sá, 2008). These financial problems—
chiefly reductions in state and local appropriations—were the result of new thinking on 
public good functions of higher education. 
 University education as a private good. The fiscal crises of the 1970s gave rise 
to more than a national system to stimulate innovation. It also fundamentally altered ideas 





accumulation. Throughout much of the postwar era, economic and social policies in the 
United States reflected key characteristics of the Keynesian welfare state. The objectives 
of the Keynesian welfare state “were to promote full employment in a relatively closed 
national economy through demand-side management, and to generalize norms of mass 
consumption through welfare rights” (Jessop, 1993, p. 9). The United States, along with 
many social democratic European states, embraced the belief that state power should be 
exercised in parallel with, or even in place of, market forces to achieve full employment, 
economic growth, and citizen wellbeing (Harvey, 2005). States often intervened in 
industry and established a variety of policies to protect minimum standards of income, 
nutrition, health, housing, and education (Torres, 1995). By the time the U.S. economy 
sputtered in the 1970s, there were deficiencies in the Keynesian welfare state’s ability to 
foster growth of the order expected by corporate and political leaders. One proposed 
solution to the problem was to enact austerity measures. When this solution failed to 
jumpstart the economy, discursive space was created for a different solution: 
neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005).   
 Neoliberalism was not, in fact, new when its advocates ascended to power 
beginning in the early 1980s. A small group of passionate economists, historians, and 
philosophers had gathered in Switzerland in 1947 around Friedrich von Hayek to found a 
society dedicated to classical liberal ideals—above all others, personal freedom (Harvey, 
2005). These early neoliberals theorized that the free market was the best way to mobilize 
the baser elements of human nature for the benefit of all, while ardently opposing state 
intervention (Ong, 2004). By championing a discourse of individual freedom, neoliberals 





the free market and democracy go together” (Pieterse, 2004, p. 10). Amidst the economic 
woes of the 1970s, well-known neoliberal academic Milton Friedman was awarded the 
Nobel Prize for economics in 1976, signaling a sea change in the acceptance of neoliberal 
doctrine. When Ronald Reagan was elected President in 1980, appointments to key 
political positions of neoliberal adherents paved the way for the creation of the neoliberal 
state (Harvey, 2005). 
 In the realm of education, neoliberalization frequently materializes as an array of 
policy prescriptions that seeks to “pass the cost of educational services to clients through 
user fees, [increase] the participation of the private sector in education (i.e., 
privatization), and [promote] decentralization of educational services” (Torres, 1995, p. 
293). Public universities have not been insulated from these policy prescriptions. For 
example, despite evidence of positive externalities of higher education to states, between 
1981 and 2001, the proportion of public university revenue provided by state and local 
government declined from 50 to 36 percent (Titus, 2009). The 2008 financial crises only 
exacerbated this trend, as evinced by Table 2. According to Selingo (2013): “For the last 
twenty-five years…states have been slashing higher education appropriations during each 
downturn in the economy and never fully restoring the money when good times returned” 










Table 2: Changes in State Funding per Full-time Equivalent Student, 2007 versus 2013 










at Public Colleges 
and Universities 
10,271,685 11,471,488 1,199,803 11.7% 
State 
Appropriations 
Per FTE Student 
$8,487 $6,134 (2,353) -27.7% 
Sources: Grapevine survey; State Higher Education Executive Officers Association; Delta Cost Project. 
 
Budget cuts have often been cited as one reason why public universities have sought 
private money through the commercialization of research and recruitment of full-fee 
paying students, including those from overseas (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997).  
Because neoliberalism promotes the view that university education is a venture 
whose benefits are largely private, a potent belief has surfaced that responsibility for 
financing it belongs predominately with the individual consumer, in lieu of the 
government. Several federal polices operationalized this idea, thereby “marketizing” 
higher education finance. In 1972, the Higher Education Act of 1965 was amended so 
that financial aid was given directly to students, instead of institutions. What eventually 
became Pell Grants were essentially vouchers, and students became “partially state-
subsidized consumers in quasi markets for higher education” (Slaughter & Rhoades, 
2004, p. 45). In time, loans came to replace grants as the government’s preferred form of 
financial aid to students. While in 1975-76 loans accounted for just 20 percent of all 
student aid, by 2002 this percentage had escalated to 69 percent (Schrecker, 2010). The 





penalty-free IRA withdrawals for college-related expenses. According to Slaughter & 
Rhoades (2004), these programs promoted competition among universities for preferred 
customers who use non-payment of taxes to access prestigious schools. Higher education 
institutions favored those who could easily repay loans or required no assistance because 
of tax relief.  
Competition did not enhance efficiency or lower costs, but rather fueled a 
“positional arms race” in the system and engendered segmentation (Ehrenberg, 2000). 
The result has been “a virtual circle of competition in which students and institutions in 
the same (elite) market segments compete ever more vigorously with and for each other” 
(p. 44). Competition has been stoked by the development of college ranking systems, 
which are designed to inform consumer choice yet often do little more than encourage 
universities to emulate those institutions that perform well according to a small set of 
indicators.        
Aftershocks: Implications of Tectonic Shifts among Public Universities 
 Public universities across the United States continue to deal with the implications 
of these two shifts in higher education’s political-economic landscape and the policies 
that codified them. It is worth discussing several of the most prominent aftershocks, as 
they contextualize the theory of academic capitalism and several of the theoretical 
propositions that inform this dissertation. These aftershocks relate to the mission, costs, 
revenues, accountability, and affordability of public universities. 
 Research and administrative expansion. The first implication is that knowledge 
creation has become a vital font of resources and prestige for public universities. 





valued, which can in turn affect the mission, spending, and personnel at institutions. 
Mission creep denotes an incremental organizational change and is often used in higher 
education research to describe when teaching-oriented universities shift their focus to 
research (Dubrow, Moseley, & Dustin, 2006). Shifting focus from teaching to research 
frequently requires redistribution of institutional resources. For instance, Morphew and 
Baker (2004) found that universities experiencing mission creep increased spending on 
institutional support and research, while decreasing expenditures on instruction. This is 
the case because, as research receives greater attention, public universities must hire more 
administrators with expertise in acquiring and managing grants (Slaughter & Rhoades, 
2004).  
 Clotfelter (1996) found that new research universities invested in facilities and 
administrative staff to help secure research funding. Many public universities must also 
hire administrators to fulfill non-research responsibilities previously part of academic 
work. Massy and Zemsky (1994) captured this trend in their conceptualization of the 
“administrative lattice,” whereby administrative staff at colleges and universities grow as 
faculty expend more effort on research and less on teaching, student advising, and service 
to the campus. One recent area of growth in university administration is related to 
teaching and new technologies for instruction, such as online courses and using large 
quantities of data to improve pedagogies. 
 The academic profession and teaching quality. A second aftershock, then, is 
that the orientation to knowledge creation has altered the academic profession and raised 
questions about the quality of teaching at public universities. Slaughter and Leslie (1997) 





universities, where faculty that won competitive grants, developed doctoral programs, 
and published extensively advanced their careers. Beginning in the mid-1980s colleges 
and universities began to favor research output in academic promotion and tenure 
decisions. Faculty who excelled in their scholarship were rewarded with course buy-outs 
and fewer teaching demands (Schrecker, 2010). Like never before, faculty began to 
consider how to commercialize their intellectual products through disclosing discoveries 
to technology transfer offices, founding spin-off companies, or selling courseware, 
raising concerns over conflict of interest and commitment (Washburn, 2005). Faculty 
members were encouraged to develop skills in securing external funding for research 
projects. This represents one way being entrepreneurial in the academic profession entails 
more than forming companies. 
 The incentives surrounding research have, according to some observers, detracted 
from undergraduate education. Tenured and tenure-track faculty, in this view, are pulled 
away from teaching and are unavailable to students because of research demands. 
Benjamin (1998) countered the notion that tenure-track faculty are indifferent to 
undergraduate education, showing that, in fact, more tenure-track faculty are needed to 
increase student learning. Nevertheless, it is the case that many colleges and universities 
have come to rely upon “contingent” and “adjunct” faculty to teach courses, especially in 
the rapidly expanding cottage industry of professional and executive degree programs. 
Many non-tenure track faculty are researchers at universities, with minimal teaching 
obligations. As of 2012, over two-thirds of the national faculty workforce were part-time 
or off the tenure track, and their numbers continue to rise (Street, Maisto, Merves, & 





some scholars associate this academic staffing trend with lower retention and graduation 
rates (Bettinger & Long, 2006; Ehrenberg & Zhang, 2005; Harrington & Schibik, 2004; 
Jaeger & Eagan, 2011). Part of the reason why contingent faculty are utilized—and why 
tenure-track faculty activity is under the microscope—is that public universities must 
increasingly demonstrate to stakeholders their commitment to productivity (often 
measured in degrees earned) and efficiency. 
 The accountability movement. A third implication of tectonic shifts in higher 
education’s political-economic landscape is the rise of the accountability movement. This 
movement initially focused on issues of resource allocation and utilization. However, 
towards the end of the 1980s, student outcomes dominated the accountability agenda 
(McGuiness, 2005). By 1994, one-third of states had a higher education performance 
assessment system in place, and today most states or statewide coordinating boards 
mandate an accountability reporting system (Leveille, 2006). Many states and statewide 
coordinating boards have launched initiatives to tie declining appropriations to measures 
of “output” performance, such as credit attainment and degree completion, “in order to 
ensure that taxpayer dollars yield the best possible returns” (Miao, 2012, p. 1). 
 Public universities have turned to new technologies as a means lowering costs 
and increasing productivity. One such technology receiving widespread attention is 
online courses capable of accommodating massive numbers of students with low 
overhead costs. Presently, these courses are largely free or open, explaining why they 
acquired the name Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs). Some institutions have 
explored massive online degree programs and massive online introductory courses, 





cost-effectiveness are not just coming from political leaders. Public universities are 
progressively expected to ensure affordability and returns on investment to parents and 
students, who economically rationalize the college choice, treating tuition payment as a 
business transaction wherein price is weighed against narrow measures of value.  
College rankings like the one produced by U.S. News and World Report take 
advantage of this desire to maximize return on investment, even though the data on which 
it bases its rankings tells students more about the make-up of the in-coming class (e.g., 
test score and class rank) than what they might experience in the classroom (O’Meara, 
2007). Research suggests that the U.S. News rankings shape admissions and pricing 
decisions at higher education institutions, making them less accessible to underprivileged 
groups (Meredith, 2004; Monks and Ehrenberg, 1999). Yet there is no evidence to 
suggest that rankings and elements of good practice in undergraduate education go hand 
in hand (Pike, 2004). This has not prevented the annual publication from selling 2.2 
million copies of its rankings, reaching over eleven million readers per year, and 
profoundly influencing the decisions of university leaders.  
 Rising tuition and student indebtedness. A final aftershock relates to rising 
tuition and student indebtedness. According to the Delta Cost Project, in 2010, students 
paid approximately half of education and related costs, not including opportunity costs—
a 15 to 18 percent increase in ten years (Desrochers & Kirshstein, 2012). Looking at this 
trend more broadly, Titus (2009) reported that, after adjusting for inflation, tuition at 
four-year public institutions increased by 75 percent between 1991 and 2004. In order to 
pay rising tuition expenses, many students and their families have turned to loans to 





loan debt, and the national average for indebtedness reached a record-breaking $26,000 
per student in 2012 (Institute for College Access and Success, 2012). Such figures have 
prompted several organizations and media outlets to suggest that higher education is 
confronting a student debt crisis (e.g., The New York Times series “Degrees of Debt,” 
2012). The fact that tuition continues to rise above the rate of inflation is one reason that 
public universities have been inundated with criticism. Recent monographs on the state of 
higher education have included such damning titles as Is College Worth It?, and College 
(Un)bound. In response to this “unprecedented mix of external forces, [which] turned the 
spotlight on higher education institutions, amplified accountability demands, and raised 
the stakes for the very legitimacy of the enterprise in the eyes of society,” Slaughter and 
Rhoades (2004) developed their theory of academic capitalism (Gumport, 2005, p. 113).  
Overview of the Theory of Academic Capitalism 
 The theory of academic capitalism began as a study of public universities in 
Australia, Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom between 1970 and 1995. 
In Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the Entrepreneurial University, Slaughter 
and Leslie (1997) concentrated upon changes to the nature of academic labor in response 
to the emergence of global markets and reductions in government funding for higher 
education. Such external conditions “precipitated campus reactions of a resource-
dependent nature,” made manifest as “faculty and institutions began to compete or 
increased their competition for external funds” (p. 209). It was in this initial work that 
Slaughter and Leslie popularized the phrase “academic capitalism,” which was chiefly 
designed to capture the encroaching profit motive in public postsecondary education. 





Market behaviors referred to profit-oriented activities, such as patenting and collecting 
royalties, founding spin-off companies from research commercialization, and selling 
products and services. On the other hand, market-like behaviors were responses to 
competition for external money, including the pursuit grants and contracts, endowment 
funds, and student tuition and fees. The first volume of Academic Capitalism did not 
attempt to generate theory, relying instead upon pre-existing work on organizational 
resource dependence, or the idea that “the internal behaviors of organizational members 
are understood clearly only by reference to the actions of external agents” (Slaughter & 
Leslie, 1997, p. 68). 
 By contrast, in the second volume, Academic Capitalism and the New Economy: 
Markets, State, and Higher Education, Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) provided a theory 
dedicated to exploring academic capitalism in U.S. higher education. The crucial claim of 
the theory is that universities have shifted to an “academic capitalist knowledge/learning 
regime.” This regime “values knowledge privatization and profit taking in which 
institutions, inventor faculty, and corporations have claims that come before those of the 
public” (p. 29). Knowledge is considered a commodity whose worth is measure by its 
ability to flow through global markets and generate money for individuals and 
institutions. Slaughter and Rhoades differentiate this regime from its predecessor, the 
public good knowledge/learning regime, which values knowledge as a public good to 
which the citizenry has claims, guided by values like communalism, universality, 
disinterestedness, and organized skepticism. These Mertonian values privileged academic 
freedom and a separation between the public and private sectors. In some ways, 





would argue, in fact, that the public good was aided by a “Darwinian model of academic 
meritocracy which a) built the most competitive academic system in the world and b) had 
the perfect ingredients for academic capitalism” (Uriagereka, personal communication, 
September, 2013). What Slaughter and Rhoades’ theory correctly underscores—even 
with its problematic name—is that the relationship has changed, eroding the degree to 
which the public stands as true benefactor of this model.  
 Other scholars (e.g., Kezar, Chambers, & Burkhardt, 2005) have similarly worried 
that “higher education is foregoing its role as a social institution and public role in society 
and is functioning increasingly as an industry…. The values undergirding this social 
mission include equality, service, truth, justice, community, academic freedom, and 
autonomy” (p. 23). Importantly, these scholars see the public good and academic 
capitalist knowledge/learning regimes as conflicting but, ultimately and uncomfortably, 
co-existing. That is, the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime, though 
ascendant, has not completely replaced the public good knowledge/learning regime. 
Slaughter and Rhoades take a critical stance on this uneasy coexistence, warning that the 
benefits of the regime may fall on the population unevenly and further dilute public 
support for higher education. 
Problem and Purpose 
 Slaughter and Rhoades conceptualized the academic capitalist 
knowledge/learning regime as comprising specific values, norms, and practices regarding 
the creation, application, and ownership of knowledge-based products in academe. 
Nevertheless, they do not fully explain means and motivations through which institutions 





an outcome of external conditions and not a process whose values must be constantly 
normalized and reinforced to secure consent and participation. The chapters of their work 
devoted to substantiating the theory focus on how the push of resource constraint and pull 
of market opportunities led faculty and departments to commercialize research or develop 
academic programs that generate revenue. Moreover, the theory analyzes how “the 
consumption versus…educational dimensions of a college education become increasingly 
emphasized” in response to the expectations of students whose tuition money has 
becoming increasingly vital to university operations (p. 279). By the conclusion of their 
text, and after reviewing subsequent research that makes use of the theory (e.g., Mars, 
2006; Mars & Ginter, 2012; Mendoza, 2007; Mendoza, 2012; Metcalfe, 2004; Szelényi, 
2013), a persistent question remains under-examined: how do we understand academic 
capitalism as a multi-level process at higher education institutions? 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the means and motivations through 
which norms and values of the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime are created 
and transmitted to university actors. It critically examines the development of an 
institutional ethos that attributes great importance to innovation and entrepreneurship at a 
public doctoral/research-intensive university in the United States. Accordingly, this study 
is interested in two sub-areas of interest. First, why was this ethos initiated and supported 
by university leaders? Out of a vast universe of values and norms related to knowledge, 
those linked to innovation and entrepreneurship were championed over public 
engagement, democratic citizenship, or social justice. This study seeks to explain this 
choice in the political-economic context of higher education today. Second, how was this 





than a slogan, innovation and entrepreneurship has intersected with decisions about 
awards, promotions, and course offerings. This study is keenly interested in how the 
ethos has become a conduct-shaping mechanism—or an exercise of power—designed to 
produce particular subjectivities consistent with the present iteration of capitalism.  
 There are several shortcomings in the theory of academic capitalism that must be 
addressed in order to develop a nuanced account of how and why values and norms 
associated with innovation and entrepreneurship were institutionalized. First, building 
upon the extant literature requires moving beyond the theory’s emphasis on resource 
dependency. The theory largely operates under the assumption that the pursuit of external 
money drives entrepreneurial behaviors in academe, giving little attention to alternative 
institutional objectives, such as legitimacy and prestige enhancement, or tradition. 
Second, Slaughter and Rhoades described the knowledge-based economy as a structural 
reality—they do not consider its symbolic and discursive elements, which illuminate the 
ways in which contemporary capitalism requires the construction of particular 
subjectivities and social practices to ensure its perpetuation (Jones, 2008). Lastly, the 
theory of academic capitalism does not sufficiently recognize that the knowledge-
processing functions of universities affords them power in deciding what counts as 
knowledge—indeed, what is thinkable—in society. The exercise of this power entails 
developing formal means of shaping conduct that are absent in the theory of academic 






Scope and Significance 
 I narrow the scope of the study in three ways. First, in order to adequately capture 
specific means and motivations, I focus on a single institutional case: a doctoral/research-
extensive university in the United States, hereafter referred to as Tidewater University 
(TU). Second, even though all university actors are subject to the values and norms of the 
innovation and entrepreneurship ethos, my main concerns are faculty members and 
undergraduate students. Third, I bound the case in a specific time period. This study is 
not interested in the historical evolution of faculty patenting or entrepreneurship 
education per se, which have already been extensively investigated (Katz, 2003; Kuratko, 
2005; Berman, 2012), but rather the interplay of an institution’s fundamental values and 
identity, efforts at prestige enhancement, and exercise of power within a specific context. 
In order to capture the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos as it developed and touched 
the lives of faculty members and undergraduate students, I have selected 1998-2013 as 
the period of study, thereby capturing two presidential administrations at TU. 
Tidewater University was founded in 1856 and benefited from federal funding as 
a result of the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862. Like other land-grant universities, TU 
built an institutional mission around accessibility and a utilitarian curriculum comprised 
of the “practical arts” of agriculture, mechanics, and military instruction. Over the course 
of the next century, Tidewater became the state’s flagship public institution, receiving 
official recognition of this status in 1988. Today, TU teaches over 37,000 undergraduate 
and graduate students and employs approximately 5,000 faculty members (two-thirds of 
whom are non-tenure track). It boasts a half billion dollars in external research funding, 





steadfastly striving to improve its prestige through better performance in college ranking 
systems. To this end, it has become more selective in admitting students, attempted to 
recruit and retain “star” faculty, increased its pursuit of external funding for research, and 
reminded stakeholders at every turn that it is a school “on the move” (O’Meara, 2007).  
TU has embraced innovation and entrepreneurship as an unmistakable 
coordinating theme in institutional decision-making. The number of academic programs 
that teach an “entrepreneurial mindset” has increased, and new awards for faculty have 
been created for innovation and entrepreneurship. Most recently, TU announced the 
launch of an Institute for Innovation and Entrepreneurship to achieve the goal of 
exposing all students to entrepreneurial learning opportunities. Although concentrating 
upon a single case restricts this study’s generalizability—an issue addressed in chapter 
three—Tidewater provides a window into how public universities are responding to and 
interfacing with the challenges and opportunities of twenty-first century political-
economic conditions. 
 Undertaking this line of research is important for at least four reasons. First, it fills 
a void in an expanding body of literature on all things “entrepreneurial” in academe, 
which to date has centered upon: faculty patenting and entrepreneurial behavior 
(Henderson, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 1998; Mendoza, Kuntz, & Berger, 2012; Owen-Smith, 
2000; Powell & Owen-Smith, 2002); state-subsidized undergraduate student 
entrepreneurs (Mars, 2006; Mars, Slaughter, & Rhoades, 2008); graduate student 
socialization (Mendoza, 2007); industry-friendly and revenue-seeking academic units 
(Mendoza, 2012; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004); institutional technology transfer trends 





adaptation (Clark, 1998; Clark, 2004; Christensen & Eyring, 2011). This study departs 
from the literature by focusing on entrepreneurship as an institutional ethos forged in the 
crucible of higher education’s political-economic landscape. Second, this study is unique 
in suggesting that the translation of an ethos implicates a power dynamic, whereby 
institutions attempt to shape faculty member and undergraduate student conduct. Third, 
this study contributes to the refinement of theory, which can be subsequently applied and 
evaluated at other institutions. I add theoretical propositions to the theory of academic 
capitalism related to the discursive dimensions of the knowledge-based economy, 
institutional legitimacy and prestige enhancement, state control, and governmentality. 
Fourth, this study provides insight into the ways in which higher education institutions 
reflect and (re)produce the social relations of contemporary capitalism. Rather than 
assume that the capitalism is naturally self-reproducing, I show one of the poignant ways 
in which public universities teach, endorse, and, therefore, replicate the beliefs and social 
practices that perpetuate America’s capitalist system.  
Research Questions 
 The research questions guiding this study investigate the means and motivations 
through which values, norms, and practices of the academic capitalist knowledge/learning 
regime take shape in an institutional ethos of innovation and entrepreneurship at 
Tidewater University.   
 Question 1: Through what processes did an institutional ethos of innovation and 





 Question 2: Why did university leaders (e.g., chancellor, presidents, provosts, 
deans, and program directors) initiate and support an innovation and 
entrepreneurship ethos?  
 Question 3: How was an innovation and entrepreneurship ethos translated into 
incentives for faculty and academic opportunities for undergraduate students? 
Theoretical Foundations 
 The theoretical framework of this study is based upon the theory of academic 
capitalism and its conceptualization of the academic capitalist knowledge/learning 
regime. However, I draw upon works from five additional theoretical perspectives to 
develop a set of propositions that address the aforementioned shortcomings of the theory 
of academic capitalism. In general, these perspectives move beyond structural or 
materialist theories of social phenomena and instead privilege the semiotic constitution of 
social reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Although each of these theoretical 
perspectives is covered in chapter three, the following section introduces the propositions 
and the main ideas from which they are derived.   
 Firstly, scholarship on the cultural dimensions of political economy argues that 
the exact trajectory of capitalism depends upon the institutions, organizations, and social 
practices involved in its reproduction (Jessop & Sum, 2001). There are normative and 
symbolic projects, such as discourses of the knowledge-based economy, created to help 
manage conflict and coordinate the activities of individuals and institutions within the 
system (Jones, 2008). Public universities are implicated in determining capitalism’s 





Proposition 1: Public universities align their strategic priorities with discourses 
of the knowledge-based economy and (re)produce the social relations of 
neoliberal capitalism. 
 Secondly, new institutionalism theorizes that it is not enough for public 
universities to succeed economically to survive. In order to compete in the institutional 
and consumer market—and garner prestige—they must establish and maintain 
legitimacy. Legitimacy is structured in a higher education field whose parameters are 
defined by the most prestigious institutions, encouraging emulation on the part of less-
prestigious schools. 
Proposition 2: The development and translation of an institutional ethos is 
influenced by perceptions of legitimacy and prestige in the higher education field.  
 Thirdly, in addition to legitimacy and prestige, ground-breaking work by Daniel 
Schugurensky (1994) revealed the twin powers of market demands and, crucially, state 
imperatives in directing public university operations. His heteronomous university model 
offers “a comprehensive account of current changes in higher education” and 
“encompasses a ‘commercial’ (or service) university and a ‘controlled’ (also known as 
‘responsive’ or ‘accountable’) university” (2006, p. 306). This model “constitutes a new 
structural and globalized model of dependency to the market and subjection to the state” 
(p. 307). Schugurensky demonstrates the relationship between globalization and the 
advent of this model through a case study of the Universidad de Buenos Aires. 
Proposition 3: Accompanying the marketization of public universities is 






Fourthly, both sociologists and critical political economists have developed a 
research program around the power dynamics within neoliberalism through Foucault’s 
concept of governmentality. Of particular interest to Foucault in generating his concept 
were not situations of outright domination, but instead contexts in which conduct is 
shaped through techniques designed to induce self-management on the part of affected 
individuals. This study uses governmentality to examine the mechanisms through which 
faculty and undergraduate student conduct is shaped and for what ultimate purposes. 
Proposition 4: The translation of an institutional ethos into incentives for faculty 
and academic programs for undergraduate students represents a form of 
governmentality.  
 Lastly, the new sociology of knowledge stresses that social institutions do not 
simply respond to pre-existing environmental conditions in determining what ideas to 
research and teach. They simultaneously organize and validate certain bodies of 
knowledge over others and play an important role in deciding what is thinkable in society 
(Gumport, 2007). Thus, universities make entrepreneurship a valuable endeavor and body 
of knowledge worth knowing. At times, this means producing demand for it as an 
academic subject and incentivizing it as an area of faculty work when no pre-existing 
demand or interest existed. 
Proposition 5: Public universities wield power in validating certain ways of 
thinking and behaving in society.  






 What informed the meanings ascribed to innovation and entrepreneurship (the 
knowledge-based economy and neoliberal capitalism);  
 Why university leaders initiated and supported values and norms associated with 
the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime (resources, 
legitimacy/prestige, state imperatives); and  
 What were the implications of translating the ethos (governmentality and the 
validation of social thought and behavior)   
Methodology 
 This study employs case study as a comprehensive empirical strategy. The design 
of this project develops a “logical sequence that connects the empirical data to [the] 
study’s initial research questions” (Yin, 1994, p. 19). Consistent with case study 
methodology, the theoretical propositions direct attention to something that should be 
considered in the research and provide some idea of where to look for evidence. In fact, 
part of the reason why I selected a case study design is that I wanted the project to benefit 
from prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis 
(Yin, 1994). Additionally, case study is suited to “investigating a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when…the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 1994, p. 13). Lastly, case 
studies are a preferred research strategy when the questions posed ask “how” or “why” 
something occurs as it does (Merriam, 1998). Given my interest in how and why the 
academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime is transmitted to actors at Tidewater 





informed by and improved due to a pilot study, as well as my positions at the university, 
which situate me directly in conversations surrounding entrepreneurship on campus. 
The research design was divided into two stages of data collection. The first stage 
sought to understand the development and meanings of an innovation and 
entrepreneurship ethos at Tidewater University, with the goal of identifying the 
fundamental values cultivated and communicated by university leaders. It also sought an 
explanation for why university leaders initiated and supported the innovation and 
entrepreneurship ethos, with an eye to contextualizing strategic planning and institutional 
decision-making in higher education’s political-economic landscape. Data in this stage 
came from 15 semi-structured interviews with individuals who served in strategic 
planning and key institutional decision-making roles at TU between 1998 and 2013, 
including at least one chancellor, as well as presidents, provosts, and deans of select 
schools and colleges. Data from documentary evidence, such as speeches, press releases, 
committee reports, and marketing materials was used to corroborate interview data.  
The second stage explored how the institution translated this ethos into practice 
through incentives for faculty members and academic opportunities for undergraduate 
students. Of particular interest were the promotion and tenure processes, awards, courses, 
business model pitch competitions, and degree programs. 15 semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with participants knowledgeable about these incentives and academic 
opportunities. Participants included members of the appointment, promotion, and tenure 
guidelines revision task force, as well as faculty and administrators involved in the design 
and delivery of entrepreneurship courses and degree programs in units that directly 





Committee reports, syllabi, and other documents were reviewed to complement and 
augmented interview data. Finally, interviews were conducted with faculty and staff 
affiliated with the new Institute for Innovation and Entrepreneurship. 
 The collection of multiple types of data from multiple sources was an effort to 
improve the credibility of findings through triangulation, or the “process of using 
multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an observation or 
interpretation” (Stake, 2000, p. 443). Dependability was also improved by creating a case 
study database and chain of evidence. The main goal of interpreting the data was analytic 
generalizability to assess whether the empirical results confirm the theoretical 
propositions. True generalizability, of course, is only possible through further assessment 
with additional cases. Every effort is made to clearly explain the steps followed in 
carrying out this research design to encourage subsequent research. By giving attention to 
the particularities of Tidewater University—and also considering the broader political-
economic landscape—this design augurs to advance understanding of the multi-level 
process by which public universities transmit values and norms associated with the 
academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter provided a description of two tectonic shifts in higher education’s 
political-economic landscape that were central to the development of Slaughter and 
Rhoades’ (2004) theory of academic capitalism and, consequently, this study. Since the 
1970s, public universities have been embroiled in the pull of opportunities created by the 
development of a national innovation system and the push of challenges precipitated by 





Rhoades recognized these challenges and opportunities, exploring in some detail 
behavioral responses they conceptualized as the academic capitalist knowledge/learning 
regime. After establishing this background, I presented the constitutive elements of the 
dissertation project, which critically analyzes the institutional means and motivations of 
transmitting norms and values associated with this regime. The study traces the 
development of an institutional ethos that attributes great importance to innovation and 
entrepreneurship and the translation of this ethos into incentives and academic 
opportunities. Underlying this project are theoretical propositions that suggest this ethos 
serves purposes beyond money-making, such as enhancing prestige and responding to 
state imperatives. 
 The remainder of the dissertation is divided into six chapters. Chapters two and 
three represent the literature review and study methodology, respectively. In reviewing 
the literature, I explore research on the role of legitimacy and prestige among higher 
education institutions, university corporatization, and entrepreneurship in academe 
Additionally, I review the small body of literature developing around governmentality 
studies in higher education. The third chapter describes the research paradigm and 
provides further detail about the design I followed in carrying out this study. I then 
discuss the methods of data collection, data organization, techniques of data analysis, and 
ethical considerations of the project.  Chapters four through six present the findings of the 
dissertation, with each chapter taking up one of the three research questions. In each 
chapter, I discuss how the findings connect to the theoretical propositions. The final 
chapter summarizes the arguments I proffered throughout these chapters, suggests several 





CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
 This study sits at the confluence of four streams of literature: institutional 
legitimacy and prestige enhancement, university corporatization, entrepreneurship, and 
governmentality studies in higher education. These four streams roughly equate to the 
key categories of research on which I base the background, theoretical framework, and 
objects of study included in this project. In the chapter that follows, I review literature 
from each of these streams with the goal of positioning this study within intellectual 
conversations surrounding the changing nature of higher education, particularly in light 
of the shifting political-economic landscape discussed in chapter one. The four streams 
are summarized in Table 3. 
These streams overlap in that scholars have linked corporatization to institutional 
legitimation efforts and the rise of academic entrepreneurship (Gumport, 2005; Slaughter 
and Rhoades, 2004). I recognize these interrelationships, while treating the streams as 
distinct for organizational purposes. This review is based upon research in the form of 
books, edited volumes, journal articles, and a few works of popular media. When 
appropriate, I made an effort to consult literature outside the field of higher education to 
reflect the diversity and breadth of perspectives on the issues discussed. Importantly, this 
chapter is not merely designed to summarize pre-existing scholarship, but also to identify 
those gaps in literature this study proposes to address. The main thrust of this chapter is 
that a critical study of the development and translation of an institutional ethos of 
innovation and entrepreneurship is timely and advances our understanding and analysis 





The next section explores scholarship on legitimacy and prestige enhancement in 
higher education. This section demonstrates that public universities are not just seeking 
new resource streams—they are also striving defend their practices and justify their 
existence in an era of unparalleled scrutiny and economic uncertainty. In the second 
section, I review how scholars have approached the nature of change in higher education 
through the lens of university corporatization. This section includes an overview of work 
that understands public universities as businesses in need of new models borrowed from 
corporate America. However, the majority of the section examines the substantial body of 
literature that is critical of university corporatization. I include in the latter discussion a 
more complete treatment of the theory of academic capitalism, as well studies that apply 
its constructs. The third stream of literature covered in this chapter relates to 
entrepreneurship. I briefly define entrepreneurship and its position in American society, 
particularly following the 2008 financial crisis. Then, I discuss what we know about 
entrepreneurship in the context of higher education, including research on entrepreneurial 
behaviors at the institutional and individual levels. In the final stream, I explore the 
limited body of scholarly work related to Foucault’s concept of governmentality as 




















Meyer & Rowan 
(1977); Gumport 
(2005) 
Argues that public 
universities are looking 














origins, evolution, and 
debate surrounding 
academic capitalist 
norms and values; shows 
the strength of the theory 
of academic capitalism 
Theory of academic 
capitalism has not 
been explored at the 
institutional level; 
no examination of 






Clark (1998); Mars 
& Metcalfe (2009) 
Conceptualizes 
entrepreneurship; 
describes how it is 
manifested in academe; 
and efforts to train 
students as entrepreneurs 
Institutional values 













Contends power is 
exercised when 
universities attempt to 
shape the conduct of 
actors; an entrepreneurial 




has not been 
adequately brought 





Institutional Legitimacy and Prestige Enhancement 
A cursory glance at recent publications related to the state of public higher 
education in the United States reveals a similar conclusion: there is urgent need to 
“reinvent,” “re-imagine,” “rethink,” or outright “revolutionize” the system. Implicated in 
such conclusions is the notion that public postsecondary education is in some way 
broken, antiquated, or simply failing to meet 21
st
 century needs of a globalized economy. 





 questioned the value of a college degree (Bennett & Wilezol, 2013);  
 decried inefficiencies in university spending (Hacker & Dreifus, 2011);  
 linked college to the maintenance of class inequalities (Armstrong & Hamilton, 
2013); 
 and extolled the virtues of technology, like online delivery platforms, in saving a 
system on the verge of self-destruction (Selingo, 2013).  
As shown in the next section, in response to these critiques, greater emphasis has been 
placed on the need for universities to be more innovative and develop “new business 
models” in the face of mounting financial challenges (Christensen & Eyring, 2011). Both 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Lumina Foundation have provided 
hundreds of millions of dollars in grant money to reform-minded higher education 
organizations, usually in support of college completion initiatives, competency-based 
education, and financial aid reform (Parry, Field, & Supiano, 2013). Distilling key 
themes from this literature, there is sufficient reason to claim that public universities are 
in the midst of a legitimacy crisis. 
 Legitimacy and prestige defined. Suchman (1995) defined legitimacy as “a 
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions” (p. 574). Beyond perceptions of what is desirable or appropriate, legitimacy 
can also become a process—legitimation—“whereby an organization justifies to a peer or 
subordinate system its right to exist” (Maurer, 1971, p. 361). There are many reasons why 
organizations seek legitimacy: it improves credibility, increases comprehensibility, and 





people’s propensity to support certain organizations over others. Suchman identified 
three types of legitimacy in the organizational literature: pragmatic, moral, and cognitive. 
Pragmatic legitimacy involves an immediate audience inspecting organizational behavior 
in order to calculate the consequences on their own well-being. By contrast, moral 
legitimacy is not based on judgments about the practical benefits of organizational 
behavior, but rather if it is the right thing to do, reflecting a “prosocial logic that differs 
fundamentally from narrow self-interest” (p. 580). Lastly, cognitive legitimacy reflects a 
desire among organization participants to develop accounts that mesh with an audience’s 
larger belief system or to portray the organization as inevitable and natural.  
Legitimacy is a necessary precondition for higher education institutions to achieve 
prestige, which is considered one of the ways that universities convey non-price 
information to students and parents. According to Brewer, Gates, and Goldman (2002), 
prestige is always positive and demonstrates “the acquisition of things that tend to be 
associated with exceptionally high-quality service” (p. 28). Using the best service 
providers as examples, students and parents develop images of the features of prestigious 
institutions. “For example, it may be observed that good schools tend to have sports 
teams and impressive buildings with ivy-covered walls. A rule of thumb is developed that 
suggests that a high-quality, broad education can be obtained at institutions that have 
sports teams and ivy-covered walls” (p. 28). This is perhaps an oversimplified example of 
choice processes, but the point is that prestige provides reason for institutions to acquire 
what makes them look “right” (p. 29). Based upon this understanding of prestige, Brewer, 
Gates, and Goldman categorized three types of higher education institutions: prestigious, 





generators,” namely selectivity in admitting students, sponsorship of research, and 
competitive sports teams. Much of the scholarly work on legitimacy and prestige used by 
higher education researchers falls within a line of inquiry referred to as new 
institutionalism (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). 
 New institutionalism and higher education. In general, new institutional 
researchers do not conceptualize legitimacy as a strategic resource managers accumulate 
and expend, but instead as a set of constitutive beliefs formed in a powerfully symbolic 
environment. In this way, new institutional scholars stress the “collective structuration of 
entire fields or sectors of institutions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 576). DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983), for instance, contended that institutions calibrate to “a set of normative 
understandings for a field of organizations” that are “defined by the government, 
professional associations, and by other successful organizations” (Leslie & Rhoades, 
1995, p. 194). DiMaggio and Powell’s contribution to this theory was to argue that, in 
organizations with nebulous goals and a highly professionalized staff, coercive, mimetic, 
and normative forces trigger emulation of the most prestigious organizations. Morphew 
and Huisman (2002) further explained these forms of convergence, or isomorphism: 
Coercive isomorphism occurs when institutions respond to regulatory controls by 
organizations upon which they are dependent. Mimetic forces include institutions 
engaging in modeling the most prestigious organizations because they lack clear 
goals and technologies that suggest a more distinctive path. Professional networks 
and the communication that occurs in “invisible colleges” facilitates normative 





Meyer and Rowan (1977) similarly argued that “organizations are driven to incorporate 
the practices and procedures defined by prevailing rationalized concepts of organizational 
work and institutionalized in society” (p. 340). Ceremonially adopting these practices 
enhances prospects for survival, irrespective of their immediate efficacy. Therefore, in 
the words of Gonzales (2013), “from a New Institutional perspective, organizational 
survival is not contingent on fiscal strategies or hard-nosed rationales but rather on the 
pursuit of cultural resources that signal one’s…normalness” (p. 195).  
Peterson (2007) argued that higher education scholars were initially slow to take 
up new institutional perspectives, but interest in their concepts has expanded in the last 
decade. Research has utilized institutional isomorphism to account for “academic drift,” 
or the tendency of institutions to alter their structures and norms to resemble the most 
prestigious universities (Morphew, 2000; Morphew & Huisman, 2002), as well to analyze 
the related phenomenon of striving (Morphew & Baker, 2004; O’Meara, 2007). Striving 
often entails efforts to improve in college ranking systems, which represent another 
research area influenced by new institutional scholarship. Bastedo and Bowman (2010) 
found in the estimation of a structural equation model “published college rankings have a 
significant impact on future peer assessments, independent of changes in organizational 
quality and performance” (p. 165). Using institutional theory, they argued rankings are a 
structured form, far more powerful than a simple set of numbers, which shapes the 
organizational field of higher education. Furthermore, Gonzales (2013) drew upon new 
institutionalism to understand how faculty members make sense of their work at a 
striving institution. She argued that faculty used prescriptions from sources that structure 





to redefine their work. Gumport and Snydman (2002) were interested in the formal 
organization of academic knowledge, investigating how certain bodies of knowledge 
become legitimate. They maintained that universities ritualize categories of knowledge in 
degree programs and courses, thereby “shaping the landscape of ‘what is thinkable’” in 
society (p. 379). Thus far, only Gumport (2005) has explicitly looked at the ways in 
which legitimacy is conferred through the adoption of values and norms associated with 
private industry. 
In an attempt to identify the dominant legitimating logic in public higher 
education at a macro level, Gumport (2005) developed a dichotomy striking similar to 
Slaughter and Rhoades’ (2004) conflicting knowledge/learning regimes. The two 
legitimating logics she developed were higher education as an industry and higher 
education as a social institution. Higher education as an industry, in her view, currently 
governs the field and “primarily views public colleges and universities as quasi-corporate 
entities producing a wide range of goods and services in a competitive marketplace” (p. 
71). The main tasks of higher education leaders, then, are to enrich customer satisfaction, 
increase efficiency and flexibility, and to carefully weigh costs and benefits. There is 
constant pressure to make adjustments, such as scanning the environment to capitalize on 
a market niche or substituting technology for labor: “Doing nothing is not an option” (p. 
72). The connection that Gumport made between legitimacy and the decision to adopt 
private industry values and norms is relevant to one of the theoretical propositions 
detailed in the next chapter. This proposition underscores the importance of legitimacy 





entrepreneurship. However, Gumport’s scholarship provides only a small window into 
the substantial literature related to university corporatization. 
The preceding section demonstrates that scholars have identified the important 
role of legitimacy and, concurrently, prestige in organizational decision-making. As new 
institutional scholarship contends, not all phenomena at public universities can be 
chalked up to rational management or revenue maximization. In an era of heightened 
criticism, public higher education is looking to defend its practices and seek strategies of 
acquiring prestige as a non-price means of conveying quality to students and parents. At 
the time of this writing, no research has explored how the promotion of innovation 
entrepreneurship at public universities across the country relates to legitimacy and 
prestige enhancement efforts. This is one gap in the literature addressed by the proposed 
study. The next section, which provides a protracted discussion of the theory of academic 
capitalism within a stream of literature critical of university corporatization, reveals a 
second gap. 
University Corporatization 
   There is a prevalent line of thought within the literature relating public 
universities to for-profit firms, especially corporations. The value to this study of 
university corporatization literature is that it gives some sense of the origins, evolution, 
and debate surrounding academic capitalist values, norms, and practices. This debate is 
highlighted below, showing the divergent perspectives on whether university profit-
seeking is a positive or negative development for higher education. Some scholarship 
accepts public universities acting like corporations as natural or even necessary, using 





order to promote productivity, efficiency, and quality (Archibald & Feldman, 2010; 
Bennett & Wilezol, 2013; Flanagan, 2012; Kamenetz, 2012; Selingo, 2013; Sheets, 
Crawford, & Soares, 2012). Additionally, some research views corporatization as 
inevitable, given the new role of higher education institutions in driving innovation, 
forming a “triple helix” with private industry and government in the knowledge-based 
economy (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1997; Etzkowitz, Weber, & Healey, 1998).  
On the other hand, a plethora of scholarship has been published that is highly 
critical of university corporatization, citing negative consequences for faculty, students, 
and the public at large (Bok, 2003; Giroux, 2002; Gould, 2003; Kirp, 2003; Readings, 
1996; Rhoads & Torres, 2006; Schrecker, 2010; Washburn, 2005). Included in this 
critical perspective is the theory of academic capitalism (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004), 
which builds upon the notion of resource dependency, yet augments this pre-existing 
theory with an additional set of constructs that demonstrates how and why internal actors 
are integrating public universities into new economic opportunities. This section contends 
that academic capitalism offers the most comprehensive approach to understanding 
university corporatization. However, there is a substantial gap in the theory’s elaboration 
that has not yet been filled by researchers who apply it in their work.  
 “New business models” for universities. Many economists have applied 
economic concepts and models originally designed for the for-profit sector to public 
higher education. They liken public universities to for-profit firms in the marketplace 
because, in their view, universities competitively translate inputs into outputs through a 
production process (Lewis & Dundar, 2001). The products of this process are varied, but 





state appropriations to human resources. Scholars have even turned to production 
functions as a way of determining the optimal combination of inputs at their given prices 
in order to achieve the best possible outputs (Hanushek, 1987; Titus, 2009). Several 
writers have not simply applied economic concepts and models to analyze costs and 
productivity in public higher education, but also have contended that the “business 
model” of many universities is failing and propose a variety of solutions.  
These solutions are frequently derived from the experiences of corporations, 
including using new technologies to lower labor costs and boost productivity, 
diversifying revenue streams for long-term sustainability, and catering to consumer 
demand in order to best competitors. For example, in Why Does College Cost So Much?, 
Archibald and Feldman (2010) maintained that higher education is a service industry 
suffering from what economist William J. Baumol famously called “cost disease.” Its 
product heavily relies upon human interaction, requires a fixed period of time with the 
consumer, and is run by highly educated people, leading to increases in wages and costs, 
without an associated rise in productivity. Similarly, Bennett and Wilezol (2013), in Is 
College Worth It?, take the position that too many people are going to college and 
criticize federal subsidies to higher education, championing the so-called “Bennett 
Hypothesis”: tuitions will rise so long as federal subsidies rise. Among the solutions 
Bennett and Wilezol propose are encouraging students to select more marketable majors 
and shifting course delivery to online platforms, which is assumed to cure the “cost 
disease.” 
 Much of the literature about “new business models” for public universities is 





Progress posited that in various industries new technologies have been “used to create 
more simplified and more accessible solutions to customers’ problems” (p. 2). 
Exemplifying Gumport’s notion of industry logic, they highlight “emerging business 
models” that have the potential to expand access, reduce costs, and facilitate degree 
completion, such as the online, competency-based Western Governors University and 
those of “leading for-profit institutions” (p. 2). Writing for a conference at the American 
Enterprise Institute, Kamenetz (2012) took inspiration from Gordon Moore at Intel 
Corporation, who argued that computer chips are getting better and faster because they 
are getting cheaper. Applying this reasoning to “the college cost problem,” Kamenetz 
suggested as a new direction for public higher education developing more Massive Open 
Online Courses (MOOCs). The online servicing of many MOOCs is managed by for-
profit companies, such as Coursera and Udacity. Thus far, MOOCS have generally not 
been offered as part of degree programs or credentials beyond non-accredited certificates, 
but several observers have argued for their potential in efficient credentialing (Selingo, 
2013).
4
 According to Kamenetz, without such radical change from “unsustainable 
economic models,” many universities may fail: “survival is not guaranteed to anyone” (p. 
29). Writing for Educause Review, Flanagan (2012) urged college and university leaders 
to “not invest dollars trying to advance the existing model,” but rather learn “the tools, 
skills, and experience to envision, test, and implement new business models” (p. 14). In 
each of these pieces, the authors cited the work of Clayton Christensen, a Harvard 
Business School professor who developed the theory of disruptive innovation and has 
become a frequent commenter on higher education. 
                                                 
4
 By 2014, most observers had revised their initial praise of MOOCs as a true solution to the high costs of 






 In the Innovative University: Changing the DNA of Higher Education from the 
Inside Out, Christensen partnered with Henry J. Eyring (2011) to pen a pathway of 
change for what they call “traditional universities.” Historically, traditional universities 
have enjoyed competitive advantages and have not considered themselves in competition 
with new market entrants. Given the escalating price associated with a four-year degree, 
however, traditional universities, according to Christensen and Eyring, are at risk of 
being unable to adequately respond to the disruptive innovation of online learning. 
Although online degree programs were initially of lower quality, Christensen and Eyring 
suggested that they have improved over time, and their cheaper model of delivery is 
forcing traditional universities to rethink operations. Drawing upon analysis of two 
institutions, Harvard University and Brigham Young University-Idaho, Christensen and 
Eyring made the case that most higher education institutions should not and cannot—
financially speaking—emulate Harvard. Instead, they should be more like BYU-Idaho by 
blending online and face-to-face learning. In short: “the combination of online 
technology and the campus experience has the potential to take innovative traditional 
universities to new levels, allowing them not only to respond to disruptive competition 
but also to serve many more students with their existing resources” (p. 51).  
Thus, the two themes running throughout the “new business models” literature 
are, firstly, an assumption that public universities and industry are virtually coterminous 
and, secondly, a steadfast belief in the necessity of disruptive innovation, which has come 
to serve as something of a buzzword in reform circles. In suggesting that public 
universities need new business models, all of these writers operate under the assumption 





begin with. There is little acknowledgement that emphatically referring to public 
universities as businesses is a recent phenomenon tied to the ascendancy of market-based 
ideology. A related body of research pairs higher education and private industry, not just 
to effect change from within institutions, but also to drive innovation in the economy at 
large. This literature places universities in a partnership with government and private 
industry, forming a “triple helix.” 
 The innovation triple helix. For the scholars who developed the concept of the 
triple helix, public universities now exist as part of a dynamic, spiraling system to drive 
innovation. Emerging from the fields of the sociology of science and evolutionary 
economics, the triple helix approach developed by Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (1997) in 
Universities and the Global Knowledge Economy: A Triple Helix of University-Industry-
Government Relations, and elaborated by Etzkowitz, Webster, and Healey (1998) in the 
edited volume Capitalizing Knowledge: New Intersections of Industry and Academia, 
assumes that an academic revolution is underway, making economic growth and wealth 
generation core functions of the university. Accordingly, rather than cite funding cuts to 
higher education as evidence of decay, the system should be viewed as undergoing 
transition. One of the hallmarks of this revolution is that “linear models of ‘demand pull’ 
or ‘technology push’ have been superseded by evolutionary models that analyze the 
developments in terms of networks” (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1997, p. 3). A non-linear, 
dynamic model is required to consider how technologies and institutions “co-evolve” (p. 
4). While traditional models stress differentiation among and distance between 
universities, private industry, and government, the triple helix approach makes each of 





In the triple helix approach, universities became vital to national innovation systems and 
“are increasingly internalizing and decentralizing intellectual property management and 
technology transfer activities,” taking on an “industrial penumbra” (p. 3). Industries in 
the triple helix approach are believed to be taking on some of the values of universities, 
sharing and protecting knowledge, although their often proprietary approach to 
knowledge creation has been hotly contested (e.g., Washburn, 2005). Lastly, government 
offers incentives and encourages academic institutions to go beyond performance of 
traditional functions and creates a policy framework that supports academy-industry 
partnerships. As follows, universities, industry, and government drive each other—a 
spiraling overlay for the shared objective of innovation. 
The triple helix model can—in theory—quickly form new combinations and 
relationships among the strands, allowing the system to harness the “creative destruction” 
of innovation. These relationships are facilitated by “trilateral networks” between the 
strands, which provide paths for actors to collaborate. As follows, all of the actors 
involved must be reflexive and constantly “[adjust] their positions given institutional 
constraints and opportunities” (p. 159). Reflexivity is made difficult by the fact that 
actors within each helix operate with their own norms of communication and codes that 
can be confounding to outsiders. Nevertheless, “science journalists, venture capitalists, 
technology transfer officers, and others who have often passed through several 
institutional spheres in the course of their careers” come to serve as translators (p. 159). 
The outcome is that the triple helix approach endogenizes technological development and 
establishes a knowledge-based economic regime that “has made the distinction between 





teleological tone to the triple helix approach: given financial constraints and the 
contributions of technology transfer to regional economies and university prestige, “there 
is likely no return to an earlier era” (Ezkowitz, Webster, & Healey, 1998, p. 16).  
What unites the “new business models” and triple helix literature is a future 
orientation, calling for universities to innovate for greater efficiency and promote 
innovation outside the confines of campus for economic growth. Scholars in this stream 
do not question the appropriateness of applying business models to public institutions, 
nor is there critical reflection on what is being compromised, diluted, or lost in the quest 
for rapid change. Not all observers are comfortable with university corporatization, or the 
idea of linking public higher education with the state and private industry to innovate into 
the future. Indeed, a body of literature has identified university corporation as the 
problem—not the solution—to many of higher education’s challenges. 
 Corporatization and its discontents. Giroux (2002) raised several serious 
objections to what he saw as the pervasive influence of “corporate culture” in higher 
education in his article “Neoliberalism, Corporate Culture, and the Promise of Higher 
Education: The University as a Democratic Public Sphere.” He went on to expand upon 
this article, proclaiming the need to recover higher education’s public good functions 
from private industry interests in Take Back Higher Education: Race, Youth, and the 
Crisis of Democracy in the Post-Civil Rights Era. Giroux (2002) defined corporate 
culture as “an ensemble of ideological and institutional forces that functions politically 
and pedagogically both to govern organizational life through senior managerial control 
and to fashion compliant workers, depoliticized consumers, and passive citizens” (p. 





defining individual success and fulfillment” (p. 429). According to Giroux, neoliberalism 
is a dangerous ideology because it “[assaults] all things public, mystifies the basic 
contradiction between democratic values and market fundamentalism, and weakens any 
viable notion of political agency by offering no language capable of connecting private 
considerations to public issues” (p. 428). The result of corporate culture as a model, 
broadly speaking, is that progressive education, public morality, and active citizenship is 
supplanted in name of making money. Non-commodified public spheres, such as schools, 
compromise their role in democratic citizenship education. Consequently, democratic 
citizenship and individual agency are refracted into the rugged individualist entrepreneur 
or self-made success story—a narrative celebrating individuals who go it alone without 
recourse to state “hand-outs” or community solidarity (Giroux, 2004). 
 The public university, in the eyes of corporatization critics, represents one 
significant front in the battle to defend public goods from corporate culture. If public 
universities become corporatized, revenue generation and efficiency become central 
values. Giroux (2002) listed a number of problematic features of the corporatized 
university: 
 Corporations “brand” chairs through donations and hire faculty members and 
shape their research program; 
 Corporate CEOs sit on boards that make decisions about institutional operations 
and allocation of resources; 
 Areas of study that do not generate money, such as those related to critical theory 
and socioeconomic critique, are marginalized, underfunded, or eliminated in 





 Corporations censor research results from laboratories and centers they fund that 
are at odds with commercial interests; 
 Higher education becomes less about higher learning than about acquiring human 
capital and getting ahead in the labor market; 
 Corporate governance replaces shared governance characterized by faculty 
member involvement in institutional decision making; 
 Knowledge becomes capital and a form of economic investment, stripped of its 
ethical and political considerations. 
The effects of corporatization are also felt at the individual level, in the lives of both 
students and faculty. First, students confront a barrage of corporatized university services. 
For instance, bookstores are now operated by Barnes and Noble, dining halls are run by 
companies like Sodexho-Marriott, and student unions are occupied by McDonald’s and 
Starbucks. Subsequently, “spaces marked as public and non-commodified now have the 
appearance of shopping malls” (Giroux, p. 446). The message to students is clear: to be a 
citizen is to be a consumer. 
 Many of Giroux’s sentiments and critiques are echoed in Washburn’s (2005) 
University, Inc.: The Corporate Corruption of American Higher Education. For example, 
Washburn speculated that the “growing role that commercial values have assumed in 
academic life” are probably no secret to most administrators, faculty, and students, 
“many of whom have watched their campuses take on the look and feel of shopping 
malls” (p. x). She likewise pinpoints market ideology as the biggest threat to academe. 
However, Washburn stresses several additional issues in her analysis of corporatization, 





industry sponsorship. In fact, she questioned if academic research poses health hazards, 
suggesting results are altered to suit corporate interests or blocked from publication. 
Additionally, in light of hearings that exposed the amount of money many top scientists 
at the National Institutes of Health received as consultants at pharmaceutical companies, 
Washburn concluded: “Today, it increasingly seems there is no branch of science that is 
not riddled with conflicts of interest” (p. 233). She includes several recommendations to 
“radically reconceive” university research commercialization, including amending the 
Bayh-Dole Act and establishing federal conflict of interest regulations to divorce 
academics from having personal financial ties to companies affected by the outcomes of 
their research. Although Washburn condemns the practices of many academic profiteers, 
she also laments the plight of humanities professors who have witnessed their 
departments eliminated by corporate-minded administrators and money-making from the 
commodification of courses. The negative effects of corporatization on faculty are 
numerous and reinforced in greater detail in Schrecker’s (2010) more recent critique of 
university corporatization. 
 As is clear from its title, Schrecker’s (2010) The Lost Soul of Higher Education: 
Corporatization, Academic Freedom, and the End of the American University leaves little 
doubt about the author’s take on corporatization. Schrecker wrote the book as “a plea to 
and for the faculty,” examining “the current plight of American higher education in the 
hope that understanding the structural and political threats it faces will help the nation’s 
faculties and the broader public mount a successful defense against those threats” (p. 5). 
Corporate-style restructuring and the adoption of corporate practices in higher education 





greater commercialization of research, increased reliance upon adjunct or contingent 
faculty, and regular attacks on the tenure system. For Schrecker, these changes to the 
academic profession produced by corporatization portend a far more serious problem: the 
disappearance of academic freedom. Without a formal system of protections for learning 
and scholarship on university campuses, Schrecker suggested that conformity will reign 
and faculty will be subjected to retaliation for their scholarship. Indeed, the academy 
surrenders its critical voice and loses its ability to question the “dog-eat-dog environment 
that,” in the view of corporatization opponents, “pits institutions, faculty members, and 
students against one another in an exhausting and unwinnable struggle for resources” (p. 
5).  
 Critics of corporatization contended that the inappropriate presence of private 
industry in higher education is a negative development. Furthermore, they understand and 
portray corporate power as unchecked, lacking self-restraint and, therefore, as a threat to 
the public sector and democracy. At the heart of corporatization critique, then, is the idea 
that private industry is the aggressor enacting harmful change to public universities, 
which are cast as a largely passive victim requiring defense. By contrast, Slaughter and 
Rhoades (2004), though certainly taking a critical perspective of university 
corporatization, provided a theory that does not “see the university as being…subverted 
by external actors” (p. 1). Rather, their theory of academic capitalism “sees groups of 
actors—faculty, students, administrators, and academic professionals—as using a variety 
of state resources to create new circuits of knowledge that link higher education 
institutions to the new economy” (p. 1). Their comprehensive account of university 





serves as the theoretical anchor for this project, but there is a gap in the theory that 
literature has not yet filled. 
 Revisiting the theory of academic capitalism. In Academic Capitalism and the 
New Economy: Markets, State, and Higher Education, Slaughter and Rhoades built upon 
the concept of resource dependency, which postulates that where organizations receive 
their revenue has bearing on how they behave. Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) first theorized 
resource dependency, arguing that external sources of funding exert enormous influence 
over organizational decision making. Furthermore, they held that “the internal behaviors 
of organizational members are understood clearly only by reference to the actions of 
external agents” (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997, p. 68). When applied to public universities, 
resource dependency theory suggests that organizations answer to, and often come to 
structurally resemble, their funders. Using resource dependency as a conceptual 
foundation, Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) drew upon the scholarship of Michel Foucault, 
Horace Mann, and Manuel Castells to create the theory of academic capitalism, which: 
focuses on networks—new circuits of knowledge, interstitial organizational 
emergence, networks that intermediate between [the] public and private sectors, 
extended managerial capacity—that link institutions as well as faculty, academic 
professionals and students to  the new economy. New investment, marketing and 
consumption behaviors on the part of members of the university community also 
link them to the new economy. (p. 15) 
One of the assumptions on which the theory hinges is that universities cannot be 
separated from a global economy that treats knowledge—which is often technologized 





knowledge-based economy, they maintain, was constructed through a partnership with 
industry and the neoliberal state, whose initiatives aimed at privatization, 
commercialization, deregulation, and reregulation were at times indirectly or directly 
endorsed by higher education leaders. Consequently, “autonomy, the preferred but 
perhaps always fictive position of universities with regard to capital and the state, 
becomes less possible” (p. 15). 
 Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) developed four theoretical constructs for the theory 
of academic capitalism: 1) new circuits of knowledge, 2) interstitial organizational 
emergence, 3) intermediating networks, and 4) extended managerial capacity. New 
circuits of knowledge refers to the idea that research and teaching are no longer bound by 
traditional scholarly circles or platforms. There are now patent officials and industry 
representatives judging the value of research, outside organizations like U.S. News and 
World Report assessing institutions, and online course delivery platforms funded by 
venture capitalists and philanthropists. Interstitial organizational emergence captures the 
creation of units within universities to manage activities related to revenue generation, 
such as technology licensing offices and fund-raising offices. Intermediating networks 
bring together the public, non-profit, and private sectors through organizations (e.g., the 
Business Higher Education Forum and the League for Innovation) to solve common 
problems. Lastly, extended managerial capacity refers to universities sanctioning 
administrators’ engagement with the market through patenting and licensing technology 
to corporations in return for royalties. As a result, many managers played the role of 
venture capitalist, leveraging institutional—even state—resources to bring particular 





fore the work’s chief claim: that universities have shifted to an “academic capitalist 
knowledge/learning regime,” which “values knowledge privatization and profit taking in 
which institutions, inventor faculty, and corporations have claims that come before those 
of the public” (p. 29). 
 The theory of academic capitalism acknowledges the positive economic 
possibilities of collaboration between public universities, private industry, and the state. 
However, it does not depict this relationship as natural law governing innovation and 
propelling growth. The theory remains critical of the academic capitalist 
knowledge/learning regime, yet, unlike other corporatization critics, Slaughter and 
Rhoades underscored the role of universities in encouraging the increased presence of 
private money and interests. Rather than focus on abstract biological metaphors, the 
theory of academic capitalism also highlights the activities of individuals—students, 
faculty, and administrators—in promoting corporatization and, of particular relevance to 
this chapter, undertaking entrepreneurial activities. At the same time, the theory captures 
in its four theoretical constructs the multitude of actors involved in the relationship. 
Public universities, private industry, and the government are not assumed to be equal 
partners in the relationship, as the theory of academic capitalism highlights competition 
for scarce resources and power as all three sides respond to new political-economic 
conditions. The utility of the theory in helping to understand the nature of change in 
higher education is perhaps best evinced by the number of researchers who have applied 
it to their own work. 
 Applications of academic capitalism. The first study to apply the theory was 





theoretical model of intermediating organizations. The model was tested in a mixed 
methods study to analyze higher education associations and their links to corporations, 
which proved to be substantial. The case study portion showed that organizations are 
actively pursuing connections with the state, industry, and higher education. Mars (2006) 
used the theory of academic capitalism to study entrepreneurship centers at two public 
universities. One of the key findings of the study was that many students were 
capitalizing on state resources for personal gain, effectively becoming “state-subsidized 
student entrepreneurs.” Mars, Slaughter, and Rhoades (2008) built upon this concept 
and—of central importance to this study—demonstrated that an entrepreneurial learning 
environment is part of the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime. Moreover, 
they reinforced the idea that students can be active agents in the regime, “recognizing and 
leveraging the entrepreneurial environment, infrastructures, and resources of their 
university to their private, commercial advantage” (p. 664).  
Mendoza (2007) examined graduate student socialization as opposed to 
undergraduate students in light of academic capitalism. Based on her case study, graduate 
students held positive views of their departments’ interaction with industry. Despite 
corporate sponsorship, “socialization to the academic profession maintains the core 
structure of Mertonian values” (p. 90). Mendoza (2012) followed this line of inquiry by 
looking at faculty in a department that is within “Pasteur’s quadrant,” where research is 
use-inspired and develops new technologies. She found that their work is still “shaped by 
the traditional cannons of the…profession of academic freedom, the quest for knowledge 
and understanding, free dissemination of knowledge, and education” (p. 44). In this and 





must be understood in its particular disciplinary and institutional contexts. Szelényi 
(2013) similarly explored the socialization of graduate students, with a particular focus 
on the meaning of money in the training of science and engineering doctoral students. 
Based upon interviews with 48 graduate students and 22 faculty, she found that “an 
important focus of doctoral student socialization…involved efforts to train the next 
generation of scientists and engineers to embrace the academic capitalist, market-driven 
culture increasingly characterizing academic life” (p. 289). However, it should be noted 
that this process of socialization was hotly contested by some students and faculty 
members. 
 Although the theory of academic capitalism provided a useful analytical lens for a 
number of studies that inform my inquiry, several gaps in the literature remain. First, 
most of the studies applying the theory have focused on faculty members, graduate 
students, and specific academic units, rather than the instantiation of academic capitalist 
values and norms at the institutional level. Second, money is still the principal prism 
through which researchers conceptualize motivations for engaging in academic capitalist 
activities—with the exception of Szelényi’s (2013) discussion of the symbolic value of 
money, they do not explore the possible rationales of legitimacy and prestige 
enhancement. Third, apart from Mendoza’s (2007) and Szelényi’s (2013) studies of 
graduate student socialization, the transmission of values and norms of the academic 
capitalist knowledge/learning regime to university actors, including undergraduate 
students and faculty members, is an understudied area. Lastly, most scholars have 
accepted the theory of academic capitalism without attempting to improve upon it. This 





development and translation of an institutional ethos of innovation and entrepreneurship. 
As follows, the proposed project builds upon a rapidly increasing stream of literature 
related to entrepreneurship in the context of higher education. 
Entrepreneurship in Higher Education 
 If public universities are constructing—and operating within—an academic 
capitalist knowledge/learning regime, entrepreneurship is both a guiding value and vital 
mechanism in the pursuit of cost recovery mechanisms and new money. 
Entrepreneurship, however, is not universally understood, carrying a variety of context-
dependent meanings. This section provides a working definition of entrepreneurship in 
the context of higher education based upon classic scholarship on the subject. It also 
positions entrepreneurship within American society, arguing that, since the 2008 financial 
crises, the concept has flourished in everything from popular culture to government 
efforts aimed at economic growth and competitiveness. Much of the section is given to 
analyzing research on entrepreneurship in higher education, beginning with a review of 
the “entrepreneurial university” and proceeding to entrepreneurial activities on the part of 
faculty and students. This review of research includes a growing number of studies 
related to teaching entrepreneurship and measuring entrepreneurial competencies among 
students. The result of this analysis is that research on entrepreneurship in academe is 
growing and presently represents a hot topic in the field. However, it is also in its 
infancy, and unchartered waters of research remain in order to understand the nature of 
change in higher education. 
 Understanding and contextualizing entrepreneurship. According to Joseph 





“invention is the first occurrence of an idea for a new product or process, while 
innovation is the first attempt to carry it out in practice” (Fagerberg, 2005, p. 4). 
Schumpeter (1934, 1950) provided an often cited conceptualization of entrepreneurship 
in his theory of economic development, which posited that efficiency and growth in a 
free market capitalist system requires disturbance to reallocate physical, financial, 
human, and social capital. Thus, the entrepreneur thrives in uncertain environments and 
“disrupts the cyclical economic equilibrium that encourages stagnation over expansion” 
(Mars & Metcalfe, 2009, p. 12). In his conceptualization, Schumpeter stressed 
redistribution of resources and alteration of practices to create profit. Breaking the status 
quo and spurring wealth generation through innovation requires that the entrepreneur 
assumes some economic and social risk. Lounsbury and Gynn (2001) suggested that 
cultures of entrepreneurship develop with norms that support risk-taking, and 
entrepreneurs often concoct stories of success—both true and mythical—to assuage 
investor fears. Storytelling demonstrates that the work of the entrepreneur is not merely 
technical or economic, but also social.  
However, risk-taking does not mean that entrepreneurship is unplanned or 
unsystematic. Firstly, many entrepreneurs look for ways to minimize risk by making use 
of business incubators, entrepreneurial training centers, or subsidized research centers, 
which provide assistance in carrying out an invention in practice and sometimes even 
assume some of the initial cost of the venture. Additionally, as Drucker (1993) noted, the 
reallocation of resources inherent to entrepreneurship, though initially disruptive, 
fundamentally reshapes economic conditions. It is perhaps for this reason that Schultz 





entrepreneurship was less about disruption than about the process of re-introducing 
equilibrium after destabilization occurs. In this process, entrepreneurship represents a 
constant variable in the circular flow of production in a free market economy.  
Mars and Metcalfe (2009) captured many of these features in their definition of 
entrepreneurship in the context of higher education, which is the meaning preferred in 
when the concept appears in subsequent sections: “we define entrepreneurship as those 
activities that combine risk, innovation, and opportunity” among both institutions and 
individuals, “particularly in times of uncertain resources,” with the intent of generating 
wealth (p. 4; emphasis added). Thus, it is important to note that entrepreneurship in 
higher education is the process of taking an idea to the market for exchange, but also 
about the recognition of opportunity, reflecting what some term an “entrepreneurial 
mindset” (Higdon, 2005). Although this project centers on entrepreneurial values and 
norms as an expression of the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime, it is worth 
noting that the attention given to entrepreneurship extends beyond the walls of campus; it 
is weaved into the American social fabric.  
The United States is in the midst of an entrepreneurial moment, evident in popular 
culture as much as governmental initiatives. In print media, Walter Isaacson’s biography 
of Steve Jobs, the co-founder of Apple, Inc. and an icon of innovation was a New York 
Times bestseller in 2011. In the same year, Eric Ries published with much anticipation his 
book The Lean Startup: How Today’s Entrepreneurs Use Continuous Innovation to 
Create Radically Successful Businesses, which sold 90,000 copies and was named one of 
Amazon’s best business books of the year. Ries’ methodology encourages 





or intuitive decision-making. Most Recently, LinkedIn co-founder Reid Hoffman offered 
The Startup of You: Adapt to the Future, Invest in Yourself, and Transform Your Career, 
whose publisher description offers what might be the manifesto for the age:  
In a world where wages are virtually stagnant, creative destruction is rocking 
 every industry, global competition for jobs is fierce, and job security is a thing of 
 the past, we’re all on our own when it comes to our careers. In the face of such 
 uncertainty, the key to success is to think and act like an entrepreneur: to be 
 nimble and self-reliant, to be innovative, and to know how to network and stand 
 out from the crowd.  
Hence, the entrepreneurial moment is not merely about starting new businesses, but also 
thinking and acting like an entrepreneur. 
 In television, budding entrepreneurs can learn lessons watching ABC’s Shark 
Tank, which features a panel of investors (“sharks”) who offer capital to contestants 
based upon their business pitch in exchange for partial ownership of the company. In 
2012, Shark Tank was the most watched Friday night television program in the country, 
averaging seven million viewers per episode. The History Channel took advantage of the 
entrepreneurial moment, running a four-part “docudrama” titled The Men Who Built 
America. In addition to lionizing historical industrial magnates like Cornelius Vanderbilt, 
John D. Rockefeller, and Andrew Carnegie, the series also included running commentary 
from present-day entrepreneurs on persistence, taking risks, and out-thinking competitors. 
On the big screen, F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby was adapted to film for the 
fourth time. While the tale of Jay Gatsby, a millionaire who made his fortune through 





lost on critics and journalists. Nick Gillespie (2013) of the libertarian magazine Reason 
intoned that, regardless of the film’s success, Gatsby “is the great American novel of the 
ways in which free markets…overturn established order and recreate the world through 
what Joseph Schumpeter called ‘creative destruction’” (p. 3).  
  The U.S. government has actively supported entrepreneurship, motivated by 
census data showing that startup companies have been the primary source of job growth 
in the economy over the preceding thirty years (Haltiwanger, Jarmin, & Miranda, 2008; 
Markovich, 2012). Job creation became a central concern to the government after the 
2008 financial crisis, when real estate pricing plunged and major financial institutions 
teetered on the brink of total collapse. Unemployment soared to 10.1 percent in 2009 as 
the United States entered a prolonged period of economic recession. In 2012, Congress 
passed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act in order to reduce regulations on 
young, growing companies from making an initial public offering to investors and to 
legalize crowdfunding, or the solicitation of a large number of unaccredited investors 
(Markovich, 2012). Beyond legislation, in 2010 former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton 
established the Global Entrepreneurship Program and, together with the U.S. Agency for 
International Development, launched an online toolkit to help country partners share 
research and best practices related to facilitating the business startup process. According 
to a Department of State media note, “entrepreneurship is important to the United States,” 
which “is uniquely placed to support and assist entrepreneurship overseas because of its 
expertise and entrepreneurial culture.” Entrepreneurship in higher education grew in 
tandem with these governmental initiatives and messages from popular culture. However, 





as reformers sought language to capture what they believed to be solutions to academe’s 
challenges.   
 The entrepreneurial university. Institutional change-oriented activities and 
survival mechanisms in times of financial uncertainty gave rise to the notion of the 
entrepreneurial university. Although several scholars have employed this language (e.g., 
Etzkowtiz, Webster, & Healey, 1998; Slaughter & Leslie, 1994), Clark (1998) presented 
the most detailed characterization of the entrepreneurial university. Using case studies of 
universities in England, Scotland, the Netherlands, Finland, and Sweden, Clark (1998) 
developed a set of concepts to understand how a few “proactive” higher education 
organizations successfully changed the way they operated in the midst of the dramatic 
financial challenges of the 1980s and 1990s. Clark (2004) classified his concepts as 
“transforming elements” and “sustaining dynamics,” which, though combined uniquely 
in each institution, point to the emergence of entrepreneurial culture in each and provide 
a taxonomy for assessing trends at institutions in a variety of contexts. 
The first element of the entrepreneurial university is that these institutions 
diversify their funding base to promote self-reliance and create discretionary income. 
Secondly, entrepreneurial universities are neither overly centralized nor decentralized—
they “introduce professionalized clusters of change-oriented administrators at all levels,” 
or a bureaucracy “steering the core” through a set of rationales and overarching beliefs—
in other words, an ethos (p. 359). Thirdly, entrepreneurial universities are not 
overburdened with traditional, disciplinary-bound units, but rather feature many 
interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research centers that specialize in new modes of 





education programs, extension offices, distance education centers, and other units that 
build external relationships. Fourthly, so-called “heartland” departments that are open to 
change and attract faculty, students, and resource providers, generally in the sciences and 
technology, lead the entrepreneurial university, while those less open to change may fail 
to survive. The final element of entrepreneurial universities is intensity—the force with 
which it pursues a future-looking agenda. Clark (2004) concluded rather fatalistically as a 
result of this analysis: “The study of modern academic entrepreneurialism teaches, and 
teaches well, that, one by one, as the twenty-first century unfolds, universities will largely 
get what they deserve. The lucky ones will have built the institutional habits of change” 
(p. 368).  
Clark’s definition of the entrepreneurial university has been applied to various 
institutions as a way of explaining and, at times, celebrating the nature of their change. 
This is especially true of scholars examining European universities. For example, 
Kristensen (1999) chronicled the entrepreneurial activities of the Copenhagen Business 
School in Denmark; Schutte (1999) charted the University of Twente’s change from a 
regional teaching university into a national research university and its incipient 
entrepreneurial activities in the Netherlands; and Pawlowski (2001) argued that the 
Higher School of Business-National Louis University in Poland had transformed from a 
business school to an entrepreneurial university and “a blueprint for the regeneration of 
higher education in Poland” (p. 427). Volkmann (2004) observed that: 
the United states followed by the United Kingdom and the Netherlands in Europe 
 are pioneers in the introduction of entrepreneurship as an academic field of 





 and Germany are catching up at high speed. Thus, at the beginning of the twenty-
 first century, entrepreneurship is becoming an important academic discipline in 
 the United States, but also in Europe. (p. 185)  
The creation of new academic programs and research fields in the United States is one of 
several manifestations of the entrepreneurial university.  
 Entrepreneurial activities in the academy. A number of researchers have 
attempted to describe and analyze the activities of faculty and students combining risk, 
innovation, and market opportunity at universities to generate wealth in times of 
uncertain resources. With a few exceptions, (e.g., Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004), much of 
the literature related to faculty focuses on entrepreneurial activities in the applied 
sciences, such as medicine and biotechnology (Powell & Owen-Smith, 1998; Owen-
Smith & Powell, 2003), as well as factors that contribute to faculty involvement in 
technology transfer (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2001; Renault, 2006) and its measurement at 
the institutional level (AUTM, 2012; Colyvas & Powell, 2009). Student entrepreneurship 
is comparatively understudied, with most research advocating the spread and 
improvement of entrepreneurship training and a small number of scholars exploring the 
motivations, expressions, and implications of student entrepreneurialism (Mars, 2006; 
Mars, Slaughter, & Rhoades, 2008). Reviewing this body of literature, it is clear that 
research on entrepreneurship at universities is in its infancy, whether at private or public 
institutions, and there are several gaps in knowledge, specifically related to the normative 
dimensions of academic entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial behaviors among students. 
 Faculty entrepreneurial activities. As part of their theorization of academic 





interviews with faculty, largely at research universities, who had interacted with industry 
in the previous five years. Their sample reflected some of the demographic patterns of the 
academic entrepreneur: the majority of interviewees were male, tenured, white, and 
leaders in their departments (engineering, science, and medicine). Based upon these 
interviews, Slaughter and Rhoades identified three areas of conflict related to the 
academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime: publishing versus patenting, access 
versus secrecy in relation to consulting work, and contested ownership over intellectual 
property in the creation of spin-off companies. The authors found that, when facing 
powerful market incentives, “professors responded by straddling both worlds, retaining a 
place in the university community but also assuming the role of (state-subsidized) 
entrepreneurs who were sometimes consultants, officials, or even presidents of their own 
companies” (p. 129). Recognizing that these findings have been challenged (e.g., 
Mendoza, 2012), the academic capitalist dimensions of these areas of conflict—patenting 
and forming spin-off companies, in particular—provide an organizational schema to 
discuss literature on faculty entrepreneurial activities. 
 Patenting is the most researched faculty entrepreneurial activity, with empirical 
studies of frequency, motivation, and consequences. According to Slaughter and Rhoades 
(2004), whereas in the past only industry scientists patented and professors published 
their research, many of the faculty they interviewed believed in the value of patenting in 
addition to publishing. In fact, 60 percent of the faculty interviewed held a patent. 
Zusman (1999) calculated that, as a result of the Bayh-Dole Act, the number of patents 
awarded to academic institutions between 1984 and 1994 tripled (Berman, 2012). 





clear relationship between the uptick in patenting activity and revenues institutions 
collected from intellectual property licenses. When the Association of University 
Technology Managers surveyed universities in 1991, it found that licensing revenues 
totaled $123 million—this figure would reach 2.5 billion dollars by 2011 (AUTM, 2012). 
“While questions remained about how to best manage patenting, the practice itself had 
become firmly established by the end of the decade. If the passage of Bayh-Dole and the 
institutionalization of the technology transfer office [had not] clinched the deal, the 
revenues that were finally starting to be generated by patents would have” (Berman, p. 
114).  
 Questions surround both the management and efficient production of patents from 
inventor faculty and also—more fundamentally—why faculty patent. Berman (2012) 
argued that “the increased entrepreneurialism of bioscience faculty meant that they were 
becoming attuned to the commercial value of their work and the possibility of patenting” 
(p. 113). This value is exemplified in a number of noteworthy patent successes. For 
instance Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer’s DNA recombination method resulted in a 
patent awarded to Stanford University and the University of California, which would 
ultimately bring in license revenues in excess of $250 million. Several studies have been 
conducted to empirically answer the question “Why patent?” with two common 
explanations: 1) financial incentives for and personal beliefs of faculty and 2) 
institutional policies and procedures. Owen-Smith and Powell (2001) interviewed 68 
faculty and licensing professionals at two research universities. They found that 
incentives to patent varied between physical and life scientists, with physical scientists 





gain. On the other hand, life scientists, who usually develop therapeutic compounds or 
medical devices, expect to make money from patent royalties, favor exclusive licensing 
arrangements, and defend intellectual property. These perceived personal benefits of 
disclosing a discovery to university officials is then weighed against the costs of 
interacting with licensing professionals and dealing with campus interstitial 
organizations, namely technology transfer offices. Finally, Owen-Smith and Powell 
suggested that patenting activity among faculty is enhanced when academic and 
commercial rewards are linked. That is, apart from making money, faculty are also 
motivated by the prospect of receiving tenure or being further promoted.  
 Renault (2006), though corroborating the finding that faculty were more likely to 
patent when institutions provided financial incentives through revenue sharing policies, 
determined through interviews with 98 professors in science and engineering departments 
at 12 southeastern universities that “personal beliefs about the appropriate role of 
universities in commercializing technology are the single most important predictor of 
their actual behavior” (p. 237). Using a Likert scale to determine attitudes about 
academic capitalism and Mertonian values, Renault found that for each one point 
increase on the academic capitalism scale he developed, a professor is approximately 60 
percent more likely to collaborate with industry, 63 percent more likely to patent their 
research, and 407 percent more likely to start a spin-off company. Yet this does not mean 
“the newer norm of academic capitalism is universally embraced,” and the persistence of 
Mertonian values in light of often steadfast support of technology transfer at the 
institutional level is noteworthy (p. 237). Part of reason that faculty attitudes toward 





entrepreneurial activities in the academy. Research on the consequences of academic 
entrepreneurship has identified a set of frequent issues related to tenure and promotion, 
the true benefits of patenting, distraction from other job responsibilities, and changes to 
epistemology and research ethics (Stein, 2004). 
 Holbrook and Dahl (2004) observed that faculty receive conflicting messages 
about promotion expectations because the job now includes many activities, such as 
innovation and entrepreneurship, which have not been added to traditional areas subject 
to review (e.g., research, teaching, and service). They suggested that junior faculty are 
unlikely to engage in patenting if it does not count towards tenure, but optimistically 
noted that North Carolina State University and Ohio State University, among many 
others, have revised promotion and tenure guidelines to reward patenting. They caution, 
nevertheless, that “it would be destructive to academic values to grant promotion and 
tenure based on licensing revenue, industry contracts, or start-up participation alone” (p. 
98). Although many researchers point to the billions of dollars in licensing income to 
universities, Thursby and Thursby (2004) contended that this figure is misleading, as 
licensing tends to be concentrated in a few institutions (e.g., MIT, Caltech, Stanford) and 
very few licenses generated revenue. To borrow from Stein (2004), “Rarely do 
universities have the financial or staff resources to market the patents aggressively, so 
most of them languish in offices of technology transfer. Only a very few universities have 
ever made substantial dollars from patents held by faculty,” meaning many institutions 
spend more on technology transfer offices than they receive in royalty income (p. 7; see 
also Washburn, 2005). Stein additionally expressed concern that if faculty spend much of 





the classroom: “To survive in today’s academic setting, scientists must go where the 
money is, which means that they cannot take chances on…spending too much time with 
their students or participating in other outside activities” (p. 4). Slaughter and Leslie 
(1994) wondered whether academic entrepreneurship reshaped epistemologies of science 
and argued that “[faculty] began to see commercial application as inevitable, sometimes 
as intrinsic, to their inquiry” and “did not see basic and applied as dichotomies or see a 
broad or deep chasm between the two” (p. 184). Finally, Guston (2004) suggested the 
need to create a center for responsible innovation to evaluate the ethics of faculty 
involvement in entrepreneurial activities, and Krimsky (2004) reinforced the idea of 
creating guidelines to separate publicly funded knowledge producers and stakeholders 
who have financial interest in their research. 
 The creation of spin-off companies or start-up ventures is one of the least studied 
areas of faculty entrepreneurship. Although faculty do not factor prominently in his 
study, Shane (2004) produced one of the only accounts of the university spin-off 
company phenomenon. Drawing on data from the Association of University Technology 
Managers, he reported that 3,376 university spin-offs were founded in the United States 
between 1980 and 2000. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, many universities formed 
technology transfer offices in the late 1990s, and 554 spin-off companies were created 
between 1996 and 2001. Although the number of firms founded is modest in both 
countries, university spin-offs tend to be successful: several billion dollar companies are 
university spin-offs, and university spin-offs, on average, are more likely to go public. 
Since the 1980s, a growing share of patent licensing is going to these firms, rather than 





companies established and operated thanks to university resources. Because of the 
increasing economic importance of university spin-offs and their revenue-generating 
potential, “many institutions focus significant attention on…licensees of university 
intellectual property by establishing incubators, venture capital funds, business plan 
competitions and support systems to help entrepreneurs to start new companies” (Shane, 
p. 2). Faculty participation in spin-off companies they help found includes research and 
patenting contributions, recruiting talented graduate students for employment, assuming 
leadership responsibilities, sitting on oversight boards, and owning stock.  
 The formation of spin-off companies and its consequences on the academic 
profession constitute one gap in the literature on entrepreneurial activities by faculty. 
Research on patenting has proliferated, perhaps due to the quantifiable nature and 
availability of data, yet other areas of faculty entrepreneurial activities, including research 
on consulting, has stagnated. Moreover, there is a dearth of scholarship related to 
entrepreneurship outside the fields of applied sciences. Although it is possible that 
entrepreneurial activities among faculty in the arts and humanities is less widespread than 
in science and technology disciplines, Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) pointed to the 
existence of several “new economy products” whose creation and sale are not bound by 
disciplinary borders, such as educational materials (lecture notes, syllabi), curricula, 
video lectures, and course management software. These products are increasingly being 
seen as intellectual property, much like scientific discoveries, and are similarly 
commodified. Finally, it is worth noting that most research reviewed above positioned 
faculty entrepreneurship as a peripheral happening whose presence on university 





academy. Thus, more research is needed at the institution level to understand how norms 
associated with entrepreneurship have developed to foster faculty venture creation, what 
tensions and oppositions have developed against such institutionalization, and what the 
cultural dimensions of entrepreneurship reveal about the public good functions of 
universities. 
 Student entrepreneurial activities. Student entrepreneurial activities are 
remarkably understudied compared to those of faculty, perhaps because efforts to 
encourage student entrepreneurship during their time on campus are a recent 
development at many public universities. The aforementioned study by Mars (2006) is 
one of the few scholarly works that focuses on student entrepreneurship, concluding that 
two entrepreneurship education centers located in public universities “served as a nexus 
between the university and the private marketplace in ways promoting the emergence of 
state-subsidized student entrepreneurs” (p. 143). Mars, Slaughter, and Rhoades (2008) 
followed-up on the concept of a state-subsidized student entrepreneur, believing that 
“student entrepreneurship is an emerging phenomenon characterized, like faculty 
entrepreneurship, by opportunities for market activity, particularly in science and 
technology fields that are close to the market” (p. 638). As a result of their analysis, the 
authors developed a conceptual framework to account for differing entrepreneurial 
agency among students based upon access to university resources like office space, 
information technology, ability to consult with experts, and social capital. The 
implications of student entrepreneurship, according to their study, are three-fold. First, 
students are unmistakably involved in the muddling of the division between private 





knowledge-based economy are more privileged as entrepreneurs than their peers. Third, 
student entrepreneurship presents the possibility of new relationships with faculty 
business partners, disturbing traditional role definitions. Much of the literature that 
involves students is not about entrepreneurial activities, but rather how to teach students 
to become entrepreneurs and how to assess the outcomes of this training. 
 The first college-level course in entrepreneurship was offered to 188 MBA 
students at Harvard University in 1947 (Katz, 2003). The idea spread from Harvard to 
other institutions, but the diffusion was initially slow: according to one survey, only 
sixteen institutions were teaching entrepreneurship courses in 1970 (Vesper, 1993). 
Within the past three decades, however, entrepreneurship courses have proliferated, and a 
new course of study in higher education has emerged. The Kauffman Center for 
Entrepreneurial Leadership (2000) reported that “entrepreneurship education has grown 
dramatically, as reflected in the increased student enrollment, formal entrepreneurship 
centers, intercollegiate business plan competitions, new entrepreneurship curricula and 
programs, and endowed chairs and professorships” (p. 6). In the words of Katz (2003), an 
“American infrastructure” for entrepreneurship training has been erected, consisting of 
more than 2,200 courses at 1,600 institutions. In Canada, Menzie (2004) reported growth 
rates for entrepreneurship course offerings of 444 percent at the undergraduate level. 
Katz (2004) found in a survey that the number of entrepreneurship-related chairs 
increased from 237 in 1999 to 406 in 2003. One additional indicator of the expansion of 
entrepreneurship as a field of research is the fact that no fewer than forty-four 
entrepreneurship refereed journals had been created as of 2003 (Katz, 2003). Kuratko 





study would have been more rapid were it not checked by a number of challenges, 
including the low number of quality articles published in too many journals, the lack of 
qualified PhDs to teach courses, and the “academia vs. business incongruence” (Kuratko, 
2005, p. 589). Whereas three decades ago it may have been non-existent, there has 
recently been an efflorescence of efforts to teach the next generation skills, knowledge, 
and values related to entrepreneurship. 
 In terms of curricular content, students in entrepreneurship academic programs 
tend to complete course work in financing new ventures, marketing innovations, 
intellectual property management, new product development, entrepreneurial law, 
business negotiations, and characteristics that define the entrepreneurial personality 
(Mars & Metcalfe, 2009; Solomon, Duffy, & Tarabishy, 2002). Courses draw upon a 
variety of sources of information, including textbooks, how-to guides, government 
publications, conference proceedings, and biographies of innovators (Kuratko, 2005). A 
common feature of entrepreneurship education is participation in business model or plan 
competitions, where teams of students attempt to win start-up money to fund their 
fledgling ventures. Such competitions typically allow students to network with industry 
experts and gain experience pitching ideas to investors (Mars & Metcalfe, 2009). 
Opportunities are created for students to meet with entrepreneurship mentors, interview 
experts, and go on field trips to nearby firms (Kuratko, 2005). Not all entrepreneurship 
education, then, is relegated to classroom activities, and universities have sought ways to 
integrate experiential entrepreneurial learning through simulations and living-learning 
programs. Rasmussen and Sørheim (2005) argued that traditional, individual-centered 





where students work on teams and actually form new ventures. Yet even after 
incorporation of experiential learning opportunities, some have argued there is need to 
improve existing curricula and pedagogy.  
Gibb (2002), for instance, argued that unresolved issues remain in 
entrepreneurship pedagogy, leading him to conclude that “the correct place for 
entrepreneurship and enterprise in the higher education sector may lie outside the 
business school” (p. 259). This is the case because business schools are corporate in 
culture and focus upon venture management, business model planning, and high-growth 
companies. Gibb recommended that universities create independent centers that draw 
from a wide range of disciplines “to distance the ‘subject’ from its heroic ideology and 
association with business and market liberalization philosophy” (p. 259). Fiet (2000) 
reviewed eighteen entrepreneurship course syllabi and found that many courses lack 
theoretical rigor. The teaching of entrepreneurship, he argued, should be theory-driven 
and not descriptive, which requires the identification—with student approval—of 
competencies to be mastered. Focusing on the development of competencies has been a 
recent focus in assessing the success of entrepreneurship training, deviating from 
measures like the number of businesses created. The Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2009) authored a study that called for more 
evaluation of entrepreneurship training based on “softer” outcomes, such as shifts in 
attitude. Several studies have sought to demonstrate whether entrepreneurship training 
has a meaningful impact on student interests, intentions, and self-efficacy. Lee, Chang, 
and Lim (2005) compared the influence of entrepreneurship education on American and 





effects are greater among Korean students, where the entrepreneurial culture “is still in 
the embryonic stage of development” (p. 41). Additionally, Peterman and Kennedy 
(2003) used a pre-test-post-test control group design to evaluate an entrepreneurship 
education program in Australia and found that the program increased students’ perception 
of the desirability and feasibility of starting a new company, especially for those who 
previously had limited exposure to entrepreneurship. Empirical studies on the outcomes 
of entrepreneurship training are few in number, but are likely to increase as the field 
continues to grow (Alberti, Sciascia, & Poli, 2004). 
 One of the organizations responsible for encouraging the expansion of 
entrepreneurial training in general, and cross-disciplinary entrepreneurial studies in 
particular, is the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation. As the self-described largest non-
profit enterprise in the world dedicated to entrepreneurship, the Kauffman Foundation 
represents a perfect example of an intermediating network, bridging private industry 
interests and public educational institutions. The central Kauffman initiative at the 
tertiary level is called Kauffman Campuses. Beginning in 2003, the initiative awarded $5 
million to each of eight institutions “to make entrepreneurship education available across 
their campuses, enabling any student, regardless of field of study, to access 
entrepreneurial training.” Another six campuses were selected to participate in 2006, with 
the ultimate goal of producing a “culture of entrepreneurship” through matching funds 
from the institution. In addition to Kauffman Campuses, the foundation publishes 
periodic research on the state of entrepreneurship education in the United States. A recent 
report on higher education contended that, because “the nation’s ability to prosper and to 





well-educated population, “entrepreneurship and college education are inextricably 
bound” (p. 4). 
 The extant literature on student entrepreneurship raises more questions than it 
answers. Indeed, the frontier of research on higher education’s entrepreneurial turn 
appears to be shifting from faculty patenting to the domain of students. Future research 
may address how entrepreneurship education affects student conceptions of the mission 
of public universities and the use of knowledge. It is possible that a select number of 
students see a college education as a platform to start a business, and not an opportunity 
to intellectually develop. Furthermore, subsequent studies are needed to understand how, 
in the words of the Kauffman Foundation, campuses “instill the spirit and skills of 
entrepreneurial studies.” That is, what are the values, norms, and incentives through 
which a culture of entrepreneurship is institutionalized on public university campuses? 
Similarly, do the values and norms that are transmitted amount to a celebration of 
entrepreneurship, disallowing the expression of skepticism or critique of market forces in 
solving major problems? A final gap in research on student entrepreneurship relates to 
questions of power and privilege distribution. If it is, indeed, the case that students in 
science and technology fields are better positioned to receive resources that enable 
entrepreneurial activities, are students studying disciplines less integrated in the market 
marginalized or ineligible for resources and rewards?  Such questions surrounding how, 
precisely, entrepreneurship becomes enshrined in modes of thought and factors into 





Governmentality Studies in Higher Education 
 Governmentality is an under-utilized concept in higher education literature, 
despite its relevance to understanding how certain ideas become internalized among 
university actors. Underlying this section is the notion that public universities wield and 
exercise power when they attempt to shape the conduct of actors. Scholars (e.g., Mitchell, 
2006; Servage 2009) have positioned initiatives to promote an enterprise-oriented 
subjectivity, or entrepreneurial self, among faculty and students in higher education as 
confirmation of a neoliberal governmentality in public higher education. This study 
would be one of the few in existence that meaningfully applies the concept of 
governmentality to U.S. higher education and specifically ties it to the promotion of 
innovation and entrepreneurship at a public doctoral/research-intensive university. 
The concept of governmentality is the brainchild of French philosopher Michel 
Foucault, who stated that the core objective of his vast body of scholarship was “to create 
a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made 
subjects” (1994, p. 326). Foucault was keenly interested in relations of power and a 
concept of government that is broader than the reach of the state (Mitchell, 2006). 
Governmentality concerns itself with “government in its widest sense as the structuring 
of the possible field of action by others” (Peters, 1996, p. 83). In other words, it “is a 
framework for analysis that begins with the observation that governance is a very 
widespread phenomenon, in no way confined to the sphere of the state, but something 
that goes on whenever individuals and groups seek to shape their own conduct or the 
conduct of others” (Walters, 2012, p. 11). Thus, to study governmentality, according to 





thought, encouraging people to self-regulate or self-govern according to a set of 
rationalities. For Foucault, governmentality provided a means of understanding how 
power is exercised in the neoliberal state, where the “principle for regulating and limiting 
governmental activity must be determined by reference to artificially arranged or 
contrived forms of the free, entrepreneurial and competitive conduct of economic-rational 
individuals” (Burchell, 1993, p. 271). He focused the discursive structuration of a market-
based system of reason based upon the idea of Homo economicus, or the assumption that 
all people are self-interested individuals (Peters, 1996). The concept of governmentality, 
and more specifically neoliberal governmentality, has become increasingly popular 
among social science scholars since the 1990s (Walters, 2012). However, its use in 
educational research, especially at the postsecondary level, is limited. Several scholars 
have built the concept into titles and subtitles, but failed to effectively incorporate it in 
their analyses. 
 One example of this latter argument is Miller’s (2003) attempt to show how the 
history of U.S. universities “is characterized by an expansion of governmentality, in the 
sense of research undertaken for the public weal, and teaching that reaches into the lives 
of the populace to train it in self-regulation” (p. 898). In reality, the article says very little 
about governmentality, aside from a few references to “transferring the cost of running 
schools away from governments and toward students, who are regarded more and more 
as consumers who must manage their own lives, and invest in their own human capital” 
(p. 901). The same is true of Olssen and Peters’ (2005) “Neoliberalism, Higher 
Education, and the Knowledge Economy,” which has a section on “neoliberal 





governmentality. Its main argument with regards to governmentality is that power is 
exercised through principal-agent lines of command, which insert a hierarchical mode of 
authority by which market and state pressures are instituted among faculty. Thus, the 
academic profession is increasingly subject to a “particular pattern of power” established 
on contract, “which in turn is premised upon a need for compliance, monitoring, and 
accountability organized in a management line” (p. 325). More sophisticated and 
elaborate analyses using the concept of governmentality have been crafted, although their 
point of reference is not solely the United States. 
 Looking at both Canada and the United States, Servage (2009) argued that a 
scholarship of teaching and learning movement is taking place at North American 
universities. This movement seeks to improve pedagogy at the post-secondary level and 
that college teaching itself should be an object of research, inquiry, and peer review. For 
Servage, this movement took shape in a context of neoliberalism in higher education, 
giving rise to “new public management” practices, which “includes fostering 
competition…in the interests of efficiency, as well as forms of monitoring and of 
appraising the organization and its workers to hold them accountable” (p. 31). Using the 
concept of governmentality, Servage shows how new public management combined with 
discourses of lifelong learning due the precariousness of work. People came to conduct 
themselves within these discourses, constructing a subjectivity of “self-as-entrepreneur,” 
legitimizing “a declining role for government and business in social welfare” (p. 33). 
Through her analysis, she demonstrates that the scholarship of teaching and learning 





economic return, and “thus come to regard themselves as ‘entrepreneurs’ of their own 
work and learning” (p. 35).  
 Mitchell (2004) uses neoliberal governmentality to frame her analysis of polices 
of the Education and Culture Directorate of the European Commission. Her contention is 
that policies aimed at immigrants are “oriented towards the formation of mobile, flexible, 
and self-governing European laborers and less oriented towards an institutionalized 
affirmation of civic awareness or the importance of respect for and valuation of 
individual and group difference” (p. 391). These two studies represent some of the few 
efforts to add empirical support to the concept of governmentality in higher education. 
There is thus much room for contribution to this stream, as Mitchell noted: “With respect 
to the provision of empirical data it is neoliberalism as seen through the lens of 
governmentality that is most commonly under-researched” (p. 389). The present study, 
therefore, intends to add empirical weight to the theoretical conversations surrounding 
governmentality in higher education. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter attempted to map out four streams of literature relevant to this study: 
institutional legitimacy and prestige enhancement, university corporatization, 
entrepreneurship, and governmentality studies in higher education. It discussed how 
higher education institutions calibrate their structures and behaviors based upon a field 
that sets the parameters of appropriateness and normalcy. Such efforts to enhance 
legitimacy are designed to ensure that public universities remain comprehensible and 
retain the trust of supporters. This has become all the more important at a time when 





the ways that public universities responded to increased scrutiny and economic volatility 
was to translate research into economically viable products and, therefore, contribute to 
economic growth and competitiveness. Some theorists bemoaned the growing intimacy 
between private industry and public postsecondary institutions, arguing that 
corporatization corrupts the academy. Others, however, saw higher education as an 
industry itself, in desperate need of “new business models.” However, this chapter agrees 
with Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) that the nature of change in higher education can be 
best understood through the theory of academic capitalism. Academic entrepreneurs 
participate in networks that, due to the global knowledge-based economy and neoliberal 
state, prioritize profit-making in higher education. The third stream of literature 
exemplified the various ways in which faculty and students act as entrepreneurs in the 
context of higher education. Additionally, it illustrated how higher education institutions 
are ever more interested in training a new generation of Americans equipped with an 
“entrepreneurial mindset.” Such efforts to regulate conduct in ways that promote the 
“entrepreneurial self” embody what some scholars refer to as neoliberal governmentality. 
These scholars contend that higher education institutions are implicated in efforts to 
enshrine mobility, flexibility, lifelong learning, and entrepreneurship as modes of thought 
in faculty and students, such that they come to self-regulate in ways deemed compatible 
with contemporary capitalism. 
 Several gaps in the literature came to light in the preceding sections that justify 
the proposed study. First, many studies have explored how the search for new sources of 
revenue have triggered marketization, private industry influence, and entrepreneurialism 





ways in which public universities, in the midst of unparalleled criticism and economic 
recession, adopt an institutional ethos that builds or maintains legitimacy and prestige. 
Second, most scholars who have applied the theory of academic capitalism to explain 
phenomena in higher education have not attempted to improve it. Furthermore, only a 
few studies have analyzed how norms and values of the academic capitalist 
knowledge/learning regime are transmitted to university actors, with most focusing on 
graduate student socialization. Literature on academic entrepreneurship has tended to 
focus on faculty patenting and business creation, as well as institutional technology 
transfer. Studies of entrepreneurship at the institutional level were virtually absent in this 
review, and there is a void in research with respect to the institutionalization of 
entrepreneurial values and norms through conduct-shaping mechanisms. This means that 
the proposed project would be one of the few studies that utilizes the concept of 
governmentality to understand the translation of an institutional ethos constructed around 






















CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
 This chapter explains how I approached empirically answering the research 
questions posed in the introduction. It is, in many ways, the roadmap I followed in 
carrying out a project that contributes to understanding of how and why a public research 
university transmits values and norms of the academic capitalist knowledge/learning 
regime. Writing in their Handbook of Qualitative Research, Denzin and Lincoln (2000) 
reasoned that “the situated researcher approaches the world with a set of ideas, a 
framework (theory, ontology) that specifies a set of questions (epistemology) that he or 
she then examines in specific ways (methodology, analysis)” (p. 18). This quote 
effectively synthesizes their five phases of qualitative research, which I use to guide my 
discussion of this study’s research design and organize the remainder of the chapter.   
Phase one describes how I am situated as a researcher and the experiences that led 
me to these issues, culminating in a restatement of the purpose and research questions. In 
this section, I also provide a more developed explanation of institutional ethos. The 
second phase is dedicated to detailing my interpretive paradigm, focusing on the 
ontology, epistemology, and methodology of the study. Phase three is given to working 
through the research design, bridging the interpretive paradigm and empirical materials. 
This section covers the data collection stages, sites, and types of data collected. I describe 
in some detail the interview participants and documents that informed the arguments 
offered in chapters four through six. The final two phases illuminate how I analyzed and 





Phase One: The Researcher 
 This section represents a deliberative attempt to demonstrate reflexivity and show 
the ways in which I am situated in the proposed study. This means that I try to reveal at 
the outset my voice as a researcher and recognize my limitations as a human instrument 
of data collection. An essential premise of this section is that values influence the inquiry 
process through the choice of what to objects to study, selection of an interpretive 
paradigm, use of theories to develop a framework, and so on (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). I 
enter this project cognizant of those values. I am deeply invested in public higher 
education, having for the better part of seven years studied and worked professionally at 
the doctoral/research-intensive university that forms the institutional case: Tidewater 
University (TU). 
I came to TU in 2007 in order to pursue my master’s degree, during which time I 
worked part-time in residential programming. Upon completion of my degree, I stayed at 
Tidewater to work full-time as a staff member in international affairs and soon began 
doctoral studies. In my time at TU, I have had the opportunity to directly experience 
university life from a variety of vantage points. For example, I lived in a residence hall, 
taught courses for engineering students, directed a short-term study abroad program, 
lived with a Greek-letter organization, volunteered at the business school, served on the 
faculty affairs committee of the university senate, and worked in the office of the provost. 
These experiences informed the study by providing real-life examples of the ways in 
which public higher education has responded to financial stresses and challenges to 
legitimacy. Furthermore, these experiences allowed me to understand the complexity of 





 The decision to pursue a dissertation related to academic capitalism and, more 
specifically, institutional attempts to foster innovation and entrepreneurship, came by 
way of a constellation of micro-events. I took note of several business model pitch 
competitions—where students present their ideas to a group of mentors-cum-investors—
happening in various colleges on campus early in my years as a student at TU. At the 
same time, I could not help but peruse popular print media that claimed to address higher 
education’s problems through the ideas of “educational entrepreneurs,” who are 
purportedly re-inventing postsecondary learning through online platforms and market-
based reforms (Selingo, 2013, p. xi). Working in the office of the provost, I heard 
mention of entrepreneurship in meetings related to revisions to the promotion and tenure 
guidelines. Meanwhile, the president issued a press release as I was developing this 
dissertation topic to announce that a new Institute for Innovation and Entrepreneurship 
would soon launch in order to ensure that all 37,000 students receive exposure to 
entrepreneurship training. Although the true influence of this Institute remains to be seen, 
the timing of this press release was fortuitous, and it galvanized my belief in the 
importance of this topic.  
Given that several of entrepreneurship initiatives began as the United States faced 
an economic recession and employment crisis, my mind gravitated to sociological 
theories of university change. It seemed as though TU was operating in concert with a 
host of external forces championing the entrepreneur and condemning public higher 
education’s perceived inefficiency and ineffectiveness. These observations were only 
magnified as I continued to study comparative education policy from a critical 





entrepreneurial trend at TU and efforts in many advanced capitalist states to educate a 
particulate type of person—at equal turns mobile, flexible, and enterprising—for 
purposes of economic competitiveness (Jessop, 2008). Similarly, I saw connections 
between corporate influence in U.S. higher education and forms of education 
privatization globally. I became sensitive to the use of language that equated public 
universities and businesses and labeled students as consumers, especially at TU. 
 In addition to being a higher education professional, I am also a student of the 
political economy of education. “Political economy” is chiefly designed to convey “an 
interdisciplinary social scientific approach that studies the interaction between 
democratic politics and market relations” (Morrow, 2006, p. xx). Often, political 
economy is skeptical of the notion that self-regulating market processes inherently or 
necessarily serve public interests. With this is mind, studies from a critical political 
economy perspective aim to “provide empirical evidence and theoretical arguments for 
showing how, when, and with what consequences the use of market mechanisms are 
utilized in problematic ways to guide public policies” (Morrow, 2006, p. xx). 
Historically, critical political economy has not been applied to U.S. higher education to 
the same degree as it has been to lower levels of education, epitomized in studies of 
socioeconomic and cultural reproduction (Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Apple, 1982). This is 
largely because of the relative autonomy from government intervention of higher 
education institutions compared to primary and secondary schools. I see this project as an 






Inspiring action, whether in terms of institutional transformation or social 
transformation, is a vital goal of undertaking this research. This means not merely 
thinking of ways to promote positive transformation in public higher education, but also 
recognizing what should be protected from change and giving thought to what might be 
lost in the fervor for reform. Therefore, I approach this study not as a disinterested, 
objective observer, but rather as someone intimately familiar with, and embedded within, 
the higher education landscape whose changes I attempt to chronicle in the pages that 
follow.  
 Restatement of purpose. The purpose of this study is to critically examine the 
development of an institutional ethos that attributes great importance to innovation and 
entrepreneurship at a public doctoral/research-intensive university in the United States. 
Accordingly, this study is interested in three sub-areas of interest. First, how did the ethos 
develop and what are its fundamental values? This question allows me to assess the status 
of the ethos and its meanings. Second, why was this ethos initiated and supported by 
university leaders? Out of a vast universe of values and norms related to knowledge 
transmission, those linked to innovation and entrepreneurship were championed over 
public engagement, democratic citizenship, or social justice. This study seeks to explain 
this choice in the political-economic context of higher education today. Third, how was 
this ethos translated into incentives for faculty members and academic opportunities for 
undergraduate students? More than a slogan, the twin notion of innovation and 
entrepreneurship has entered conversations related to promotion and tenure, as well as 
academic programming. This study is keenly interested in how this ethos become a 





social relations in keeping with capitalism today. In this way, I approach academic 
capitalism as a process that affects multiple levels of one institution over time. 
 Restatement of research questions. The research questions guiding this study 
investigate the means and motivations through which values and norms of the academic 
capitalist knowledge/learning regime are institutionalized and transmitted to university 
actors.   
 Question 1: Through what processes did an institutional ethos of innovation and 
entrepreneurship develop at Tidewater University? 
 Question 2: Why did university leaders (e.g., chancellor, presidents, provosts, 
deans, and program directors) initiate and support an innovation and 
entrepreneurship ethos?  
 Question 3: How was an innovation and entrepreneurship ethos translated into 
incentives for faculty members and academic opportunities for undergraduate 
students? 
 On institutional ethos. The common denominator of these three questions is the 
concept of institutional ethos. According to Kezar (2007), ethos is the “fundamental 
character or spirit of a culture,” which “connects individuals to a group; it expresses a 
particular group’s values and ideology in a way that creates an emotional connection” (p. 
13). The core themes of a campus’ ethos give consistency to the experience of students, 
staff, and faculty, and the ideology must be constantly reinforced: “Because an ethos does 
not develop on its own, educators must tend their institution’s ethos on an ongoing basis 
and consistently work to align policies and practices with it” (Kezar, p. 14). Thus, it is 





ethos is a combination of values, norms, and sustaining practices. With this in mind, I 
define institutional ethos as the values that are appropriated and cultivated by key 
university planners and decision-makers to coordinate and normalize the activities of 
faculty and undergraduate students to some desired end. An ethos is transmitted and 
sustained through purposeful policies and practices.  
In Kezar’s scholarship on institutional ethos, interviewees at several schools 
revealed the mechanisms through which an ethos was maintained and enhanced. These 
mechanisms included creating a shared understanding of the ethos through retreats, 
strategic meetings, official departmental communiques, and regular conversations. After 
a shared understanding is reached, an institutional ethos was developed through co-
creation, or “an ongoing willingness on the part of campus community members to 
perpetuate the ethos” (p. 17). A third mechanism was anticipatory socialization, which 
entails communicating the ethos to campus community members before they even arrive 
on campus through mailings and promotional materials. Finally, institutional ethos was 
sustained through relationship building so that there was transference to new members of 
the community and periodic refreshment of core themes. This study is keenly interested 
in these mechanisms, especially the development of the ethos and the co-creation of its 
accepted meanings. It intends to highlight the ways in which an ethos is transmitted to 
university actors through various mechanisms.  
Phase Two: Interpretive Paradigm 
 The construction of the research questions was informed by a “net of 
epistemological and ontological premises,” or an interpretive paradigm (Denzin & 





research: positivist and post-positivist, constructivist, critical, and feminist. This study 
most closely aligns with the constructivist paradigm, meaning it reflects and represents a 
relativist ontology, interpretive epistemology, and naturalistic/hermeneutic set of 
methodological procedures (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). Each of these components of a 
constructivist paradigm is treated in turn below. 
The basic question of ontology asks: what is the nature of reality? For modernists, 
reality is single, it is “out there,” and it can be approached through methods so long as 
there is minimal (or no) “human contamination of its comprehension” (Lincoln & Guba, 
2000, p. 176). By contrast, this study takes the view that reality is relative, meaning it is 
constructed from community consensus regarding what is “real” and meaningful, giving 
rise to many local instantiations. Epistemology is fundamentally about the relationship 
between knowledge and the knower. Knowledge in this study is taken to be the product 
of human agents, and it acknowledges the knower’s subjective experiences and 
intersubjective relations in shaping what counts as truth. Because “knowledge of the 
social (as opposed to physical) world resides in meaning-making mechanisms of the 
social, mental, and linguistic worlds that individuals inhabit, knowledge “cannot be 
separate from the knower, but rather is rooted in his or her mental and linguistic 
designations of that world” (Lincoln & Guba, p. 176).  Thus, it is impossible to 
understand a society outside of its cultural and linguistic categories, and knowledge must 
in some measure be infused with values. Lastly, the methodology of this paradigm 
prefers to study the phenomenon as it naturally occurs. Its methods draw heavily upon 





 Case study inquiry. These methods common to a constructivist paradigm are 
often employed in a comprehensive strategy for empirical inquiry known as case study. 
This is the strategy I employed in this project. Case study has a long genealogy in the 
history of scholarly research, although many researchers doing case study have called it 
by another name (Stake, 2000). Like ethnography, case study is both an empirical 
strategy and end product of the research process (Merriam, 1998). The initial incarnations 
of this strategy arose out of a desire to understand and explain particularly complex social 
problems. It has proved adept in circumstances when “how” or “why” questions are 
posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon in its natural setting (Yin, 1994). Additionally, as Merriam 
(1998) noted, case study is a suitable design when, like this study, the researcher is 
interested in the processes by which something happens (e.g., transmission of norms and 
values).  
Although much can be inferred about case study from its name, Yin (1994) 
offered a multi-part definition: 
1. A case study is an empirical inquiry that: 
-investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, 
especially when… 
-the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident 
2. Case study inquiry: 
-copes with a technically distinctive situation in which there will be many 





-relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
triangulating fashion, and as another result… 
-benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data 
collection and analysis. (p. 13) 
Yin noted that the development of theoretical propositions prior to data collection is one 
way that case study departs from ethnography or grounded theory. Developing theoretical 
propositions helps to direct attention to issues in the literature that have not been 
resolved, while also informing the researcher of where to look for relevant evidence. 
Furthermore, theoretical propositions give some sense of the level at which the findings 
of the case study are generalizable. This project constitutes what Stake (2000) called an 
instrumental (versus intrinsic) case study and Merriam (1998) labeled an interpretive case 
study. In general, this category of case study is used “to illustrate, support, or challenge 
theoretical assumptions held prior to the data gathering” (Merriam, 1998, p. 38). It 
pursues as one criterion of quality analytical—as opposed to scientific or statistical—
generalization. Yin (1994) described analytical generalizability as when “a previously 
developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the 
case study” (p. 31). The case is thus designed to “provide insight into an issue or redraw a 
generalization” (Stake, 2000, p. 437).  
 According to Stake (2000), focusing too intently on theorizing or generalizability 
can detract from the value of examining the particularities of the case itself. In fact, for 
several researchers the focus of case study should not be theory, but rather understanding 
the case as a bounded, integrated system (Merrian, 1998; Stake, 1995). Stake (2000) 





study. He argued in favor of investigating a single case, which may well exist as simply 
one instance in a whole class of cases: “maybe we cannot understand this case without 
knowing about others; but while we are studying it, our meager resources are 
concentrated on trying to understand its complexities” (p. 436). I take the position that 
balance between underscoring particularities and searching for generalizability must be 
struck, such that the case’s unique history, identity, and operations within several 
contexts can be brought to light in ways that foster broader inference, or transferability, 
on the part of readers.  
I attempt to strike this balance through the development of theoretical 
propositions and following Stake’s (2000) recommendation to include information about 
the nature of the case and its historical background. This project looks at a single case for 
two reasons Yin (1994) raised. First, it can illuminate whether the theoretical propositions 
I developed are correct or whether others might be more relevant. Second, there is value 
in selecting a single case if the researcher has rare accessibility to observe and analyze 
the particularities of phenomenon in question. As previously mentioned, my intimacy 
with the university and work at the office of the provost provides me with unique access 
to data.  
 Why Tidewater University? This is a case study of a public doctoral/research-
intensive university. Its parameters are not limited to a single department or group of 
people. Rather, it looks at how and why an entire institution developed values, norms, 
and practices in a certain historical moment and political-economic context, with the goal 
of coordinating a wide range of activities and achieving desired ends. Familiarity is one 





beyond matters of proximity and convenience, TU is representative of a population of 
doctoral/research-intensive public universities in the land grant tradition. Tidewater 
University has embraced innovation and entrepreneurship as an unmistakable 
coordinating theme in institutional decision-making. These two words grace the cover of 
campus publications and adorn advertising billboards that extoll the virtues of “fearless 
thinking” in “sparking quantum advances” and “launching daring ventures.” Tidewater is 
not unique in its desire to encourage innovation and entrepreneurship. Thus, the case that 
constitutes this dissertation was not selected because it is entirely unique or drastically at 
odds with prevailing policies and practices in U.S. higher education. Rather, it is 
reflective of a trend and, therefore, is appropriate for beginning to empirically explore the 
theoretical propositions detailed below. That being said, TU was selected, in part, 
because efforts to promote innovation and entrepreneurship are not restricted to certain 
programs or areas of campus—the emphasis has been placed on innovation and 
entrepreneurship across the entire institution, making it suitable for an institutional case 
study.  
I bound the case in several ways in order to clarify the question: What is this a 
case of? One of the ways in which the case is bounded is to identify it as an institutional 
case made up of a public research institution in the U.S. postsecondary system. A second 
way that I bound the case is to determine a specific time period within which to examine 
the institutional ethos. While endeavoring to remain focused on a contemporary 
phenomenon, I also seek to acknowledge the fact that many of the leaders instrumental in 
the development and transmission of TU’s institutional ethos have since moved on (but 





between 1998 and 2013. This period captures the inception of many of the 
entrepreneurship initiatives at TU. In this way, the case becomes “a specific, complex, 
functioning thing” in order to facilitate “holistic description and explanation” (Merriam, 
1998, p. 29).  
Limitations of the study. There are several limitations to consider when 
interpreting the findings of this dissertation. As previously noted, the research design 
does not empirically substantiate generalization beyond the case and its relationship with 
the theoretical propositions guiding the study. Even though TU’s efforts to promote 
innovation and entrepreneurship are consistent with programmatic and strategic trends 
across American postsecondary education, it is important to recognize that this case study 
stands alone and should be read as a rich example, not as a representative sample of all 
public research universities. The fact that the institutional case is a public university—
more specifically, a public research university—should also be acknowledged, as the 
missions of these institutions may be strikingly different than those at other institutions. 
Another limitation of the study that should be considered is that interviews were 
largely conducted with individuals familiar with and involved in campus 
entrepreneurship. There are certainly exceptions to this pattern, but the overall picture of 
the case could be skewed because of a lack of interviews with individuals who are less 
active in this space. In particular, the arguments presented in later chapters could have 
been strengthened by additional interviews with faculty members representing more 
disciplines. It is possible that my research design, which favors interviews with high level 
administrators, biases my data in ways that over-emphasize the importance of these 





crucial to interview central administrators based upon the findings of prior research, 
which indicates the increasing power of these positions on many campuses (Stromquist, 
2013). There is one glaring omission in the interview data, as I was not able to interview 
the university’s top administrator for innovation and entrepreneurship. This was not due 
to a lack of effort—the individual simply could not find time to meet.  
 Theoretical framework. The theoretical framework of this study is based upon 
the theory of academic capitalism and its conceptualization of the academic capitalist 
knowledge/learning regime. As described at length in other sections, the norms and 
values of this regime center upon:  
 viewing public universities as intricately bound to the private sector to address 
funding shortfalls and capitalize on market opportunities;  
 treating knowledge as a raw material and academic research products as 
commodities that can be owned, marketed, and sold; 
 pursuing external money and profit as core university functions; 
 cultivating faculty entrepreneurship and training students as entrepreneurs as part 
of an orientation to economic relevance and growth in the knowledge-based 
economy. (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004)  
However, I draw upon works from five additional theoretical perspectives to develop a 
set of propositions that address shortcomings of the theory of academic capitalism. These 
theoretical perspectives are cultural dimensions of political economy, new 
institutionalism, the heteronomous model of university change, governmentality, and the 
new sociology of knowledge. In general, these perspectives move beyond structural or 





social reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). As follows, these propositions foreground 
symbolic projects public universities undertake for strategic purposes, consistent with the 
“cultural turn” in social science research, and they pay closer attention to power 
dynamics in the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime. 
 Cultural political economy of education. The first theoretical proposition is 
inspired by emerging scholarship on the cultural dimensions of the political economy of 
education. Although its name is convoluted, and its methods remain rather abstract, 
cultural political economy offers two important ideas for this study. First, it 
problematizes the knowledge-based economy as a material reality. Meyer, Ramirez, 
Frank, and Schofer (2007), for instance, argued that “the much-heralded ‘knowledge 
society’ is more important and realistic as a set of assumptions and cultural claims than it 
is as an actual depiction of a mundane social order” (p. 204; emphasis added). Thus, they 
referred to the knowledge-based economy as a coordinating myth for educational 
institutions. Similarly, Jessop (2008) conceptualized the knowledge-based economy as 
the “hegemonic economic imaginary of the current stage of capitalism—locating this in 
relation to the crisis of the main forms of economic growth in the post-war period” (p. 
34).   
 By economic imaginary, Jessop suggested that the knowledge-based economy is 
discursively constituted, particularly by organizations like the World Bank and OECD, 
and materially reproduced. According to Mulderrig (2008) the knowledge-based 
economy discourses, as they relate to education, focus upon performance, 
competitiveness, and skills for economic growth and social cohesion. Higher education 





discourses into policies related to accountability, incentives, and curricula. What I take 
from this first idea is that public universities may not be responding to true economic 
exigencies, but rather appropriating the language of powerful institutions to coordinate 
activities, including the preparation of individuals well-suited to the demands of the 
capitalist system.  
The second idea of cultural political economy hinges upon a key assumption: the 
capitalist system is not naturally self-reproducing (Jones, 2008). It relies upon particular 
social relations and institutions to determine its trajectory and ensure its perpetuation. 
This is where the “cultural” enters the conversation in a meaningful way. The 
“economic” is not separate and distinct from the “political” or “cultural,” despite years of 
disciplinary distancing of the three areas. This argument indicates that they economy is 
no less symbolic than culture and no less concerned with power than politics. In this way, 
the economy is always partially political and cultural, consisting of values and practices 
that are shared, communicated, and enforced. Thus, when public universities orient their 
activities to contribute to economic growth, more is at stake than simple transactions of 
goods and services for money. They become institutions implicated in capitalism’s 
cultural project, serving as vital players in the reproduction of social relations that help to 
maintain the system and guide its development.  
As Mars, Slaughter, and Rhoades (2008) poignantly suggested in their article on 
entrepreneurship training, the education of students as entrepreneurs amounts to the 
socialization of young capitalists, not because they necessarily start companies but 
because they learn to think in an entrepreneurial way. These two ideas are still being 





theoretical proposition. Proposition 1: Public universities align their activities with 
discourses of the knowledge-based economy and (re)produce the social relations of 
capitalism. 
 New institutionalism. One question flows naturally from the preceding discussion. 
Why does public higher education validate entrepreneurship as a body of knowledge and 
coordinate its activities to serve economic growth and competitiveness? The traditional 
response has revolved around money: the push of funding cuts and pull of market 
opportunities for new knowledge has produced changes to public higher education 
explained in the second chapter. However, I find this response lacking. For example, we 
do not have a clear picture of how much money institutions actually make from academic 
capitalist activities relative to their costs. Some information, such as revenue from 
licensing patents, is often readily available, but this is just one part of entrepreneurial 
activities. Information on spending related to technology transfer, research 
commercialization, and entrepreneurship education is harder to find, may not be 
publicized, or may not reach decision-makers. As such, it is difficult to determine the 
cost-effectiveness or profitability of academic capitalist activities, meaning money alone 
may not be the only or most important axis of decision-making.  
 Therefore, I propose an additional explanatory variable based on the theoretical 
perspective of new institutionalism. New institutionalism theorizes that not all 
organizational behavior is efficacious. Some practices are rationalized in an 
organizational field and institutionalized in society. Moreover, new institutionalism 
contends that it is not enough for public universities to succeed economically to survive. 





must establish and maintain legitimacy. Legitimation is enacted within a cultural 
framework of institutional fields (e.g., education, publishing, healthcare, etc.) defined by 
the government, professional associations, and the most prestigious schools (Leslie & 
Rhoades, 1995).  
 For the purposes of this project, new institutionalism suggests that 
entrepreneurship may not be required for public universities to achieve their core 
functions. Instead, the decision to develop an institutional ethos that attributes great 
importance to innovation and entrepreneurship, and to translate this ethos into incentives 
and academic opportunities, may be a strategy to accumulate resources that signal 
normalness or being “cutting edge.” The logic at the heart of this perspective is that 
public higher education institutions, particularly in an era of intense scrutiny, are looking 
to see what the government, professional organizations, and prestigious universities say 
they should be doing in order to survive and thrive. If the institutional field is prioritizing 
innovation and peer institutions are developing entrepreneurship incentives and academic 
programs, public university leaders are apt to adopt these priorities and practices in order 
to keep pace. The effect of this sensitivity to legitimacy is convergence around certain 
practices of prestigious institutions. Proposition 2: The development and translation of an 
institutional ethos is influenced by perceptions of legitimacy and prestige in the higher 
education field.  
The heteronomous model of university change. In 1994, Daniel Schugurensky 
developed a comprehensive model of university change to guide his analysis of the 
Universidad de Buenos Aires. Using Slaughter and Leslie’s (1997) initial work on 





the service university is a necessary but insufficient concept to provide a 
 comprehensive descriptor of the nature of the changes [to higher education]. From 
 my perspective, by focusing on the relationships between the universities and the 
 market, the concept of the [entrepreneurial] university tacitly overlooks the new 
 relationship between the university and the state. (2006, p. 306)  
The model he developed is based upon heteronomy, or “subjection to external controls 
and impositions—that is, subordination to the law or domination of another” (p. 306). 
Thus, two forces are responsible for the heteronomous university: market demands and 
state imperatives. Schugurensky detailed these forces in his 10 C’s of the heteronomous 
university (see Table 4). 
Table 4: Schugurensky's (2006) 10 C's of the Heteronomous University 
Commercial University Controlled University 




Cooperation with business 
Corporate rationality 





Coordination (collaboration and 
 competition) 
 
 The two-part heteronomous model of university change describes features of a 
university that is both commercial and controlled. The commercial side of the 
heteronomous university, according to Schugurensky, “consists of a privatization 
package based on a combination of policy instruments, including the proliferation and 
strengthening of private institutions, entrepreneurial management, and a multiplicity of 
cost-recovering mechanisms” (p. 306). The commercial university encompasses the first 





product of a reoriented relationship between higher education the market; it is also 
directly shaped by state control. Hence, the controlled university “is characterized by 
decreased funding as well as conditional funding” (p. 306). One of the unique aspects of 
the heteronomous model of university change is that it was developed in reference to 
universities outside the United States, principally in Latin America. Accordingly, 
Schugurensky makes clear that the forces driving university change are inherently linked 
to globalization. 
Schugurensky developed four caveats when applying the heteronomous model of 
university change. First, it is certainly the case that universities have been influenced by 
the state and private interests in the past. What is different in the present is that this 
 globalized model of dependency to the market and subjection to the state…goes 
 beyond the classic control of a specific institution by a businessperson through 
 endowments or donations and beyond conjunctural infringements on institutional 
 autonomy by the government in a particular university or nation-state. (p. 307) 
Second, the heteronomous model does not suggest that institutions completely surrender 
autonomy, but rather that the space of decision-making is reduced by external logics. 
Third, the heteronomous model is an abstraction and should not justify overlooking the 
specific context in which it is applied. Lastly, the transition to the heteronomous model 
often triggers opposition from those with alternative visions of the university. 
Acknowledging these caveats, Schugurensky’s work inspired a third theoretical 
proposition that incorporates the role of the state. Proposition 3: Accompanying the 
marketization of public universities is increasing responsibilities to the state, creating 





 Governmentality. The fourth theoretical proposition takes as a starting point the 
notion that public universities wield power in deciding was is thinkable in society. 
Decisions about how to exercise this power are made in concert with prevailing ideas 
about economic relevance and legitimacy in public higher education. However, the 
distinctive contribution of governmentality scholars is in theorizing how this power is 
exercised at the micro-level and affects the lived experience of individuals. Foucault’s 
concept governmentality maintains that governance is “something that goes on whenever 
individuals and groups seek to shape their own conduct or the conduct of others” 
(Walters, 2012, p. 11). Of particular interest to Foucault in generating his concept was not 
situations of outright domination or coercion, but instead contexts in which people have 
liberty to maneuver within a space that is subject to rationalities and techniques of 
governing. These contexts certainly include educational institutions like public 
universities. Therefore, governmentality reveals how university actors are made into 
particular kinds of subjects, incorporating values and norms into their modes of thought 
in ways that benefit the institution and other powered interests. 
 Public universities do not compel faculty to research specific topics or force them 
to turn their discoveries into sellable products. Furthermore, students have great liberty in 
choosing what to study, where to live, and how to spend their free time. Yet there are 
undeniable efforts to shape faculty and students’ conduct on campuses. For example, the 
professional lives of faculty are shaped by the tenure and promotion process, which 
assigns differential weights to scholarly activities and sets parameters for effectiveness in 
the professoriate. Higher education institutions also design pathways for students by 





knowledge areas that lead to employment. At no point do faculty or students directly 
surrender their freedom; they have the option of ignoring tenure criteria and selecting any 
number of academic programs to pursue. However, they are induced to self-manage or 
put their current or future livelihoods at risk. Proposition 4: The translation of an 
institutional ethos into incentives for faculty members and academic opportunities for 
undergraduate students represents a form of governmentality.  
 The new sociology of knowledge. The new sociology of knowledge “is part of a 
larger movement in social science generally, distinguished by a turn away from 
materialist theories or theories of social structure, and a turn…focused on the ways a 
society’s multifarious meanings are communicated and reproduced” (McCarthy, 1996, p. 
22). Previously, sociologists of knowledge—Karl Mannheim chief among them—argued 
that knowledge is socially determined. Marxist have long assumed this to be true, basing 
their analyses on the notion that people’s beliefs and idea systems are shaped by 
predominant forms of social organization (e.g., classes). In this line of thought, as the 
social structure changes so, too, does the salience of certain ideas (McCarthy, 1996). The 
problem with social determinism, according to new sociologists of knowledge, is that it 
does not account for the now pervasive contention that social reality does not exist in its 
own right, but rather is semiotically produced and communicated. Consequently, 
knowledge is not a mere reflection of some pre-existing social structure—it is a 
signifying system through which social order is made manifest, or constructed. The new 
sociology of knowledge, therefore, asks: “What kinds of symbols and knowledges are 
used and by whom? How are they produced and disseminated? What do they teach? How 





production of knowledge” and, crucially, the power that accompanies such production 
(McCarthy, p. 24).  
I agree with Gumport (2007) that the new sociology of knowledge provides 
unique insights into the functioning of higher education institutions. Drawing upon the 
work of Clark (1983), Gumport maintained that much of higher education research is 
preoccupied with the people-processing functions of universities: students undergo 
development, increase their human capital, and seek upward mobility through earning 
credentials. By contrast, Clark underscored the knowledge-processing functions of 
universities: “Knowledge materials, and advanced ones at that, are at the core of any 
higher education system's purposes and essence. This holds true throughout history and 
across societies" (1983, p. 13). Universities wield power as central locations where 
knowledge is processed:  
As educational institutions in general evolve, they develop categories of 
knowledge and thereby determine that certain types of knowledge exist and are 
authoritative. They also define categories of persons privileged to possess the 
bodies of knowledge and to exercise the authority that comes from knowledge. 
Education structures, in effect, are a theory of knowledge, in that they help define 
what currently counts as knowledge. (p. 26) 
The idea that universities themselves are a theory of knowledge constitutes one lens 
through which change in higher education can be viewed and understood. It raises 
fundamental questions about what bodies of knowledge public universities produce, 





The new sociology of knowledge is relevant to this study because it stresses that 
public universities do not simply respond to pre-existing environmental conditions in 
determining what ideas to research and teach. They simultaneously organize and validate 
certain bodies of knowledge over others and play an important role in deciding what is 
thinkable: “Higher education is seen as a major social institution that, among other 
things, defines areas of expertise that are worthwhile to society, behaviors that are 
appropriate among precollege youth for competitive admission, [and] parameters for 
creating new knowledge through research” (Gumport, 2007, p. 350).  
One concrete example of how public universities endorse certain bodies of 
knowledge is in deciding which academic programs to fund and which to cut. 
Historically, higher education institutions have fulfilled a dual role of preserving and 
developing new knowledge, and their preferred approach was simply to add new 
academic programs to those already in existence (Gumport & Snydman, 2002). Now, 
however, fiscal constraints have rendered purely additive approaches impossible, 
requiring that difficult choices be made. The decision to fund academic programs in 
entrepreneurship, for example, instead of classics makes a statement about what 
knowledge is judged valuable and shapes how people define problems and develop 
solutions. These insights yield the fifth theoretical proposition. Proposition 5: Public 
universities wield power in validating certain ways of thinking and being in society 
through its knowledge-processing functions. 
Phase Three: Research Design 
 The research design for this study consisted of two overlapping stages of data 





to differentiate data collection and sites in the two stages, analysis and presentation of 
findings drew on data in a more fluid manner to effectively answer the research 
questions. Case study seeks to provide a “thick” description of the phenomenon of 
interest, which typically means it assembles multiple types of data through several 
methods of collection (Merriam, 1998). According to Yin (1994), there are six sources of 
evidence in case study inquiry: documentary evidence, archival records, interviews, 
direct observation, participant-observation, and physical artifacts. In this design, I made 
use of documentary evidence, semi-structured interviews, and direct observation. 
Interviews provided the largest share of data, and I conducted a total of 30 semi-
structured interviews with 31 individuals. The goal of data collection was to follow one 
of Yin’s (1994) principles of case study data collection, triangulation, which Stake (2000) 
defined as the “process of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the 
repeatability of an observation or interpretation” (p. 443).  
Table 5: Data Collection Stages and Sites 
Stage Data Type Site(s) 
1. The Institutional 










Offices of key decision-
makers 







APT task force members 
 and meetings 
Institute for Innovation and 
 Entrepreneurship 







 Stage one: development of and explanations for the ethos. The first stage of 
the research design was dedicated to understanding the development of an innovation and 
entrepreneurship ethos at Tidewater University. This stage included collecting data to 
ascertain the fundamental values appropriated and cultivated by university leaders; 
identify the key individuals who played a role in its development; discover the 
mechanisms by which this ethos was communicated to university actors; and, in general, 
highlight its various meanings. Additionally, stage one aimed to collect data concerning 
why university leaders initiated and supported an innovation and entrepreneurship ethos. 
Of particular interest in this stage was understanding the motivations for adopting and 
means for disseminating values and norms associated with the academic capitalist 
knowledge/learning regime, such as knowledge privatization, profit-taking, and research 
commercialization. Close attention was paid in this stage to how university leaders talk 
about innovation and entrepreneurship with respect to higher education’s political-
economic landscape, taking specific note of references to the knowledge-based economy. 
Attention was also paid to any mention of peer institutions or the development of market 
niche. Data in this stage came from 15 semi-structured or semi-standardized interviews 
with individuals who served in strategic planning and institutional decision-making roles 
at TU between 1998 and 2013, including at least one chancellor, as well as presidents, 
provosts, deans, and program directors. Table 6 provides a list of stage one interview 
participants. All interview participants were assigned pseudonyms in order to protect 
their anonymity. 
 Accessibility was one of the challenges of interviewing university leaders. 





office of the provost. Still, the availability of some individuals for interviews was 
somewhat brief, as noted in Table 6 below. I had contact with several university leaders 
through meetings for which I was present, and I was able to regularly and persistently 
work with their administrative assistants. Of course, this did not guarantee I was able to 
interview all key decision-makers for this study. For example, I was not able to interview 
the newly named associate vice president for innovation and entrepreneurship. Beyond 
questions of accessibility, the challenges of interviewing elites necessitated consideration. 
 Hochschild (2009) defined elite interviewing as “discussions with people who are 
chosen because of who they are or what positions they occupy. That is, by ‘elite’ I do not 
necessarily mean someone of high social, economic, or political standing; the term 
indicates a person who is chosen by name or position for a particular reason” (p. 1). 
Dexter (1970) noted that elite interviewing is a specific type of interview focused on 
specialized knowledge whose protocols differ from other types. For one thing, elite 
interviewing required that I know as much as possible about the context and participant 
as possible beforehand to avoid wasting their time. It also required steering the 
participant to answer the question without recourse to strategic rhetoric or politicking. 
Lastly, I had to avoid the temptation of capitalize on participants’ specialized knowledge 
by simply asking them to answer my research questions. In the words of Hochschild: 
“Few interview subjects think in the ways that social scientists think, so posing one’s 
own analytic puzzle to the subject usually just elicits…stares and silence or stammers” (p. 
3). In this way, I tried to create enough space in the interview process to allow the 





(Kezar, 2003). These strategies complemented those designed to promote successful data 
collection through interviewing more generally. 
Table 6: List of Stage One Interviewees 
Name Position Years of 
Term 
Int. Length 
1. Kenneth Hofbauer Chancellor of the State 
University System 
2002 – Present  41 minutes 
2. William Pierson Former president 1998 – 2010  57 minutes 
3. Nancy Martin Former provost 2011 – 2013  47 minutes 
4. Nicholas Johnson Research executive 2011 – Present    60 minutes 
5. Tony Christensen Research executive  2013 – Present  44 minutes 
6. Amy Curtis Former president of 
senate; Professor in 
humanities 
2011 – Present  39 minutes 
7. Travis Campbell-
Green 
Academic executive  2013 – Present  49 minutes 
8. Vanessa Trevali Dean of college 2004 – Present  46 minutes 
9. T. Y. Patel Academic executive  2010 – Present 50 minutes 
10. Francis Brenner Program director  2011 – Present  43 minutes 
11. Dorothy Winters Budget executive  2012 – Present  35 minutes 
12. Carol Hawthorne Admissions executive  2001 – Present 28 minutes 
13. Don Roberts Dean of college  2009 – Present  60 minutes 
14. Wes Smith Dean of college  2012 – Present  59 minutes 
15. Bradley McDowell Program director  2013 – Present  25 minutes 
  
Interviews constitute a vital method of data collection in this study and, consequently, 
care was given to ensure that they were properly conducted. According to Berg (1995) 
semi-structured or semi-standardized interviews involve the “implementation of a 
number of predetermined questions and/or special topics,” which are asked in a 
systematic order (p. 33). However, the researcher is expected to digress and probe 
answers. Using a standardized set of questions requires that they be worded in a way that 
is familiar to participants and consistent with their education or socio-economic level. As 
a way of drawing out the most complete story, interview questions were divided into four 





questions. The former category were those most central to the study, designed to glean 
specific information, while extra questions closely resembled essential questions with 
slightly different wording to check for reliability of responses. Throw away questions 
could be discarded if they jeopardized the asking of questions central to the study. 
Probing questions were developed in the moment in order to seek clarification or 
elaboration of a response. Lastly, I did not use double-barreled or affectively worded 
questions.  
As previously noted, 15 semi-structured interviews were conducted for stage one. 
Interview participants tended to be part of the university’s central administration, 
reporting directly to either the president or provost. 13 of the 15 interview participants 
were formerly full-time faculty members, and many of them retained appointments in 
their respective academic departments. It should be noted that the term of appointment 
for many interview participants does not accurately reflect how long many of them have 
been employed at Tidewater. Indeed, over half of the interview participants had worked 
at the university for over 25 years. Interviews lasted between 25 minutes and an hour, 
with an average interview length of 45 minutes. All interviews were conducted 
individually, either over the phone or in-person at the interview participants’ offices. All 
interviews were digitally recorded, uploaded to cloud-based storage, and transcribed 
using computer software. I took notes during interviews to capture significant non-verbal 
moments in the interview. Additionally, I wrote a short two to three paragraph memo 
after each interview to keep track of trends as a way of tailoring subsequent rounds of 






 Aside from interviews, data for stage one also came from a limited selection of 
documentary evidence. The reason for collecting documentary evidence was to 
corroborate and augment interview data. Although a plethora of documents speak to 
innovation and entrepreneurship at TU, only certain sources were consulted in order to 
ensure in-depth interpretation and avoid unnecessary data hoarding. Specific sources of 
documentary evidence included publicly available speeches and other writings from the 
aforementioned university leaders, press releases, promotional literature, and newsletters. 
Such material culture presents its own challenges of interpretation for the researcher. It 
must be interpreted without necessarily the benefit of indigenous commentary (Hodder, 
2000). To ensure effective interpretation, documentary evidence must be read with 
reference to various contexts of production and consumption. One way to confirm the 
interpretation of documentary evidence is to check hypotheses against accepted theories 
inside and outside the discipline. Moreover, coherence aids in confirming interpretations, 
which entails checking that the arguments do not contradict one another and conclusions 
follow from their premises (Hodder, 2000). Thus, documents were closely interpreted in 
light of the theoretical framework and hypotheses were checked against interview data. 
Through such means, I sought in stage one to answer research questions one and two, 
developing an understanding of TU’s institutional ethos and how it developed, as well as 
identifying the reasons why the ethos was initiated and supported. 
 Summary of Stage One Data Collection 
 15 semi-structured interviews with individuals who served in strategic 
planning and institutional decision-making roles at TU between 1998 and 
2013, including at least one chancellor, as well as presidents, vice 





 Documentary evidence, including publicly available speeches and other 
writings from the aforementioned university leaders, the university’s 
strategic plan and follow-up reports, relevant articles from the faculty and 
staff newsletter, press releases, and program brochures. 
 Stage two: translating the ethos into incentives and academic opportunities. 
The second stage of data collection presented more difficulties than the first. Because I 
was interested in determining how an institutional ethos has been translated into 
incentives for faculty members and academic opportunities for undergraduate students, 
there was no clear limit on the number of objects of study or data collection sites. Thus, 
the picture drawn from data of how the ethos is translated was inherently partial. In order 
to approximate a holistic sense of the case and capture key themes in areas heavily 
involved in innovation and entrepreneurship, I selected three sites of data collection: 1) 
the joint provost/university senate task force on guidelines for faculty promotion and 
tenure; 2) the colleges of business and engineering; and 3) the Institute for Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship. These sites offer a window into the ways in which Tidewater shaped 
faculty and undergraduate student conduct. As follows, I completed a second round of 
interviews, collected additional documentary evidence, and engaged in direct 
observation.  
More specifically, this stage entailed a total of 15 semi-structured interviews with 
16 administrators, faculty members, and undergraduate students.
5
 Interviews lasted 
between 30 and 62 minutes, with an average length of 43 minutes. As Table 7 indicates 
below, I interviewed three faculty members who were involved in the promotion and 
                                                 
5
 One interview included 2 students, hence the discrepancy between the number of interviews and the 





tenure guidelines task force, which is currently in the process of revising university 
guidelines for promotion and tenure with specific instructions to consider inclusion of 
innovation and entrepreneurship. Additionally, I conducted four interviews with 
individuals affiliated with the college of engineering, including three entrepreneurship 
program directors and two undergraduate students who manage a startup incubator on 
campus. Three of the interviews were with entrepreneurship program directors and 
faculty in the college of business, as well as two organizers of business model pitch 
competitions who work closely with the college of business. Lastly, I interviewed two 
new staff members in the Institute for Innovation and Entrepreneurship and the president 
of a student-run “social venture” housed in the offices of the Institute. Interviews were 
again digitally recorded, securely stored, and transcribed. As was the case in stage one, I 
took notes during the interviews and wrote short memos following each interview. 
Beyond interviews, I collected relevant documentary evidence of proceedings of the 
promotion and tenure guidelines task force, particularly the task force charge and final 
report. Documentary evidence for this stage, moreover, included course syllabi, state 
system policies, university policies, course catalogues, award announcements, and 
strategic plans. The final data collected during stage two came from observation of the 
promotion and tenure guidelines task force meetings and the fieldnotes written during the 
meetings. This data was used to corroborate my interpretation of interview data and 








Table 7: List of Stage Two Interviewees 
Name Title Site/Sponsor Int. Length 
1. Lee Nguyen Professor in Sciences P&T Task Force 62 minutes 
2. Flora Harter Professor in Humanities P&T Task Force 37 minutes 
3. Tonya Aydan Faculty Ombuds Officer P&T Task Force 32 minutes 


























9. Christine Neilson Director, Prince 









11. Mathias Gruber Lecturer College of 
Business 
53 minutes 





















Observation represents one of the fundamental methods of data collection in the 
social sciences, and is vital even in research designs structured around interviews. 
Whereas in the past distance was placed between the researcher and people, today 
observation is thought to be more of a “dialogue between researchers and those whose 





through fieldnotes that observations and lived experience are translated into text for 
purposes of description and analysis. Fieldnotes represent “accounts describing 
experiences and observations that the research has made while participating in an intense 
and involved manner” (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995, p. 5). The inscription of 
observation into text involves perception and interpretation, as it is not possible to 
perfectly capture what happened. In order to increase the likelihood of a rich 
interpretation of observation, I made use of jottings, or brief written records of 
impressions through key words and phrases (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995). With the 
help of jottings, I made every effort to immediately write up fieldnotes after leaving the 
observation setting to take advantage of the freshness of recollections.  
The objective in stage two was to shed light on how university actors 
operationalized the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos, incorporating it into the core 
functions of the university. Additionally, I sought to understand the ways in which the 
conduct of faculty and undergraduate students is shaped through incentives and academic 
programs. Underlying this effort is the question: what kind of faculty member or 
undergraduate student is being cultivated at an institution that is actively promoting and 
building an identity around innovation and entrepreneurship? Thus, stage two took up the 
third research question.  
 Summary of Stage Two Data Collection 
 15 semi-structured interviews with members of the promotion and tenure 
guidelines task force; Institute for Innovation and Entrepreneurship; as 
well as faculty and staff in the colleges of business and engineering. 






 Direct observation of task force meetings. 
 Throughout the two stages of data collection, several themes were pursued and 
given particular attention. One of these themes is how various participants define and 
understand entrepreneurship and its relation to the values of the university. The second 
theme is reasons provided by participants to explain the promotion and importance of 
entrepreneurship in campus activities. Included in this theme was any mention of 
resources, revenues, peer institutions, and challenges to the operations of public 
postsecondary institutions. The final theme of interest is efforts on the part of university 
leaders to encourage faculty members and undergraduate students to think and behave in 
certain ways through the creation of incentives and sanctioning of knowledge via 
academic programming.  
Phase Four: Data Organization and Analysis 
 Yin (1994) maintained that analysis of case study evidence is one of the least 
developed and most difficult aspects of the strategy. “Unlike statistical analysis, there are 
few fixed formulas or cookbook recipes to guide the novice…Instead, much depends on 
an investigator’s own style of rigorous thinking, along with the sufficient presentation of 
evidence and careful consideration of alternative explanations” (p. 102-3). Data was 
organized into a database that includes: fieldnotes, documentary evidence, interview 
transcripts, and memos. The strategy for data analysis, drawing upon Yin (1994), was to 
closely read in light of the theoretical propositions that led to the case study. These 
propositions help to decide which data merited attention and which could be ignored. I 
agree with Edwards (2013) that data analysis in qualitative research is an iterative process 





both induction and deduction, raising data to a higher level of abstraction, while 
attempting to forge and verify theory. 
 The main goal of data analysis was to pattern match (Yin, 1994). This means that 
I looked for patterns in the data and compared these to the theoretical propositions. This 
task sought to discover convergence and divergence between data and theory. However, 
identifying patterns, taking note of convergence, and, ultimately, making conclusions 
required a rigorous, systematic approach to analysis. I made use of Miles and 
Huberman’s (1994) three-part approach, consisting of: 1) data reduction; 2) data display; 
and 3) drawing/verifying conclusions. 
 Data reduction. According to Miles and Huberman (1994), the reduction process 
happens throughout data analysis. Initially, reduction takes shape in editing and 
segmenting texts so that they can be easily read. In later stages, the most important means 
of data reduction is coding. Coding is the process of assigning tags, names, or labels to 
chunks of data (Punch, 2009). Ryan and Bernard (2000) usefully listed at least three steps 
in coding: sampling, building codebooks, and marking texts for drawing conclusions. 
Sampling refers to choosing the corpus of texts being analyzed and determining the unit 
of analysis (word, phrase, sentence, etc.). In this study, the texts being analyzed included 
documentary evidence, interview transcripts, and fieldnotes. I elected to use phrases and 
sentences as the unit of analysis in order to avoid over-decontextualizing the data. Before 
developing a codebook, I used descriptive or in-vivo codes to get a feel for the data 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). I then deductively built a codebook with the help of existing 





limited to a single round. Rather, I coded the entire set of data each time I sought answers 
to the research questions.  
During the coding process, I wrote up initial ideas in order to pinpoint 
relationships between codes (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Miles 
and Huberman (1994) called this a memo: 
A memo is the theorizing write-up of ideas about codes and their relationships as 
 they strike the analyst while coding…it can be a sentence, a paragraph or a few 
 pages…it exhausts the analyst’s momentary ideation based on data with 
 perhaps a little conceptual elaboration. (p. 72) 
I used several notebooks to memo, which proved to be the most important means of 
organizing my ideas. Memos formed the building blocks of the outlines from which I 
wrote chapters four through six, which present the main findings of data analysis. 
 Displaying data. The second part of the data analysis approach I took is 
displaying the data. Data displays help to organize and summarize the often voluminous 
amount of data, even in segmented form. The main display techniques I employed was a 
critical events timeline. According to Miles and Huberman (1994) a critical events 
timeline chronologically orders events and the actors involved in them. It typically 
includes only the most important events that are relevant to the case. A critical events 
timeline is useful because it can illustrate the moments in which data points cluster 
around particular events or actors, suggesting the need for further analysis to understand 
the importance of that moment to the case (Edwards, 2013).  
 Drawing conclusions. The drawing of final conclusions in qualitative research 





analysis approach was only possible once the data had been reduced and organized in 
displays, although many conclusions arose from earlier stages of analysis via memos 
(Punch, 2009). An important step in drawing conclusions was also to consider rival 
explanations and show that the patterns do not substantiate such claims. For the purposes 
of this study, conclusions were intended to be answers or explanations to the “how” and 
“why” research questions posed at the outset of this chapter. By following this iterative 
process, which allows for both inductive and deductive reasoning, I attempted to develop 
a set of explanations for the advent of innovation and entrepreneurship as a guiding ethos 
at TU. The explanations that are proffered are, by design, tentative because they are 
based on a single case. However, they suggest a possible line of inquiry for additional 
research.  
 Quality dimensions. Denzin and Lincoln (2000), in describing the constructivist 
paradigm, indicated that qualitative researchers use as criteria of quality terms such as 
credibility, transferability, dependability, confirmability, and authenticity, in lieu of the 
validity or objectivity conceptualizations common in positivist paradigms. Credibility is 
the constructivist equivalent of validity, and Mertens (2005) defined it as correspondence 
between what participants say in the course of data collection and how their responses are 
interpreted and portrayed by the researcher. As previously noted, the best means of 
improving the credibility of a case study is through triangulation. Beyond triangulation, I 
increased the credibility of this study by sharing my data analysis and explanations with a 
peer and sharing interpretations with select interview participants for feedback. 
 I consider the next two criteria of quality—transferability and dependability—to 





transferability and dependability are concepts I took seriously. Transferability is 
effectively concerned with the extent to which explanations can be applied in other 
situations, which is an essential step in achieving true analytical generalization (Mertens, 
2005). The ability to make such inferences is left to the reader based upon the strength of 
the case study write-up and the detail provided. Analytical generalization is only possible 
through replication. Therefore, dependability, or being transparent and clear in explaining 
the data and its collection, organization, and analysis, is essential so that other researchers 
can make judgments about the appropriateness of the research design in addressing the 
questions at hand. One means through which I enhance dependability was to construct a 
case study database (Yin, 1994). 
 The last two criteria of quality are confirmability and authenticity. In many ways, 
the need for confirmability goes without saying—it should be a requirement in any 
research design that claims are based upon empirical materials. The tactics I used to 
ensure confirmability were to cite pieces of data and, when appropriate, make frequent 
use of direct quotations from participants to support my conclusions. Secondly, 
borrowing from Yin (1994), I intended to expose the logic by which I arrived at 
conclusions through a chain of evidence (e.g., “text excerpts led to these themes, which 
were related to other themes, and yielded the following conclusions”). Authenticity asks 
whether the researcher considered and reported all evidence and considered several 
viewpoints in constructing their interpretation. Authenticity should not be confused with 
objectivity, which is purposefully abandoned in constructivist paradigms. Instead, it calls 
on the researcher to be balanced and diligently report data that conflicts with theoretical 





remain true to the data, even if it means refuting my scholarly inclinations and theoretical 
propositions.  
 In the end, one of the most important dimensions of quality I used to evaluate this 
study is derived from a question posed by Lincoln and Guba (2000): “Are these findings 
sufficiently authentic that I may trust myself in acting on their implications? More to the 
point, would I feel sufficiently secure about these findings to construct social policy or 
legislation based on them?” (p. 178). Recognizing that no research design can deliver 
absolute truth, I was motivated by the desire to trigger action based on this project, which 
demanded rigorous application of the aforementioned methods and constant reflection on 
credibility, transferability, dependability, confirmability, and authenticity.   
 Counter-evidence. In this design, I also gave thought to what might disprove my 
theoretical propositions. For example, data that would raise significant questions with 
respect to the theory of academic capitalism would de-emphasize the influence of 
administrators and, in general, the upper tier of university leadership in initiating and 
supporting the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos. That is, if data points to the role of 
student or faculty member demand, signaling that innovation and entrepreneurship 
“bubbled up” as important values and practices, my theoretical foundation of this study 
would require revision. A similar rethinking would be occasioned by the strong presence 
of social good, instead of money, as a motivation for entrepreneurial activities. For 
instance, if interview participants resoundingly pointed to the desire to serve humanity 
through entrepreneurship and not generate revenue, academic capitalist explanations 
would be weakened. Looking at the first proposition, the applicability of cultural political 





knowledge-based economy as a justification for their practices and if there was not an 
effort to instrumentalize the education of students to serve economic growth and capital 
accumulation. 
 With regard to the second theoretical proposition, derived from new 
institutionalism, counter evidence that would require alternative explanations includes 
interview participants disregarding the influence of rankings or institutional peers and 
even indicating signs of indifference to prestigious institutions in determining 
organizational values, norms, and practices. One type of counter evidence related to the 
third theoretical proposition on the heteronomous model of university change would be 
clear signs that market forces alone condition public universities, resulting in numerous 
commercial manifestations. The absence of the state’s role in innovation and 
entrepreneurship would undermine the usefulness of this theoretical proposition. 
 Governmentality, the subject of the fourth theoretical proposition, would be 
difficult to confirm if TU showed no interest in shaping the conduct of faculty members 
and undergraduate students. If entrepreneurship was not translated into incentives on 
campus, and if the entrepreneurial mindset had only a minor part to play in this case 
study, governmentality would be less germane. Lastly, counter evidence for the fifth 
proposition would center on Tidewater taking a rather localist view of its operations. That 
is, it would be difficult to argue the fifth proposition if evidence demonstrated that TU 
did not believe its decisions affected the dispositions and behaviors of society writ large. 
Although this counter evidence is difficult to ascertain because it is often predicated on 





 Ethics. Most qualitative researchers interact with and, at times, are members in 
the communities they study. As such, they are inherently intrusive and involved in the 
lives of interview participants. This description certainly applied to me, as a researcher 
deeply situated in the case I investigated. There were both rich opportunities for data 
collection in this arrangement, as well as scenarios fraught with possibilities for harm. 
Beyond adhering to the basic premise of “do-no-harm” research, I implemented several 
steps to ensure the study is ethical. First, I guaranteed that participants (not informants) 
take part in interviews voluntarily, following the rules of informed consent. To this end, 
an application was submitted to my university’s institutional review board (IRB), which 
required the development of an informed consent form for all research involving human 
subjects. All participants signed an informed consent form, which were electronically 
stored. The informed consent form explains the study and seeks to demystify its purpose 
and methodology. It specifically asks if participants agree to being digitally recorded. 
Moreover, the consent form clearly states that confidentially will be maintained at all 
times. 
 Confidentiality was especially important in this study because I interviewed 
university leaders, many of whom must answer to various stakeholders and constituents, 
including the state legislature. One of the ways in which I maintain confidentiality was to 
assign the institution a pseudonym and, when possible, give generic names to programs 
and departments so that readers cannot identify participants. Furthermore, all of the 
participants were given a pseudonym, and their true identities were only accessible 
through the original interview transcriptions, which were saved on a password-protected 





express themselves without fear of their opinions being used against them. I then made 
every effort to conceal the identities of participants to help build trust and ensure that 
conducting this study improves higher education without compromising the livelihoods 
of those who helped me. Finally, it is worth noting that an ethical commitment to action 
permeates this study. Thus, part of what makes this project ethical is that is designed to 
inform decision-makers and truly make a difference in deciding what public higher 
education should look like in the coming years.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter explains my roadmap for empirically answering the research 
questions of this dissertation. These questions were developed based upon an interpretive 
paradigm anchored in constructivism. Based upon the process and explanation-oriented 
nature of the research questions, I selected case study as a comprehensive research 
strategy. I outlined in this chapter my rationale for conducting a single institutional case 
study of Tidewater University and its development and translation of an institutional 
ethos that centers on innovation and entrepreneurship. Data collection methods aligned 
with case study inquiry and included finding relevant documentary evidence, 
interviewing university actors, and directly observing sites where innovation and 
entrepreneurship are translated into incentives and academic opportunities for faculty 
members and undergraduate students. This chapter also provided a detailed discussion of 
the techniques through which I analyzed the data, as well as the various means through 





CHAPTER FOUR: MEANINGS AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE ETHOS 
 
Every president comes in and wants to make a mark in some way. I think this is [our 
president’s] thing. This the flag he wants to put in the ground. 
-Staff person  
 
Who doesn’t like innovation and entrepreneurship? Translating it from a buzzword into 
something actionable is kind of the difficulty. 
-Research executive 
Introduction 
This chapter addresses the first research question: through what processes did the 
innovation and entrepreneurship ethos develop at Tidewater University? As I collected 
data, it became clear that this question ultimately entailed two tasks, which informed the 
organization of the chapter. The first task was to better understand the nature of the ethos 
and its status at TU. I employ interview data and select documentary evidence to present 
the meanings of innovation and entrepreneurship and how these concepts are understood 
by various actors at Tidewater. With this foundation, I shed light on several core values 
that underlie the ethos, consistent with the definition of institutional ethos elaborated in 
previous chapters. Analysis reveals that disparity in the meanings ascribed to innovation 
and entrepreneurship, as the ethos continues to undergo development. Moreover, 
conceptualizations rely upon a preponderance of language and examples taken from the 
for-profit sector. Despite efforts to conceptualize entrepreneurship as a process and 
mindset that are applicable to the non-profit sector and to government, meanings showed 
a bias towards consumer product formation and company building as intended outcomes. 
In the end, this chapter argues that the ethos remains a project under construction, 





 The second task was to pinpoint through interview data the principal sites in 
which these meanings of innovation and entrepreneurship are being crafted, as well as 
where on campus the underlying values are commonly communicated. I group these sites 
by their administrative homes, yielding three groups: the college of engineering, the 
college of business, and the offices of the president and provost. The origin of a few 
illuminating sites within each group is treated in turn, attempting to demonstrate an 
approximate chronology of development covering several years, primarily between 1998 
and 2013. Entrepreneurial programs and initiatives were spearheaded by a surprisingly 
small group of individuals, and I highlight those people who were frequently mentioned 
in interviews as instrumental in championing the emerging innovation and 
entrepreneurship ethos.  
 Upon closer examination of the findings, it becomes apparent that sites 
responsible for helping to create and perpetuate the ethos are concentrated in the colleges 
of business and engineering. Recently, central administrative offices have also 
contributed to the campus-wide promotion of the ethos, transforming it into an 
institutional priority and marketing campaign under the slogan “Fearless Thinking.” 
Many new programs in this campus-wide orientation reflect a trend towards teaching 
entrepreneurship to undergraduate students. Just as important as where the ethos is found 
is where it is absent. The humanities are on the margins of the ethos, based upon its 
intended outcomes. Perhaps the most striking theme that emerged from the data is that 
the ethos can largely be traced back to the ambitions of administrators, many of whom 
are engineers by training and profession. Although there is a desire to make innovation 





faculty members writ large. Accordingly, this chapter argues that the ethos has been a 
top-down initiative that was devised centrally and not through popular will or 
mechanisms of shared governance. 
 The remainder of the chapter is divided into two sections, one for each of the 
aforementioned tasks. The first section charts the meanings and values that comprise the 
innovation and entrepreneurship ethos, while the second section chronicles the 
development of the ethos based upon the places and people that brought it into existence. 
At the conclusion of the chapter, I discuss how the findings relate to the theoretical 
propositions elaborated in chapter three. Although this chapter mainly serves as context 
and a launching point for answering the remaining two research questions, the findings 
speak to theory, especially the theory of academic capitalism. In particular, this chapter 
shows Tidewater’s treatment of knowledge as a raw material and exemplifies constructs 
of the theory, such as interstitial organizational emergence. The next section begins by 
revisiting the definition of institutional ethos I developed, before proceeding on to 
meanings of innovation and entrepreneurship.  
Nature and Status of the Ethos 
 Revisiting institutional ethos. For the purposes of this dissertation, I build upon 
Kezar’s (2007) work to define institutional ethos as the values that are appropriated and 
cultivated by key university planners and decision-makers to coordinate and normalize 
the activities of faculty and undergraduate students to some desired end. An ethos serves 
as a philosophy that guides the construction of institutional identity. While it emerges 
gradually, it seeks to be pervasive and lasting, finding sustenance through purposeful 





of a particular group’s values and is often intended to provide consistency to the 
experience of students, faculty, and staff. Importantly, an ethos resembles ideology in that 
it must be regularly reinforced, and the institution’s policies and practices must align with 
it. This chapter centers upon what, precisely, the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos is 
and which individuals labored to bring it to fruition as an expression of certain values 
about knowledge production and the mission of the university in the 21
st
 century. The 
question of how the ethos has been translated for the purposes of reinforcement—as well 
as the implications of these efforts—is left to later chapters. Interview participants and 
documentary evidence provided an array of meanings of innovation and 
entrepreneurship, which show the contours of the ethos and allow for the distillation of 
the values as they are crafted and circulated at Tidewater University. 
 Meanings of innovation. This subsection demonstrates that innovation proved to 
be a contentious concept among interview participants, and the few concrete 
conceptualizations displayed a diversity of viewpoints. Some interview participants 
understood innovation only in connection with or comparison to entrepreneurship, as if it 
had no meaning by itself. For a few faculty members, innovation was a source of 
contempt because they believed their entire careers had been predicated on being 
innovative and, therefore, the elevation of the concept to a “buzzword” undermined their 
longstanding contributions to the advancement of knowledge. Perhaps the only pattern 
that emerged in the meanings of innovation was that it was attached to entrepreneurship 
for strategic purposes. The process of attaching innovation to entrepreneurship clouded 
the concept’s meaning, in the eyes of some interview participants, rendering it either 





consensus that innovation is inherent to universities and the academic profession, yet 
entrepreneurship was a recent development. Some mention was made of innovation in 
teaching or instruction, often accompanied by discussion of online delivery platforms, 
resulting in strong reactions from a few interview participants. 
 One of the basic meanings of innovation came from Tidewater’s president 
between 1998 and 2010, William Pierson. For Pierson, a former professor of mechanical 
engineering, “the essence of innovation is successful implementation, usually new 
implementation.” He eschewed what he called the “narrow boxes” in which people place 
innovation, explaining: “When someone says, I’m going to be an innovator, that person’s 
idea of innovation might be very narrow. It means they might create new widgets of some 
kind. That could be an innovation, but it’s not the essence of innovation.” As a way of 
further clarifying his understanding, Pierson contrasted innovation with invention, the 
essence of which “is the realization of ideas.” Don Roberts, a dean of one of the colleges 
since 2009, similarly distinguished innovation from invention. “Anybody can invent 
anything. You and I can sit here and argue about some problem, and you and I can each 
come up with an idea, but neither one might sell.” Thus, in Roberts’ view, innovation was 
about “the process of turning something into value.” He summarized his 
conceptualization as follows: “Innovation in my sense is more than invention. It is about 
the process that makes some software product or other product valuable, affordable, 
reliable, and that some customer wants to purchase it.” Roberts’ approach to innovation is 
unique in that it closely resembled many other interview participants’ description of 
entrepreneurship. In this way, Roberts’ comments introduce an important finding that 





entrepreneurship, vacillating between broad, abstract meanings and meanings clearly 
grounding the concepts in the world of free market enterprise. 
 In many instances, interview participants conflated innovation and 
entrepreneurship, or used the concepts interchangeably. To some degree, this conflation 
is attributable to what many saw as the strategic linking of innovation and 
entrepreneurship, such that the two concepts were considered an indissoluble pair. There 
was a pervasive belief that university leaders consciously linked the two in order to make 
entrepreneurship more palatable. Keith Meyers, who has managed an entrepreneurship-
themed living-learning program since 2004, reflected:  
 I think we tend to add innovation to make it more acceptable to certain schools 
 and certain faculty…for fear that entrepreneurship might be viewed as 
 synonymous with a for-profit venture exclusively. So, there is the need to try and 
 title things and promote things, while entrepreneurship alone would arguably fit 
 the bill. 
In this way, innovation was attached to entrepreneurship to make it seem “larger than a 
for-profit venture.” One professor in the sciences, who works part-time directing faculty 
leadership initiatives for Tidewater, traced the decision to pair innovation and 
entrepreneurship back to the office of the president and board of trustees:  
 I don’t know why the administration chose to pair innovation and 
 entrepreneurship. Well, it might have come from [the trustees] in their guidelines 
 about what ought to be considered in tenure cases. I think they had the 
 phrase…. I’m not sure where it came from. It came from above my pay grade. 





innovation and entrepreneurship came from highest levels of university leadership, there 
was no record pointing to a particular moment when the decision was made. I revisit the 
role of key university planners and decision-makers in initiating and supporting 
entrepreneurship programs later in the chapter. 
 Among a small number of interview participants, the pairing of innovation and 
entrepreneurship made perfect sense. The director of the college of engineering’s 
entrepreneurship center, the Tidewater Technology Enterprise Collaborative (TTEC), 
explicated: “For us [engineers], innovation always leads to entrepreneurship.” Yet, he 
acknowledged that “there’s lots of parts of campus where innovation is not a precursor to 
entrepreneurship. You know, in the school of dance [innovation] is a different thing.” On 
the other hand, several interview participants took issue with the pairing of innovation 
and entrepreneurship. Keith Meyers believed that “there’s lots of entrepreneurial ventures 
that are not innovative, and I think the bulk of them are…service based things. They add 
value and they’re significant and meaningful, but I have a hard time saying they’re highly 
creative.” When asked what connotation came to mind when innovation and 
entrepreneurship were used in tandem, an academic executive replied: “It’s that 
connotation that is attached to entrepreneurship, that people should be out there somehow 
creating businesses and making money. I think that gives innovation a shaded meaning. 
Einstein was very innovative. I doubt he ever thought about making money.” The desire 
to separate innovation from entrepreneurship emerged emphatically among those who 
saw innovation as inherent to academe. 
 At least two interview participants expressed contempt at the prevailing campus 





entrepreneurship is very misleading” opined Lee Nguyen, professor in the sciences, 
because it “in some sense demeans what people are doing by saying it’s not innovative 
unless they’re entrepreneurial.”  He continued, “By my definition of innovation, all the 
research we do is innovation. Sometimes it’s interpreted much more narrowly, but all 
research is plowing new ground, discovering new things, new interpretations.” Avoiding 
the term innovation was a preference shared by former provost Nancy Martin, who 
served in that role between 2011 and 2013. Martin made clear her feelings regarding 
innovation: “I really dislike that term because innovation has been something we’ve 
always done. I consider innovation knowledge creation—new ways of doing things. So, I 
don’t like that term.” Nicholas Johnson, a research executive, was not convinced that all 
faculty work is innovative, but he articulated that there are “some faddish aspects” to 
TU’s recent adoption of the term. In his words, “most faculty think they’re innovative, so 
that’s a buzzword that’s sort of vacuous at some level.” “Buzzword” was a common way 
of describing both innovation and entrepreneurship throughout the interviews.  
 Two faculty members in the humanities noted that “innovation and 
entrepreneurship” were popular in higher education media, but they still had little 
understanding of what was meant by the concepts. Amy Curtis remarked: “Innovation 
and entrepreneurship are buzzwords…They’re all over The Chronicle of Higher 
Education. I was chair of the campus senate last year, which meant that I met a lot of 
trustees, and these are words that drip off their tongues.” Her time on the senate and the 
frequent presence of innovation left her asking many questions. “As a scholar and thinker 
who has chosen a lifetime of responsibility to also be a teacher, I want to know, what do 





professor in the humanities called the frequent use of innovation “puzzling” and resigned 
herself to the possibility that “trying to figure out what it means is sort of pointless 
because there’s really nothing there. It’s just something that administrators have to put on 
their resumes so they can say, ‘Oh, I was innovative.’” Innovation as an enduring feature 
of academe was placed in stark contrast with entrepreneurship, which was viewed by 
several participants as a more recent development in response to financial challenges. 
One of the few ways in which innovation was decoupled from entrepreneurship was in 
reference to teaching, in which case it was often tied to online delivery platforms that 
were thought to reduce the costs of instruction 
 Without a single interview question related to online means of instruction, it is 
worth noting that online and blended learning, which combines online and classroom-
based teaching, were mentioned in no less than one-third of the interviews. In many 
cases, online delivery platforms like massive open online courses and blended courses 
were cited as examples of innovation at Tidewater. According to Nicholas Johnson, 
“Online education [is] another example of something that’s going on in parallel with this, 
which is an example of innovation in a sense.” For Amy Curtis, thinking about how 
technologies can improve teaching is “the kind of innovation and entrepreneurship that 
I’m more interested in.” Her colleague in the humanities, however, took a more cynical 
view of the relationship between innovation and teaching after serving on a committee 
dedicated to online and blended learning. “It was a provost commission,” she recalled, 
“and there was a lot of rhetoric about innovation, which, much of it, in my opinion, was 
completely misguided.” Specifically, she took issue with what she believed was the 





There were a lot of high level administrators on that committee, and sometimes 
they get carried away with this idea of innovation…and they want to put some 
type of innovation on their CV…. But [the committee] was weighted toward 
something that was innovative, not toward finding what was best. 
Her chief concern was finding what was best for undergraduate student learning, as she 
did not agree that innovation should mean focusing upon “how we can save money on 
educating [students] by putting them in front of a computer.” Accordingly, the virtue of 
online learning was “not helping students learn more or better. It’s just innovative.” Like 
innovation itself, online delivery platforms, as examples of innovation in teaching and 
instruction, generated mixed responses, with more negative views coming from faculty 
members.  
 The preceding discussion of the meanings behind innovation raised several points 
that merit reiteration, as they support the chapter’s central arguments. The first point is 
that innovation was not universally conceptualized or understood. Far from being a 
concept that helps to create an emotional connection, as Kezar (2007) argued in her work 
on institutional ethos, some faculty viewed innovation with contempt and as a rhetorical 
device that compromised the tradition of pushing the frontiers of knowledge at a public 
research university. Interestingly, distaste with the use of innovation was not limited to 
faculty members in the humanities, as one of the strongest critiques came from two 
faculty members in the hard sciences and engineering. Such contempt does signal the 
existence of some common meanings of the concepts, even if there is no universal 
conceptualization. Concomitantly, interview data uncovered a lack of buy-in with respect 





data that innovation was tacked onto entrepreneurship by top-level administrators and 
trumpeted by trustees. These points are given fuller expression in the next subsection, 
which explores in some depth the meanings of entrepreneurship.  
 Meanings of entrepreneurship. The meanings of entrepreneurship offered by 
interview participants were more numerous than those of innovation; however, similar 
themes emerged. For purposes of structure and clarity, the meanings of entrepreneurship 
are presented in three clusters: entrepreneurship as a process, entrepreneurship as a 
mindset, and entrepreneurship as an ecosystem. This subsection examines each of these 
clusters, as well as the outcomes of entrepreneurship, as identified by interview 
participants. The most common outcome that emerged during interviews was the creation 
of value, typically through a product that could be sold or the development of a company. 
Although there was frequent mention of social entrepreneurship, its presence was less 
pronounced than traditional entrepreneurship and often amounted to an afterthought. 
Language and examples from the for-profit sector dominated conceptualizations of 
entrepreneurship, and the models of entrepreneurial success were almost exclusively 
derived from corporations, many of them technology-based. I present several of the most 
common meanings of entrepreneurship in Table 8. This table illustrates some the 
aforementioned clusters and their attendant features, such as scarcity, scalability, and 
sustainability. It also underscores the pervasive use of “value creation” as a catch-all 
phrase to explain entrepreneurship. 
 As a result of analyzing the meanings of both innovation and entrepreneurship, I 
was able to extract five values that constitute the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos at 





disciplines and any type of organization; 2) innovation and entrepreneurship are a means 
to problem-solving in the 21
st
 century; 3) innovation and entrepreneurship produce 
greater impact than traditional forms of research; 4) innovation and entrepreneurship 
make for a more efficient institution; and 5) innovation and entrepreneurship befits this 
generation of university students. However, there was hesitance on the part of interview 
participants as to whether these values had truly been incorporated into TU’s core values. 
Despite obvious recognition that many parts of campus were trying to make innovation 
and entrepreneurship Tidewater’s ethos, some saw it as a passing fad or marketing 
scheme.  
Table 8: Common Meanings of Entrepreneurship 
Interview Participant Meaning 
Mathias Gruber, lecturer of 
entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurship is the rise of opportunity 
independent of resource dependency. So it’s 
about innovation and about finding 
opportunity and nurturing growth out of 
opportunity. 
Craig Elgin, director of Honors 
Entrepreneurship House (2010-present) 
The way I really look at entrepreneurship is 
somebody that’s going to be doing 
something innovative in a sustainable 
business manner. And finding a way to scale 
that.  
Keith Meyers, director of 
entrepreneurship living-learning 
program (2004-present) 
I think for me it’s working to start 
something new with scarce resources that 
has some sustainable value. 
Christine Neilson, director of Prince 
Entrepreneurship Center (2010-present) 
Entrepreneurship is a mindset as well as a 
process. It is a way of thinking about solving 
problems and a way of uniquely using 
resources to solve them.  
William Pierson, former president 
(1998-2010) 
The essence of entrepreneurship is value 
creation. Could be economic value, social 
value. 
Nicholas Johnson, research executive 
(2011-present) 
Entrepreneurs are those who are not 
constrained by the resources currently under 
their control, and they’re willing to accept a 
risk to establish a new and sustainable 





the value consumed. 
Travis Campbell-Green, academic 
executive (2013-present) 
Innovation has such a wide range of 
meanings that it could apply to almost 
anyone at the university, maybe 
everyone…Entrepreneurship…really does 
seem to be more connected with a profit 
motive. 
Nancy Martin, former provost (2011-
2013) 
Entrepreneurship, that’s a new concept 
because that’s the idea of creating 
commercial businesses, or there’s social 
entrepreneurship, but nonetheless it’s 
organizing people around an idea, a product, 
a concept…an activity that produces 
revenue.  
 
 Among the interview participants were those with intimate knowledge of 
entrepreneurship, including four who taught courses on the topic. One of the common 
features of their conceptualizations of entrepreneurship was that it was a process that 
starts with an idea and ends with a product or service that meets two key criteria: 
scalability and sustainability in an environment of resource scarcity. Keith Meyers 
discussed how “scarce resources dictates a lot of the curriculum and a lot of the 
programming” in the entrepreneurship living-learning program he directs. Because his 
program focuses on startups, he explained that recognizing scarce resources is crucial: 
“It’s easy for a big company to launch 20 products and figure out which 5 work and ditch 
the rest…. For a startup, you might have one [product] and it might raise or sink the 
company if that one doesn’t work. I think that’s where scarce resources comes into play.” 
For this reason, several interview participants stressed that either the initial idea driving 
the entrepreneurial process or the process itself should be resource independent or 
uniquely leverage the resources available. This is one reason why entrepreneurship has 





explained, “information technology is extraordinarily low-capital…. If you’re bright, you 
can teach yourself the language, get access to a computer, make an app, and then you can 
be like that kid in England and make a zillion dollars.” Beyond addressing resource 
scarcity, the entrepreneurial process should, according to this conceptualization, involve 
scalability.  
 Scalability refers to the ability to increase revenues while marginal costs decrease 
with each unit sale. The example of scalability one interviewee provided went like this: 
“The way I talk to my [students] about it is we don’t want you to create the flower shop; 
we want you create either a chain of flower shops or FTD.” Lastly, the conceptualization 
of entrepreneurship as a process hinged upon sustainability, not in terms of 
environmental impact, but rather in terms of making money. Danielle Ramirez, director 
of the Center for Social Innovation, listed as one of the goals of the entrepreneurial 
process: “economic sustainability or viability. It’s the pursuit of profits in many ways.” 
The centrality of generating enough income to sustain the enterprise was a point of 
conflict that emerged in the data. A few interview participants argued that 
entrepreneurship is not about making money. In his role as a research executive, Nicholas 
Johnson frequently told people that “money can become important as an intermediate 
phase between value that’s in your head…and the greater value you create…. So, it’s not 
about the money” by itself. On the other hand, one dean saw money as a defining part of 
what separates entrepreneurs from inventors. For example, he distinguished the Wright 
brothers from Lockheed and Martin, who were the real entrepreneurs because they had a 
business model and made money: “That was amazing to me. It doesn’t take anything 





but they didn’t make any money off of it.” Thus, meanings of entrepreneurship as a 
process were based upon taking an idea to the marketplace and selling it for money. The 
examples, like FTD and Lockheed Martin, were derived largely from the for-profit 
sector. 
 While conceptualizations of entrepreneurship as a mindset were often less 
contingent upon business creation, the infusion of language and examples from the for-
profit sector were still manifest. Christine Neilson, director of the Prince 
Entrepreneurship Center, defined entrepreneurship as both a process and a mindset. “The 
way I see entrepreneurship playing a role in higher education,” she explained, “is not just 
about venture creation, but about an entrepreneurial thinking and mindset,” which is 
characterized by opportunity recognition. One lecturer of entrepreneurship reinforced this 
idea, saying entrepreneurship is “a perspective on innovation and an ability to create new 
things and to view opportunities that do not depend on resources.” He continued, “The 
entrepreneurial mindset idea is, at the most basic, opportunity recognition.” Opportunity 
recognition consisted of an awareness of problems and issues, as well as an appreciation 
of the market and what customers want and will buy. In the words of Danielle Ramirez, 
“What we’re saying is we want to get to the underlying causes of problems…so we don’t 
have to point to solutions from government and non-profits…. The social entrepreneur 
asks what the underlying issues are. Can we build businesses around that?” Accordingly, 
the entrepreneurial mindset is grounded in recognizing opportunities, with an eye to 
seizing opportunity through the creation of a business. 
 Not all interview participants viewed the entrepreneurial mindset as a positive 





“this identification that the people that matter are the people that make change. And the 
people that make change have been identified in this view with the people who seize on 
opportunities in the marketplace.” He saw this mindset as one symptom of “worshipping 
of success in the marketplace that is going on and is probably unhealthy.” Although at the 
time of the interview he did not think teaching the entrepreneurial mindset was a major 
problem, he worried that Tidewater was becoming “a trade school,” as opposed to “a 
place where the market has failed and ideas have to be nurtured outside the capitalist 
world.” Nevertheless, his voice of alarm was outnumbered by those who believed that the 
entrepreneurial mindset was useful in a wide range of settings. In general, the opinion of 
interview participants was that more entrepreneurial thinking was needed across 
Tidewater’s campus. Danielle Ramirez summarized the intended reach of the 
entrepreneurial mindset for many interview participants:  
 We should still have those programs for students who are going to launch their 
 businesses. Those true entrepreneurs on campus. But more broadly, this context of 
 critical thinking, or entrepreneurial thinking, I think we should offer that in every 
 major. It applies in every field.  
A point was made to include the arts in humanities, as one dean here exemplifies:  
 This is very important training for the arts because people in dance and music 
 need to figure out how to make a living out of those professions. So, to be able 
 to…run a business, or be innovative with that, that’s a favor to the arts to teach 





Additional dimensions of the entrepreneurial mindset are addressed in chapter seven as 
part of a more detailed treatment of the implications of the innovation and 
entrepreneurship ethos for students and the role of the university in shaping their conduct. 
 The final meaning of entrepreneurship that was it was not simply the actions of a 
certain type of person and it was not encapsulated in a single program or set of policies. 
Rather, entrepreneurship was based upon and fed into an ecosystem. According to 
another director of an entrepreneurship living-learning program, “There’s this whole 
ecosystem, which is a word they like to use around this campus.” Two interview 
participants indicated that there were thriving entrepreneurial ecosystems in the colleges 
of engineering and business, foreshadowing one of the findings presented in section two. 
The dean of the college of engineering, as an example, related about when he first heard 
about entrepreneurship on campus: “I knew that there was an infrastructure, an ecosystem 
if I can use that term, that was available to engineering students, faculty, and staff.” 
Christine Neilson, director of the Prince Entrepreneurship Center, described the 
entrepreneurship ecosystem at Tidewater: 
 I think [TU] has a very strong ecosystem, and we’re doing a better job now of 
 connecting the dots. So, if you’re a student or faculty or researcher and you have 
 an idea, there’s resources for you to start that, get mentors who give you feedback 
 along the way. Or if you are working in a lab and you have a technology you want 
 to commercialize, we have resources for that, too. A lot of those resources are 
 over at TTEC in the engineering college. 
TTEC’s director suggested that the ecosystem at Tidewater is especially developed, 





such as Stanford University and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), do not 
need to have an end-to-end ecosystem because they are located within robust innovation 
hubs in the Boston and San Francisco areas. Comparison to MIT and Stanford were 
widespread, as shown in the next chapter. 
 Whether entrepreneurship was conceived as a process, mindset, or ecosystem, the 
intended outcomes were comparable. Perhaps the most frequently employed phrase 
among interview participants in relation to entrepreneurial outcomes was the creation of 
value. The value created was not considered only in monetary terms, and there was a 
clear desire to anchor entrepreneurship in the language of “value creation” as opposed to 
launching businesses or making money. When Nicholas Johnson defined 
entrepreneurship as establishing a new enterprise where the value created exceeds the 
value consumed, he was quick to point out: “I didn’t say anything about technology. I 
didn’t say anything money. I didn’t say anything about business. It’s about creating value 
that improves the wealth of nations.” Yet, when talking about faculty work, he 
characterized entrepreneurship as “getting your stuff out into the corporate environment 
by any means necessary.” Thus, if it is not about companies, it is at least linking research 
to the corporate world. Additionally, with respect to patenting intellectual property, 
Johnson was unequivocal: “Just filing a patent doesn’t do enough. You really have to 
have somebody who is motivated to go to the other side and…who is willing to figure out 
what is the business plan.” In almost every interview, even those in which the outcome of 
entrepreneurship was simplified to value creation, there was mention made of students 





Two entrepreneurship center directors discussed how business creation was not 
the metric they used to evaluate Tidewater’s entrepreneurial efforts. Christine Neilson of 
the Prince Entrepreneurship Center related: “[job creation] is not the metric that we use. 
The [state higher education system] tracks the number of companies coming out of or 
spun out from university research…. We really track the people.” However, publications 
from the center tell a different story. One flier, modeled after a napkin on which a novel 
idea is scribbled, describes the Prince Center’s impact in a list: “75 plus companies 
started, more than $25 million plus raised, 20,000 students inspired, hundreds of jobs 
created…and counting.” TTEC in the college of engineering was less apprehensive about 
using business creation as a metric of success. They produce annual impact reports, and 
the 2011 report detailed that TTEC created 7,053 jobs since 1985 and graduated three 
major companies from its incubator, two of which sold for over $1 billion. Startups, in 
particular, receive an extraordinary amount of attention in documents. One 
entrepreneurship lecturer conceded, “One of the biggest challenges is we’re fixated on 
the idea that entrepreneurship is about startups. Some of the biggest problems are 
improving existing institutions, and this is particularly true in the social sector.” Amidst 
refrains like “it’s not about starting a company,” the examples of entrepreneurship 
success were almost exclusively for-profit technology firms. The most common examples 
of entrepreneurship success offered by interview participants were a mixture of large 
social media firms, especially Facebook and Twitter, and Tidewater alumni who 
launched noteworthy businesses, including a high-end athletic apparel company and an 





referred to the glamour of technology-based startups as the “Mark Zuckerberg effect,” an 
allusion to the founder of Facebook. 
Near the conclusion of at least three interviews, participants sought to call 
attention to the social benefit or good that is also an outcome of entrepreneurship. Former 
president William Pierson, for one, challenged the idea that entrepreneurship is driven by 
narrow economic interest: “There are a lot of social entrepreneurs. There are a lot of 
organizations that founded themselves on social entrepreneurship. They provided 
resources to build up societies and communities and so on.” The director of development 
for the Institute for Innovation and Entrepreneurship, Samantha Stone, said the current 
president’s message “doesn’t say this is about starting companies. This is about creating 
benefit, whether societal or economic, or starting companies, or whatever it is, the 
societal benefit is very important.” As evidence of the important role played by social 
entrepreneurship in the conversation, interview participants pointed either to a student-
run “social venture,” which I discuss in chapter six, or the Center for Social Innovation. 
The center’s director, Danielle Ramirez, observed that social impact is “probably tacked 
on” to discussions of entrepreneurship because people had not been sufficiently educated. 
“I think we’re ready for that conversation,” she reflected, “it’s just we haven’t had it at 
that level yet.”  
Despite some awareness of the current president’s messaging that 
entrepreneurship must include social good, a professor in the sciences recalled: “I haven’t 
heard a lot of discussion from high levels of the university about social 
entrepreneurship…. I don’t think that’s what they mean. I think they mean forming 





on entrepreneurship to be at odds with the way that administrators understood the 
concept. Still, a few interview participants cautioned not to interpret “business” too 
strictly. As one business model competition organizer put it, “When we say ‘business,’ 
that applies to non-profits. It applies to community service organizations.” This was not 
the only moment in an interview when non-profit organizations, including universities, 
were equated with businesses. The principles of entrepreneurship were believed by many 
to be universally applicable, even if organizations with a social mission were by and large 
eclipsed by other examples. 
 Values underlying the ethos. I distilled five values of the innovation and 
entrepreneurship ethos based upon how interview participants described their 
understandings of these two concepts. The first of the five values is that innovation and 
entrepreneurship essentially has no boundaries, and it is useful to all campus constituents 
and units, regardless of discipline or organizational mission. Although I show in the next 
section that the origins of entrepreneurship at TU can be traced back to the colleges of 
engineering and business, the ethos revolves around the assumption that all students 
benefit by being exposed to entrepreneurial thinking, all fields of study can be enhanced 
by the inclusion of entrepreneurship, and all campus units can better ensure their future 
by being entrepreneurial. Consequently, this value reflects the desire to make innovation 
and entrepreneurship a key component of Tidewater’s culture campus-wide. In the words 
of Don Roberts, a college dean: “We are trying to transplant that culture to the whole 
university.” 
One manifestation of this effort is modules in design thinking, which are 





variety of courses, including several offered by honors programs. One dean called these 
modules “a very big deal” because “you’re then getting to students as freshmen and 
sophomores.” In the message announcing the Institute for Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship, Tidewater’s current provost said the goal was to “develop a culture of 
innovation and entrepreneurship across all colleges and curriculum.” A few proponents of 
this idea went so far as to suggest that there be an innovation and entrepreneurship 
requirement in the general education curriculum, which one dean rejected, preferring 
instead “an abundance of different kinds of opportunities for students to engage with 
this.” 
The second value was that, in the face of seemingly intractable social, political, 
and economic problems in the 21
st
 century, innovation and entrepreneurship is seen as a 
highly effective means of problem-solving. Complementing this value of the problem-
solving potential of entrepreneurship was a lack of faith in the ability of government, 
social institutions, or faculty to function properly or provide solutions. Danielle Ramirez 
of the Center for Social Innovation succinctly captured this lack of faith: 
 Professors are not equipped to give [students] the tools that they need to become 
 problem solvers. And to go to a de facto answer that we need policy 
 change…realistically, the days of us being able to do broad, sweeping policy 
 changes are probably over.   
There is little recognition of the tensions contained within this value, including the 
possible ineffectiveness of consumer products or startup firms to solve complex 





fair critique, she linked it to the fact that “we talk particularly in tech entrepreneurship 
about gadgets and things like that.”  
Throughout the lionization of innovation and entrepreneurship at Tidewater, it is 
not clear students are taught that there is no app to address growing income inequality or 
racism. In fact, one of the more arresting aspects of this value is that it does not consider 
the darker consequences possible in entrepreneurship—that entrepreneurship may create 
social problems, not solve them. As an example, a professor of computer and electrical 
engineering recounted that two faculty members who recently won a state award for 
entrepreneurship formed a company through the TTEC incubator. The primary client for 
their battery technology is a tobacco company who plans to use it in their electronic 
cigarettes.  
 Redefining impact as it relates to research is the third value underlying the 
innovation and entrepreneurship ethos. One dean explained that basic research is still 
important, but  
 in general…universities are spending a lot more time figuring out how we can see 
 the direct impact of this research. How can we transfer the technology? How can 
 we make that easy for faculty to do? It may even be profitable for them. 
At the heart of this value is the idea that research that is not translated into a business 
venture or, at minimum, does not have some type of external value is not impactful. In 
the words of Nicholas Johnson in the division of research: “If the impact [of faculty 
research] is only in a vague, academic sense, that’s not really impacting people.” Instead, 
he advanced the notion that “you have impact when your neighbors know that somehow 





is interpreted to mean external money, especially obtaining grant money to support 
research. Some interview participants took issue with this, suggesting that not all ideas 
are appreciated in their time, nor are all ideas popular in a way that garners external 
money. A professor in the humanities bemoaned that the university increasingly asked 
the program to support itself financially, “which has meant that the funding tail has 
sometimes been wagging the research dog. And that’s a problem.” She noted that 
Galileo’s ideas were certainly impactful, yet “Galileo would have had a lot of problems 
getting funding at certain points in his career.” This has not diminished pressure for 
faculty at TU to think about the value of their work based upon these new definitions of 
impact. In fact, several faculty members remarked that the primary way in which they 
understand entrepreneurship relates to securing grants to fund their research. None of the 
faculty members interviewed for this dissertation expressed a desire to be entrepreneurial 
through the formation of a company or other commercial venture. 
 The fourth value is that innovation and entrepreneurship is not just designed for 
individuals; it is necessary for Tidewater as an organization. The chancellor of the state 
university system, Reuben Hofbauer, explained: “This whole notion of being 
entrepreneurial and innovative transcends the entire university, not just the academic side 
of things, but also the administrative side.” A college dean linked such administrative 
entrepreneurship to credibility and competitiveness: “I think we’re not credible if we’re 
telling students to go off and do this and we’re not doing it ourselves, and we can’t 
compete as a university unless we are more entrepreneurial.” Examples of how the 
university as an organization was seeking to be more innovative and entrepreneurial 





launching degree programs that generated profit for academic units, such as professional 
master’s degrees. One dean cited the creation of a cybersecurity program funded by $1.1 
million grant from defense contractor Northrop Grumman as a byproduct of 
organizational entrepreneurship and “the positive aspects of aligning with business.” 
Nicholas Johnson believed that, because of this value, Tidewater was “able to adapt and 
evolve and become less dependent and more entrepreneurial…in a sense be more like a 
private university in terms of our business model.” Therefore, a crucial value of the ethos 
was that, as an institution, TU needed to be innovative and entrepreneurial, which 
generally amounted to reducing costs and seeking new revenue streams. 
 The final value that surfaced was that innovation and entrepreneurship fit this 
generation of students and spoke to the type of student Tidewater attracts. Students at TU 
were frequently described as “scrappy,” referring to their persistence to overcome 
obstacles. The director of development for entrepreneurship programs commented that 
“I’ve always felt like this was a very entrepreneurial campus. The profile of the student 
on this campus is very persistent…scrappy, we sometimes call [Tidewater] students. That 
persona for being an entrepreneur is there.” This generation of students, some argued, 
does not want to “sit in a lecture for an hour and to have this talking head on the stage. 
They want [it to be] interactive.” Additionally, this generation of students was said to be 
more interested in the interdisciplinary and collaborative nature of entrepreneurship. 
Rather than sit in a class and listen to a professor talk about problems, they were 
characterized as wanting to develop solutions and were accustomed to immediate results. 
Thus, innovation and entrepreneurship is congruent with how this generation of students 





the rage with students.” However, the extent to which the popularity of entrepreneurship 
among students sparked the creation of initiatives is arguable and explored in the next 
chapter. Even among those who acknowledged that entrepreneurship fits this generation 
of students also realized that student interests change, implying a degree of 
impermanence to the ethos. 
 Status of the ethos. As a closing to this section, I examine whether the values 
underlying the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos have truly found traction at 
Tidewater. Many interview participants believed that innovation and entrepreneurship 
were developing into institutional values. One dean believed that innovation and 
entrepreneurship “has emerged over time as a really important value for the university as 
a whole.” However, as values, innovation and entrepreneurship paled in comparison to 
references to excellence in teaching, access for students of the state, and the production of 
knowledge. Among several interview participants, there was reason to believe the project 
of constructing this ethos was incomplete. For instance, an academic executive, when 
asked if innovation and entrepreneurship were fundamental values of Tidewater, 
responded: 
 I think you’d know if we weren’t talking about it all the time. The fact that we 
 talk about it all the time means it isn’t, right? So, I think you’ll know when it’s 
 not a special thing. When you don’t have minors in it and you don’t have special 
 courses in it. 
This view is at odds with the notion that an institutional ethos, particularly one still in 
formation, requires constant reinforcement, explaining its strong presence in 





value]…. Has it been adapted by the faculty as sort of an axiomatic thing? I think not 
quite yet.” He saw the incorporation of innovation and entrepreneurship as institutional 
values as subject to the “ecclesiastical pace” at which change takes place at a university.  
 Some interview participants believed it was possible that the push for innovation 
and entrepreneurship on campus could “die out,” or constituted a passing fad that would 
be replaced by something else in a few years. One interview participant assumed that 
innovation and entrepreneurship was a marketing ploy that would one day be replaced by 
something else that resonated with consumers. The notion that innovation and 
entrepreneurship was a passing fad was met by skepticism by many who saw this as an 
irreversible progression. In the words of Chancellor Hofbauer: “It’s become so infused in 
the policies and practices and expectations of institutions…. It’s inconceivable to me that 
this could ever be reversed or in that sense be a fad. We’re in an endless evolution in this 
regard, and the university, I think, will forever be a primary resource and catalyst for 
these changes.” Despite efforts to spread innovation and entrepreneurship campus-wide 
and inculcate the aforementioned values, questions remain about the place of the ethos in 
the future. For this reason, I argue that the status of the innovation and entrepreneurship 
ethos remains far from guaranteed. The next section traces the development of innovation 
and entrepreneurship from its origins in the colleges of engineering and business to an 
institutional priority and marketing campaign, highlighting in the process those campus 
actors who are championing the ethos. 
Origins and Champions of the Ethos 
 Innovation and entrepreneurship were unquestionably happening at Tidewater 





to speak. This section illustrates the initial administrative sponsors of entrepreneurship in 
the colleges of engineering and business and the processes by which this largely 
peripheral activity in 1998 become an emerging institutional ethos by 2013. Central to 
these processes are the ambitions of a core group of central administrators, and this 
section reveals the role of several individuals whose names came up often during the 
course of interviews. In addition to demonstrating that the ethos was a top-level initiative, 
this section shows that the campus-wide promotion of innovation and entrepreneurship 
became increasingly interested in undergraduate education as a primary sphere of 
influence. Moreover, it illustrates that not all parts of campus felt included in the ethos, 
and there was substantial concern that the humanities were going to be left behind as a 
result of Tidewater’s new orientation. 
Table 9: Critical Events Timeline 
Year Event 
1981 Patent committee formed in legal office 
1984 
Tidewater Technology Enterprise Collaborative (TTEC) 
founded 
1986 Prince Entrepreneurship Center 
1998 William Pierson assumes presidency 
2000 Crandall Entrepreneurs Program founded 
2001 Vincent Chin becomes provost 
2006 Transfer student entrepreneurship program founded 
2006 
Bull's-Eye Cup business model pitch competition 
launched 
2007 TU research park established 





2009 Center for Social Innovation founded 
2010 Honors Entrepreneurship House founded 
2010 Henry Pryor assumes presidency 
2011 
Vision for Innovation and Entrepreneurship at Tidewater 
committee convened 
2012 TideVentures launched 
2012 Board of Trustees amends P&T policy 
2013 Institute for Innovation and Entrepreneurship founded 
 2013 
Request for proposals for Fearless Thinking 
blended/online courses 
2013 P&T guidelines revision task force initiated 
 2014 Proposed entrepreneurship minor 
 
 Sites where the ethos developed. In 1998, entrepreneurship at TU was relegated 
to two centers on campus: the Prince Entrepreneurship Center (the Prince Center) and the 
Tidewater Technology Enterprise Collaborative (TTEC). Several new initiatives were 
launched from or under the auspices of these centers, particularly to expose more 
undergraduate students to entrepreneurship and related learning opportunities. I begin this 
subsection by chronicling the origins of the two centers and a few of the illuminative 
programs that were established. Starting in 2010, when current president Henry Pryor 
began his presidency, entrepreneurship was married to innovation and together made into 
a signature priority at TU, resulting in the creation of the Institute for Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship and a marketing campaign around the slogan “Fearless Thinking.” I 
show that these initiatives were housed in the offices of the president and provost, not 
academic colleges, and reflect an increasing interest in teaching entrepreneurship. As a 
result of the findings presented in this subsection, I contend that the influence of original 





namely the humanities, are relegated to the margins in terms of involvement. The 
campus-wide spread of innovation and entrepreneurship can be linked to a core group of 
administrators, whose role in the development is described in the following subsection. 
 The college of engineering. The college of engineering has the longest history of 
entrepreneurship at Tidewater, and interview participants frequently acknowledged this 
history. In 1984, two former Navy researchers established a research center with “the 
vision that building companies is something that the college of engineering should do,” 
according to its current director, Tom Park. This vision was partially in response to what 
the co-founders saw as a problem at TU. Park explained:  
 This campus has something called OTT [the Office of Technology Transfer]. 
 They collect invention disclosures, they patent a few things if a case could be 
 made, and then they find people to license things to. That’s a necessary thing to 
 do, but it doesn’t build companies…. So there was this missing piece, and this 
 was the venture creation piece, and that’s what [the center] grew into. 
The OTT began as a patent committee organized by the legal affairs office after the 
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act. Tony Christensen, an early staffer in the legal office and 
current research executive, remembered, “In the early days of Bayh-Dole, everybody 
thought everybody was going to be making a ton of money” off of patenting research. 
The committee turned into an office dedicated to managing faculty inventions with the 
help of a venture capital firm. University Technology Corporation offered Tidewater 
$500,000 to establish the office, in exchange for a cut of any royalties. The firm 
eventually went bankrupt because many of the offices it helped establish were not 





instead of technology licensing. The center it created eventually was called the Tidewater 
Technology Enterprise Collaborative (TTEC).  
 The first two programs in TTEC, however, were less about technology startups 
than serving existing companies in the state. One of the programs, for example, was a 
technology extension service, described by a TTEC brochure as “providing critical 
solutions to help [state] manufacturers grow and become more competitive.” Tony 
Christensen described the program as “an outreach to manufacturers kind of modeled on 
the cooperative extension service” in the college of agriculture. It would help 
manufacturers become more efficient, “just like our cooperative extension agents would 
go out and teach farmers how to be more efficient.” Soon thereafter, in 1987, TTEC 
began a separate program to “provide funding for research projects 
connecting…companies with [Tidewater] faculty to develop technology-based products, 
services or training.” Since its inception, the program has helped over 400 companies 
receive funding from the state to subsidize expensive research projects needed to improve 
their products or services. From these modest beginnings, TTEC continued to grow. Its 
director related that “TTEC has added programs over twenty-five years. In fact, TTEC is 
kind of a catch-all for a lot of programs that either nobody wanted or knew how to do or 
were failing at other places within the university.” At times, he claimed, “TTEC was the 
only one that said we’ll do it and proposed to do it.” There are now as many as sixteen 
programs housed within TTEC, including a technology startup incubator and venture 
accelerator (see Table 8 below). The entrepreneurship “catch-all” employs approximately 
fifty full-time equivalent staff people and researchers. This makes TTEC “five-times 





personnel. The mission of TTEC now includes three areas: “educate the next generation 
of technology entrepreneurs, create successful technology ventures, and 
connect…companies with university resources to help them succeed.” I turn now to the 
area of education and reveal the origins of two programs created in TTEC during the 
1998-2013 period. 
Table 10: TTEC's "Entrepreneurship/Innovation Ecosystem" 





Industry Partnerships Program 
Honors Entrepreneurship 
House 
Venture Accelerator International Incubator 
Transfer Entrepreneurs Startup Company Lab Biotechnology Research and 
Education Program 
Minor in Technology 
Entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneur Office House Intellectual Property Legal 
Resource Center 




 Startup Boot Camp 
 
 
Source: TTEC Impact: 2011 report 
 In 2000, TTEC launched the Crandall Entrepreneurs Program for undergraduate 
students of all majors in their final years of study. The idea for the program came from 
Vincent Chin, a professor of computer and electrical engineering who, at the time, was 
dean of the graduate school and became provost for the years 2001 to 2007. According to 
a former director of the Crandall Program, “[Chin] had come over to the…incubator for 
the graduation of one of those incubator companies. And he saw students and faculty and 
everyone in the room and looked around and said, ‘Wouldn’t it be great if we could just 
put students in a dorm and let them start companies?’” He pitched the idea to an alumnus 
of the computer and electrical engineering department, Theodore Crandall, who had 
started a string of successful telecommunications companies and moved to Silicon 





Crandall Program owes its existence to an administrator partnering with a wealthy donor. 
This set-up would be repeated in 2006, when a real estate mogul approached TTEC to 
start a similar program for community college transfer students.  
 The Crandall Program was housed in TTEC because both the donor and the 
administrator responsible for its creation were from the college of engineering, with ties 
to the same department. The first director, who was initially a staff person in the 
department of computer and electrical engineering, called the program a “true startup,” 
with no formal curriculum of which to speak. They recruited an initial class of sixty 
students and hosted a few events, usually around guest speakers. Over time, they 
officially decided to make the program residential, placing it in a new on-campus 
apartment complex. Additionally, they enacted a credit-based curriculum for the 
program. Impact reports proudly state that the Crandall Program has produced two 
companies in the magazine Inc.’s list of the nation’s fastest growing firms. Another point 
of pride, according to the report, is the fact that 24 other programs based on the Crandall 
Program have been established at other universities. So successful was the Crandall 
Program that it inspired the creation of a spin-off program for underclassmen at 
Tidewater. In 2009, Chin’s successor as provost, Omar Nuri, who similarly came from 
the department of computer and electrical engineering and left Tidewater to become 
president of another university after his term as provost, sent out a call for proposals for 
new living-learning programs. TTEC turned in a proposal, and it was accepted and 
named a new honors house to attract in-coming students to the university.  
 In a press release about the Honors Entrepreneurship House from 2010, TTEC’s 





award-winning [Crandall Entrepreneurship Program] for juniors and seniors.” The 
director of the honors program recounted that the selection of entrepreneurship as the 
theme was decided by the provost: “I had nothing to do with the beginning [of the 
program]. I didn’t choose it. I didn’t negotiate the terms. I didn’t pick the director.” In his 
recollection, the program “came from the provost’s office as a task, with funding.” Thus, 
he felt he and his staff “had no voice in saying it was a priority,” but concluded about the 
program: “Would I have picked it? Maybe not. Looking back now, four years later, it’s a 
smashing success with students.” These two programs exemplify recurrent themes that 
support the main arguments of this chapter. First, the origins of the program reflect the 
decisive influence of administrators and, in particular, individuals with connection to the 
department of computer and electrical engineering. Second, the programs were 
educational in nature and designed to be open to undergraduate students from all 
disciplines, demonstrating the increasing desire to make entrepreneurship education a 
campus-wide offering. Nevertheless, both programs remain squarely under the 
administrative umbrella of TTEC in the college of engineering with little to no 
engagement with other academic colleges. The idea that entrepreneurship existed in silos 
with minimal communication and collaboration was a frequent remark made during 
interviews. The next subsection foregrounds the other primary silo, the college of 
business, after which I discuss attempts on the part of the offices of the president and 
provost to bridge the gap between the two colleges and further expand innovation and 
entrepreneurship at TU. 
 The college of business. Like its counterpart across campus, the college of 





college, Rick Truman, set out to establish an entrepreneurship center. He partnered with 
Jamison Prince, a wealthy investor who was a college of business student before leaving 
Tidewater to work on Wall Street. In the words of Christine Neilson, the current director 
of the center, Dean Truman “really felt like entrepreneurship belonged in academic 
institutions,” and as a result of his work, established at TU one of the nation’s first 
entrepreneurship centers. The Prince Entrepreneurship Center evolved over time in terms 
of its mission and offerings. Neilson explained: “The [Prince] Center is always changing 
on what the offerings are. Sometimes it’s been more research focused, sometimes very 
MBA focused.” Recently, they have sought to shift from a focus on company formation 
to “this kind of community feeling.” Referencing the “ecosystem,” Neilson positioned the 
Prince Center “at the center of the students, local entrepreneurs, faculty members, 
investors, advisors, other organizations. We’re really a match-making platform in a lot of 
ways.” One of the center’s major programs is an angel investor network, where “a 
wealthy individual who has exited from usually a technology company…who likes to 
making investments in early stage companies” is introduced to local companies seeking 
capital. The service, explicated Neilson, consisted of “looking at companies from around 
the region…that we think may be most appealing to our investors. Then we really coach 
the companies on how to present, give them feedback on their business, things like that.” 
In addition to entrepreneurship courses and a startup academy for student ventures, the 
Prince Center is known as Tidewater’s main convener of business model pitch 
competitions. 
 Twice annually, the Prince Center sponsors its Pitch Price competitions, which 





competition, students are encouraged to attend one of the Innovation Sessions held each 
Friday in the Center’s offices. Students can hone their ideas, meet with entrepreneurs, and 
practice their pitch at these sessions. The biggest competition the center manages is called 
the Bull’s-Eye Cup, which brings student companies from around the country to 
Tidewater in order to compete for over $70,000 and access to in-person advising from a 
wealthy alumnus turned entrepreneur. The Bull’s-Eye Cup takes place in a massive 
auditorium and garners national media attention. Because of its expertise in organizing 
competitions, other units on campus have looked to the Prince Center for guidance and 
assistance. For example, the college of social sciences began its own business model 
pitch competition in 2012, and it works with the Prince Center to deliver practice sessions 
with student contestants. From 1998 until 2010, entrepreneurship activities at Tidewater 
could chiefly be found within either the Prince Center or TTEC. Most interview 
participants pointed to these centers as the where entrepreneurship began at Tidewater, 
and many suggested that the two fought for ownership over entrepreneurship until it 
became an institutional priority during the administration of Henry Pryor.  
 The colleges of business and engineering are regularly cited as places where 
entrepreneurship began at Tidewater, and their influence over how the concept is 
understood and takes shape is patent. Don Roberts, a dean at TU, stated: “innovation and 
entrepreneurship started off in the business school and landed in the engineering school 
roughly about the same time, about twenty-five to thirty years ago.” Samantha Stone of 
the Institute for Innovation and Entrepreneurship likewise noted that “there was a time on 
campus when there were these two anchors and nothing else.” Many interview 





Tidewater and would continue to grow, irrespective of any campus-wide push. However, 
they noted these “silos” were not always in conversation with and sometimes competed 
against one another. As the director of the entrepreneurship honors house told it:  
 It’s been a little bit of a challenge fitting [the program] in with the colleges on 
 campus and some of the faculties because it’s been a stepchild to the traditional 
 vertical disciplines…. Where does [entrepreneurship] sit and who gets to own it? 
 You know the  fight between engineering and business, and it’s not just on this 
 campus.  
TTEC and the Prince Center did not see there being a conflict. The directors of both 
programs said that they serve different functions on campus, with TTEC focusing on 
technology-based startups and the Prince Center working more closely with 
undergraduate students. Still, the perceived gulf separating these two sites on campus was 
used as a pretext for more centralized involvement on the part of the offices of the 
president and provost. Former president William Pierson put it this way:  
 The fact of the matter is, for 25 years, you’ve had both the [TTEC and Prince 
 programs], and they were actually working against their own best interest because 
 they were almost struggling to see who was going to be the most important one. 
 So that was one of the big goals of the whole plan was to bring those guys 
 together. 
The plan he mentioned was to create an Institute for Innovation and Entrepreneurship, 






 The offices of the president and provost. On April 28, 2011, Henry Pryor was 
inaugurated as 33
rd
 president of Tidewater University, although he had served in the role 
since fall of 2010. In his inaugural address, Pryor listed “innovation and 
entrepreneurship” the second strategic priority of his administration, just behind student 
opportunity and achievement and in front of internationalization. Quoting his address, 
Pryor decreed: “The vision is to make innovation and entrepreneurship an integral part of 
our academic culture; to expand curricular and co-curricular opportunities; to accelerate 
the commercialization of ideas; to make the University a catalyst for economic vitality in 
[the region].” A landmark initiative to achieve this vision was the creation of the Institute 
for Innovation and Entrepreneurship, described as “a one-stop concierge service” that 
“will coordinate under one umbrella the many idea-generation and venture-creation 
activities on campus.” Pryor attributed the idea for the Institute to former president 
William Pierson, who Pryor tasked with chairing a committee regarding the “Vision for 
Innovation and Entrepreneurship at Tidewater University” the fall after his inauguration. 
The recommendations of this committee informed the creation of the Institute and other 
initiatives to make innovation and entrepreneurship a standout feature of the campus. 
 The committee consisted of William Pierson, the vice president of industry 
relations, and twelve other individuals, many of them coming from the private sector. In 
the committee’s final report, the necessity of making innovation and entrepreneurship a 
strategic priority was framed as follows: 
 A public research university’s mission today must embrace a contagious culture 
 of innovation and entrepreneurship to prepare the way to solution of…critical 





 whether it stems from administrative operation, research, teaching, service or 
 creating value from ideas.  Innovative thinking must be nurtured in every member 
 of our community and introduced to all students early in their studies. 
Recognizing that the colleges of business and engineering would seek to retain control of 
their programs, the committee noted that some “IE activities will be targeted to a single 
unit,” while “other IE services are needed by the entire campus.” The Institute for 
Innovation and Entrepreneurship would address this latter need, becoming the “public 
point-of-contact for IE at the university” and “balancing nationally competitive and 
comprehensive educational programs and the creation of initiatives of commercial 
value.” The Institute would be headed by a renowned director that reports to the president 
and “lead a first-of-its-kind, campus wide program that will become [Tidewater 
University’s] signature design of a 21
st
 century university model for inspiring innovation 
and entrepreneurship.” After the creation of the Institute, the committee recommended 
introducing the vision to the university community. 
 Henry Pryor followed many, though not all, of the committee’s recommendations. 
Administratively, the committee called for as many as five assistant directors, and it 
suggested that the Office of Technology Transfer be moved to the new Institute. To date, 
neither recommendation came to fruition. The OTT became part of a parallel initiative 
coming from the state legislature to merge Tidewater and another campus in the state 
system that is home to professional schools, like dentistry and medicine. In the end, the 
merger did not happen, but a new entity was formed, known as TideVentures, to spur 
greater technology commercialization from collaborative research. The technology 





TideVentures. Nevertheless, Pryor did appoint a well-known figure as director of the 
Institute, Michael Briggs, who was formerly the director of TTEC. In the press release for 
the institute, Briggs’ statement closely matched the committee report: “The goal of the 
[Institute] is to ignite the entrepreneurial spirit throughout campus. We will build on the 
strong foundation of innovation that already exists and foster new collaborations that 
leverage diverse strengths.” Pryor decided to house the Institute in the office of the 
provost, which invested some money to complement the nearly $2 million coming from 
the state. This decision was noted by several interview participants as a sign of the 
importance of innovation and entrepreneurship on campus. “The [Institute] is different,” 
remarked Samantha Stone, “We are now bringing it into the academic curriculum. This 
[Institute] is out of the provost’s office, where the academic curriculum is designed. So 
that’s our differentiator, and what’s going to make this unlike anything else.” As follows, 
the implication is that being under the auspices of the office of the provost means that the 
Institute will be integrated into the curriculum and serve as a “central hub” for campus. 
 The vision for innovation and entrepreneurship became more widely publicized 
than any of Pryor’s other strategic priorities. In fact, it became the basis for a new 
marketing campaign around the slogan “Fearless Thinking.” Visitors to campus are now 
greeted by references to “Fearless Thinking” at every turn. Banners attached to light 
poles lining campus streets showcase faculty and students who exemplify fearless 
thinking. The magazine which the office of university relations produces came out with 
an entire issue on “How to Be Fearless,” featuring essays from six notable alumni and 
coaches. An admissions executive, Carol Hawthorne, indicated that all of the materials 





Tidewater now includes an essay on how applicants are innovative and entrepreneurial. 
Accordingly, there are efforts to communicate the place of innovation and 
entrepreneurship before students arrive on campus, demonstrating the anticipatory 
socialization Kezar (2007) found to be a mechanism in the creation of an institutional 
ethos.  
 Increasing interest in teaching entrepreneurship. The trajectory of innovation 
and entrepreneurship at TU can be characterized as an increasing interest in teaching 
undergraduate students about entrepreneurship, as opposed to actual entrepreneurial 
activity in the form of technology transfer, partnering with industry, and launching 
startups. When Tony Christensen described his early work with the OTT and the start of 
TTEC, he joked that these efforts were “before [entrepreneurship] was cool.” At that 
time, he related, Tidewater “didn’t focus on student entrepreneurship…we were focused 
on two things. One, getting more technology from faculty and then partnering with 
industry.” Only later were students factored into entrepreneurship programming. The 
reasoning behind this trajectory is examined in the next chapter. Nevertheless, it is worth 
noting that several interview participants separated what one person called “hard” and 
“soft” entrepreneurship. Hard entrepreneurship consisted of the work being done to 
license technologies, incubate new firms, and translate faculty research in 
commercializable products. By contrast, soft entrepreneurship was the domain of the 
Institute for Innovation and Entrepreneurship and other largely educational centers. Of 
the two types of entrepreneurship, there was a pervasive belief that hard entrepreneurship 
would continue to thrive into the future, while soft entrepreneurship may be more 





in five or ten years that [education] piece will have just gone by the wayside. But in five 
or ten years, it is unlikely that we still won’t be trying to generate revenue.”  
 Sites on the margins of the ethos. As “Fearless Thinking” became ubiquitous on 
campus, there were sites that remained on the margins of the conversation surrounding 
innovation and entrepreneurship. The colleges of business and engineering have, for the 
most part, enthusiastically embraced the ethos, and many interview participants pointed 
to the increased collaboration between the Prince Center and TTEC as evidence of the 
desire to propel innovation and entrepreneurship out of its traditional silos in order to 
reach more faculty and students. Still, an inveterate concern was that some colleges were 
going to be left behind. A program director asked, “what are the opportunity costs of all 
of this? I think when we talk about opportunities for entrepreneurship, it seems like we’re 
saying, if you’re interested in learning Virgil, or thinking about what it means to be 
happy, you’re not going to make any money, you’re a loser.” Disciplines that do not 
intersect with the market are “not being talked about. And it’s not being made attractive 
to the student whose trying to figure out” what to study. In particular, it was noted that 
the humanities are not as involved in Tidewater’s innovation and entrepreneurship 
activities.  
 Amy Curtis, professor in the humanities, recalled that “a couple of people that 
I’ve talked to have voiced concern that in this environment, the humanities are going to 
get left behind.” While she acknowledged that “this anxiety about the humanities is not 
new,” there is a feeling among some of her colleagues that Tidewater is “becoming a very 
elite trade school.” She clarified that the humanities are partly to blame for not talking 





problems. More corporatized we’ve become. And more fixated on money, making the 
humanities look weaker.” Another professor in the humanities expressed exclusion from 
the conversation more concretely: “In my observation, the push of these things is 
completely irrelevant. I’ve never heard it come up in a department meeting.” More 
generally, one interview participant voiced concern not just for the humanities, but for the 
future of liberal arts education. She recalled that “it used to be that a well-educated 
person was someone who not only developed critical thinking skills, but was also 
enormously embedded in the history of the culture, and I don’t know that we can afford 
to lose that.” In her estimation, the promotion of innovation and entrepreneurship 
threatened the liberal arts. “This was a product of liberal arts education, that you were 
educated for life…. And that means that you have art, music, and a love of literature and 
all of those things that enrich one’s life.” There was a clear sense among many of the 
interview participants that the Tidewater University guided by an ethos of innovation and 
entrepreneurship created some parts of campus that were winners and others that were 
losers. 
 Champions of the ethos. Most interviews included a question about when 
participants remembered first hearing about innovation and entrepreneurship as they went 
about their lives on campus. Interestingly, many of them associated it with periods 
corresponding to the administrations of a core group of university leaders. More 
specifically, there were four administrators whose names were frequently mentioned as 
being instrumental in the promotion of innovation and entrepreneurship. Two 
administrators served as president, William Pierson and Henry Pryor, and two served as 





engineers, and two of them rose up the ranks from the department of computer and 
electrical engineering. At the same time, a theme in the interview data was that the 
decision to make innovation and entrepreneurship an institutional priority did not arise in 
response to a groundswell of faculty demand or support. The choice of innovation and 
entrepreneurship as institutional ethos was made in centralized offices in top-down 
fashion. 
 Former provost Nancy Martin responded when asked about her first experiences 
with innovation and entrepreneurship: “Our previous president, [William Pierson], was 
very keen on this concept. He was an engineer, and it’s logical that he would have seen 
the assistance to business and the growth of business as integral to what they do.” After 
Pierson, Martin noted, current president Henry Pryor “came in and took up that idea and 
continued to develop it. So, it’s been a continuum, but he [Pryor] certainly is very 
interested in this particular aspect.” A former associate provost for faculty similarly 
voiced the opinion that innovation and entrepreneurship “had a lot to do with the 
president of the university. So I think it came under [Pierson], who was an engineer and 
also understood that the landscape was changing. And then, of course, you’ve got it 
particularly under the new president who thinks a great deal about it. In fact, for him, it’s 
sort of the centerpiece of what he thinks the university should do.” Some interview 
participants put forth the view that Pierson laid the groundwork for Pryor, who is now 
seeing the positive outcomes of his predecessor’s labor. For example, Don Roberts in the 
college of engineering explained, “It took five years to move that inertia when [President 
Pierson] was saying this stuff, and then [President Pryor] is going to be the one who gets 





However, there was a sense that President Pryor has pushed innovation and 
entrepreneurship more than Pierson.  
 Many interview participants observed that Pryor mentions innovation and 
entrepreneurship in all of his speeches, representing, to borrow from one dean, a “central 
piece his vision for the university, no question about it.” This vision, it was remarked, has 
“trickled down.” Several interview participants noted that resources are being committed 
to translate the ethos into programs. This worried one interview participant, as it 
encouraged well-intentioned but under-informed people to try and embrace the vision: 
“Once you put funding behind it and a mandate, you have a lot of people entering a field 
who don’t have knowledge about it.” The exact amount of funding is not clear or readily 
available, but Travel Campbell-Green suggested that the resources devoted to it are still 
modest, “less than one percent” of the operational budget. For one dean, Vanessa Trevali, 
the president’s vision represented more of an obligation than a vision:  
 This is how the university works. The president announces this is one of his 
 priorities. A couple of times in passing, never anything director with an email, 
 but simply in passing  President [Pryor] has turned to me over the last couple of 
 years and said, ‘You are going to help me get this done.’ But if he hadn’t said 
 that, I would have understood that to be the case. 
While the trend has clearly been one of increasing emphasis under the current 
administration, interview data points to William Pierson and Henry Pryor as the two most 
critical champions of the ethos.  
 While the influence of these two administrators proved to be most significant to 





Vincent Chin and Omar Nuri. One of the Tidewater’s chief budget officers, Dorothy 
Winters, recounted how, in a period of rising costs and falling state appropriations, these 
two provosts encourage academic units to be entrepreneurial. “I would say it began with 
provost [Chin],” she reflected, “and it certainly continued with provost Nuri. It was this 
directive to go forth and be fruitful, be creative, be entrepreneurial, create streams of 
revenue to help you do what you need to do.” As a result, many units started professional 
master’s degrees with “mixed results,” meaning some, such as those in engineering, 
geographic information systems, and finance, were lucrative while others were not. In 
addition to this directive, Chin and Nuri were mentioned frequently because of their role 
in helping to launch new programs related to innovation and entrepreneurship, including 
the Crandall Entrepreneurs Program and the Honors Entrepreneurship House. An 
academic executive for faculty stated that Nuri “saw the world that way, in all respects” 
and believed entrepreneurship to be a good way “to optimize resources.” Both Chin and 
Nuri were products of engineering departments, and the place of engineers in central 
administrative positions was not lost on many interview participants. Nicholas Johnson 
argued that “if you look around the country, engineers have a tendency to rise to the top 
administratively.” At Tidewater, in particular, he opined, “If you go back, except for 
president Pryor, all of the senior administrators at this university for the past thirty years 
have been scientists or engineers.” The implication is that not only is the innovation and 
entrepreneurship ethos attributed to a core group of administrators, but that the values of 
these administrators hold as a result of their academic training and professional lives have 





 Interview data points to the fact that the promotion of innovation and 
entrepreneurship at Tidewater has come from a small number of voices. One professor in 
the sciences asserted, “I don’t think there’s been any effort at all to get buy-in from the 
chairs [of the various departments] as far as I know…. It feels very top down. Extremely 
top down.” William Pierson admitted that “it’s fair to say it was not a groundswell of 
interest from students and faculty members. It was well established on the campus in the 
business school and in engineering. And the rest of campus sort of looked at it as a 
province of the business school and engineering.” Yet, he defended his drive to make 
innovation and entrepreneurship a campus-wide priority by saying that, once he started 
talking about it, “people were very jacked by the whole thing.” Nicholas Johnson 
explained the lack of support from faculty by claiming that they largely “ignore a lot of 
the stuff that goes on at the university and go about their business.” However, data 
suggests an alternate reason why faculty members have not supported innovation and 
entrepreneurship as Tidewater’s ethos: they are not sure it is moving the university in the 
right direction. A professor in the sciences illustrated this sentiment: “I think the 
emphasis is too strong. Just the way it sounds to people is that everybody needs to be 
doing this, and we’re not even clear what this is, but it sounds like it has to do with 
money…. I do fear that there’s too much emphasis on it.” Hence, the champions of the 
ethos, according to interview participants, were central administrators, many of them 
engineers by training and profession. At no point during data collection was the view 






Connecting Emerging Developments to Theory  
 The preceding two sections, which together provide a snapshot of the origins of 
the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos at Tidewater University, support several of the 
theoretical propositions elaborated in chapter three. At a basic level, the values of the 
ethos align with key elements of Slaughter and Rhoades’ theory of academic capitalism. 
The norms and values of the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime include 
treating knowledge as a raw material and academic research products as commodities that 
can be owned, marketed, and sold. The same value is apparent in the innovation and 
entrepreneurship ethos, whereby the impact of research is defined in terms of its external 
value and problems are frequently believed to be solved through the creation of products 
and businesses. Additionally, the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime views 
public universities as businesses that link with corporations to address funding shortfalls 
and capitalize on market opportunities. Interview data unmistakably confirmed that 
Tidewater’s ethos valorized administrative entrepreneurship, which typically meant 
reducing costs and seeking revenue streams. Lastly, the academic capitalist 
knowledge/learning regime placed a premium on cultivating faculty entrepreneurship and 
training students as entrepreneurs as part of an orientation to economic relevance and 
growth in the knowledge-based economy. The innovation and entrepreneurship ethos, 
perhaps above all other values, promoted the idea that all campus constituents should 
embrace entrepreneurial thinking and incorporate it into their lives. As follows, 
Tidewater’s institutional ethos is a mirror to the academic capitalist knowledge/learning 
regime, providing evidence to support Slaughter and Rhoades’ core claim regarding the 





 One of the theory of academic capitalism’s constructs is also highlighted in this 
chapter: interstitial organizational emergence. This construct refers to the creation of 
units within universities to manage activities related to revenue generation, such as 
technology licensing offices. The birth of several units, such as the Office of Technology 
Transfer, TideVentures, and TTEC, clearly exemplify this construct. Although the next 
chapter examines the effectiveness of these units in generating revenue, their role is 
“boundary spanning, bringing universities, corporations, and the state closer together” for 
the purposes of creating income and spurring economic development (Slaughter & 
Rhoades, 2004, p. 23). Moreover, a critical argument of this chapter was that the ethos 
was a top-down initiative coming from central administrators. According to Slaughter 
and Rhoades, university presidents, as heads of wealthy institutions that produce 
knowledge, have become more important actors in the new economy. This chapter 
demonstrates that “presidents are now often called university CEOs, indicating that they 
have management powers similar to corporate CEOS. Colleges and universities could not 
engage in academic capitalism without the involvement of university presidents” (p. 
207). Without Tidewater’s two most recent presidents, innovation and entrepreneurship 
may not have become an institutional priority and target of investment. 
 Beyond the theory of academic capitalism, this chapter elaborated one other 
theoretical proposition, derived from the new sociology of knowledge. The fifth 
theoretical proposition contends that public universities wield power in validating certain 
ways of thinking and being in society through its knowledge-processing functions. In this 
way, the structures that are built around categories of thought comprise a theory of 





rise of many new programs to teach and promote entrepreneurship—as a process and way 
of thinking—based upon the value that 21
st
 century problems cannot be solved through 
policymaking, social institutions, or intellectuals. Rather, these programs endorsed 
entrepreneurship and, by extension, taking ideas to the marketplace, as the best means of 
effecting change and solving intractable issues. At the same time, interview participants 
noted that certain bodies of knowledge were made less attractive or were overlooked, 
such as the humanities, because they do not intersect with the market and do not offer the 
same prospects for wealth generation. Tidewater University essentially made a statement 
about what knowledge is valuable and sought to shape both how actors defined problems 
and looked to provide solutions. As a result, TU is not simply responding to pre-existing 
environmental conditions. It is also contributing to the creation and perpetuation of a 
social order, in this case free market capitalism.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter fulfilled two tasks in response to the first research question, which 
asked: through what processes did the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos develop at 
Tidewater University? The first task entailed better understanding the ethos itself and the 
extent to which it had been incorporated into the fundamental values of the institution. I 
showed through interview data and documentary evidence that innovation is commonly 
understood only in connection with entrepreneurship, and many interview participants 
took issue with how the concept is employed. Entrepreneurship was typically 
conceptualized as a process, mindset, and ecosystem. The thread running through all of 
these conceptualizations was the preponderance of language and examples taken from the 





company formation as the intended outcomes of entrepreneurship, while social 
entrepreneurship was a mere afterthought. Through analysis of these conceptualizations 
of innovation and entrepreneurship, I culled five values through which the innovation and 
entrepreneurship ethos is expressed: 
 innovation and entrepreneurship are pertinent to all academic disciplines and any 
type of organization;  
 innovation and entrepreneurship are a means to problem-solving in the 21st 
century;  
 innovation and entrepreneurship produce greater impact than traditional forms of 
research;  
 innovation and entrepreneurship applies to the administration of the university;  
 innovation and entrepreneurship befits this generation of university students. 
Although interview participants unequivocally stated that administrators at Tidewater 
were trying to make innovation and entrepreneurship institutional values, questions were 
raised about whether these ideas truly have traction. Many interview participants 
suggested that innovation and entrepreneurship may be more of a passing fad or 
marketing scheme than constitute core university values. Consequently, I argued in this 
chapter that the ethos is a project under construction whose future is uncertain. 
 In the second part of the chapter, I viewed the task as uncovering the sites out of 
which the ethos grew, and those university actors who were instrumental in its 
emergence. Interview data displayed a pattern of development, such that entrepreneurship 
began in the colleges of engineering and business in the mid-1980s. New programs, most 





these administrative homes, often by deans in collaboration with a donor. However, the 
role of the offices of the president and provost grew over time, and currently many of the 
initiatives, including the Institute for Innovation and Entrepreneurship, is managed 
centrally. This process of centralization indicates another important finding of this 
chapter, which is that the ethos was initiated by administrators, especially presidents and 
provosts. Several interview participants noted that there was little buy-in from faculty and 
that the thrust to associate TU with all things innovative and entrepreneurial came from 
top down. The assumption seems to be that it is the place of the president to establish the 
institution’s priorities, and, presently, there have been no opportunities for forums or 
mechanisms of shared governance to provide feedback. This is all the more striking, 
given that many interview participants did not believe innovation and entrepreneurship 
were the appropriate basis for guiding Tidewater’s future endeavors. I maintain in this 
chapter that the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos came from top-level decision 
making and signals the growing power of central administration in university governance. 
 The next chapter shifts from exploring the nature and status of the ethos to 
understanding the motivations for adopting it. In particular, I look at how university 
leaders understand higher education’s political economic landscape and the specific 
challenges that Tidewater confronts. Several rationales are examined in some detail, 
including the theory of academic capitalism’s persistent claim that entrepreneurship is 
intricately linked to the search for new sources of revenue for the institution. As the next 
chapter demonstrates, revenues from entrepreneurship represent a dream deferred, 
making room for alternate explanations for why, out of a vast universe of possible values, 





CHAPTER FIVE: EXPLANATIONS FOR THE ETHOS 
 
Everything that’s happening here is basically happening around the country. Every 
higher education thing you pick up and read, it’s the same story. We’re in a bit of a crisis 
right now, and we’ve probably gotten ourselves there. 
-Budget executive 
 
My speculation would be that, in the mind of whoever came up with this, innovation is 
related to invention, and entrepreneurship you could see as relating to the land-grant 
mission—translating things that happen on campus into things that are good for society. 
-Professor in the sciences 
 
Introduction 
Applying their theory of academic capitalism, Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) 
would posit that the decision to initiate and support an institutional ethos built around 
innovation and entrepreneurship is a manifestation of the academic capitalist 
knowledge/learning regime. This regime, they argue, developed largely due to the push 
of declining state funding for higher education and the pull of opportunities in the 
marketplace to locate new revenue streams. In this way, the explanation for why 
university leaders selected innovation and entrepreneurship, out of a vast array of ideas to 
strategically guide the institution, centers upon shifting resource dependencies—the 
substantial loss of government-based resources on one hand and the increasing pursuit of 
private, external resources on the other. As this chapter demonstrates, however, resources 
constitute but one piece of the myriad motivations driving the innovation and 
entrepreneurship ethos at Tidewater University. The purpose of this chapter is to answer 
the second research question: why did university leaders initiate and support the 
innovation and entrepreneurship ethos? The individuals that were interviewed for this 
dissertation clearly situated this decision within a dynamic political-economic 





 The first part of this chapter is dedicated to developing a complete portrayal of 
higher education’s political-economic context, as it is understood by a cadre of 
Tidewater’s leaders, which in this study consists of program directors, deans, associate 
provosts, provosts, vice presidents, presidents, and the chancellor of the state university 
system. Framing this first section is an illuminative text, The Post-Land Grant University, 
which was based upon a 1981 grant-funded report on TU done at the request of the 
president at that time. Many of the conditions attendant upon higher education described 
in this text from the early 1980s are reflected in the views of interview participants in the 
present. Chief among the political-economic factors mentioned by university leaders are 
transformations in the American economy associated with globalization, particularly the 
perceived advent of the knowledge-based economy and the role of the university within 
it.  
Additional factors that were regularly mentioned as influential in shaping the 
institutional ethos were: 1) government disinvestment in higher education; 2) elevated 
accountability expectations from the state; 3) increasing critique of the value of a college 
degree; 4) heightened institutional competition; and 5) intensifying student-consumer 
demands. Consequently, the political-economic environment in which university leaders 
position Tidewater bears some resemblance to two core features of Slaughter and 
Rhoades’ theorization: the new economy and the neoliberal state. However, I contend 
that the presence of other factors yields a more abundant set of challenges to which 
university leaders believe they are responding in crafting and promoting the innovation 
and entrepreneurship ethos. These factors suggest gaps in the theory of academic 





service, and the pursuit of legitimacy and prestige. In the second part of this chapter, I 
present explanations for the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos that emerged during 
interviews. Four explanations are presented and evaluated: the search for new sources of 
revenue, the influence of the university’s land-grant heritage, the pressures of keeping 
pace in a competitive higher education field, and the desire to attain and attract faculty 
members and undergraduate students.   
 This chapter makes a case for refining the theory of academic capitalism and 
provides evidence confirming the validity of several of the theoretical propositions 
developed in chapter three. Specifically, interview data brings Schugurensky’s (1994) 
heteronomous university model to fruition, providing rich detail of the twin forces of 
commercialization and state control. Connections can also be drawn between the 
interview data and perceptions of what garners legitimacy and prestige in the higher 
education field, such as contributing to economic growth and incubating the next Google 
or Gatorade. In the last part of the chapter, I attempt to further develop these emerging 
links to theory, thereby showing the ways in which the institutional case informs wider 
conversations regarding the nature of change in U.S. higher education. Like chapter four, 
I divide the majority of the chapter’s content into two sections, one devoted to the 
political-economic context and the other exploring explanations of the ethos.      
Perceptions of the Political-Economic Environment 
 The post-land grant university? In the summer of 1979, Tidewater’s then 
president asked Malcolm Moos, a political scientist and former president of the 
University of Minnesota, to direct a strategic planning study funded by a $190,000 grant 





“devise strategies that would enable the University to achieve new economies and greater 
productivity for the hard times ahead” (p. v). The result of the two-year effort was a 
report and subsequent book titled The Post-Land Grant University (Moos, 1981). This 
book cannot be readily found on administrator bookcases, instead finding refuge deep in 
TU’s library. However, its relevance to this dissertation cannot be disputed. Its first 
chapter begins by asking, “What does it mean to be a state university in America in the 
1980s?” (p. 2). The answers, it boldly declared, “are imbedded in the history of state 
universities and land-grant colleges and in the new tasks imposed upon public 
universities by contemporary conditions” (p. 2). The conditions of which it speaks 
include “the changing American economy,” especially the “sudden slowing of [its] 
century-old economic growth and the decline in the nation’s position as the world’s 
dominant economic power” (p. 15) They also include demographic shifts, such that Moos 
claimed “the United States is becoming an increasingly geriatric society” (p. 57).  
One of the most significant upheavals affecting higher education was “the 
emerging information society,” marked by drastic innovations in the “assembling, 
exchange, and dissemination of information”—activities that lie at the heart of the 
university enterprise (p. 23). Lastly, a chapter is devoted to regulations thrust upon 
universities, referring in particular to “growing demands for centralized, detailed 
budgeting systems,” which are described as “controls that leach the quality and creativity 
of universities.” According to Moos, “the nation cannot afford laissez-faire higher 
education. Some coordination and cooperation to provide order…is essential” (p. 31). 
However, he underscored that autonomy should be prioritized because it has led to the 





study concluded that it was necessary for Tidewater and similar universities to maintain 
“old land-grant themes, but with an updated approach” and also revive “a few old land-
grant themes that have been allowed to atrophy, but which need renewed attention” (p. 
11).  
 Despite the passing of some 30 years since the publication of The Post-Land 
Grant University, the conditions it describes are strikingly similar to the political-
economic context in which Tidewater operates, according to the leaders who participated 
in this study. This section chronicles their responses to a series of questions related to the 
wider environment in which TU is situated and the main challenges it confronts.  
As was true at the outset of the 1980s, university leaders almost unanimously 
noted that the American economy had changed in ways that redefined the role of the 
university and its knowledge production capacity in society. Furthermore, there was a 
pervasive belief that the financial “model”—as it was termed by interview participants—
of the university was in crisis, in large measure because of government disinvestment in 
higher education and, at the same time, ever-increasing state expectations and reporting 
demands with respect to what the university accomplishes with those diminishing funds. 
Over the course of 1998 to 2013, university leaders believed that competition had 
augmented in tandem with the institution’s improved reputation, and this competition 
included using amenities to cater to what were perceived as ascending student-consumer 
demands. The question of resources, of course, permeates many of these features of the 
political-economic context, especially with respect to the university’s relationship with 
the state. However, as interview data shows, the picture that emerges is more complicated 





 The jobs are not coming back: the changing American economy. Many 
interview participants believed that the U.S. economy was undergoing dramatic 
transformation, the dimensions of which directly bear upon the future of their institution. 
The common thread weaving these dimensions together is globalization, as evinced by 
the perceived ascension of the knowledge-based economy, the loss of manufacturing 
jobs, and the need to rediscover America’s comparative advantage in global trade through 
innovation. The notion of the knowledge-based economy was one of the most frequent 
ways of describing economic change. One program director suggested, “We’re fairly 
clearly twenty years into some new version of an industrial revolution with information 
technology.”  This revolution, according to Travis Campbell-Green, is predicated on the 
idea that “to a larger extent than ever before…jobs and the economy [are] based on new 
knowledge, you know, new industries.” The implications of the transition to a 
knowledge-based economy for universities were believed to be profound. In the words of 
the Don Roberts, a dean of one of the colleges, Tidewater’s role in the “human capital 
business” is emphasized in a budding knowledge-based economy:  
People have figured out that the future of the next economy is a knowledge-based 
economy, and the only way to get there is that you take your talent, you educate 
it, and you educate it in the best facilities with some of the best people and you 
tell them to innovate. 
While “economic workforce development” was also frequently mentioned by Chancellor 
Hofbauer, he agreed with Bill Gates’ more general assessment of the new role of the 
university in society: “I remember a talk Bill Gates gave once somewhere where he said, 





center a strong university.’ It just doesn’t exist. I think he’s right about that.” What the 
knowledge-based economy symbolized for many interview participants was the death 
knell of American manufacturing and the need to prepare TU graduates for jobs of the 
future. 
  The economic shift underway was often described in terms of phases, and the 
phase preceding the rise of information/knowledge was based upon manufacturing. “In 
the beginning, it was all agrarian and farm sciences and that kind of stuff,” Keith Meyers, 
the director of an entrepreneurship living-learning program, explained, “and then it 
became manufacturing and then it became, to some extent, knowledge and information 
and IT and things like that.” Whereas “30 years ago the driver of the American economy 
was making cars, sort of production line manufacturing,” now the “nature of the 
American economy and what drives it has moved much closer to what universities do,” 
observed Chancellor Hofbauer. Consequently, the security that came with employment 
opportunities at firms associated with this phase is a relic of the past. Former provost 
Nancy Martin remarked, “[many] of the kinds of jobs that we had here have gone, 
they’ve gone overseas.” When asked to explain further, she captured well what many 
interview participants believed with respect to jobs and the economy: 
At one point, in the 1950s let’s say, everybody got out, all they wanted to do was 
go into some safe little net of a large corporation where benefits [were available] 
and [workers] would be protected with a pension. Well, that’s gone! That’s just 
not an opportunity. So, students today coming out, the world out there is much 





students to be able to go out and deal in this world, and to think creatively and not 
be afraid to start something new, to change jobs.  
Therefore, with the shift from manufacturing to the knowledge-based economy, there was 
a clear desire to prepare students for uncertainty and risk. Several interview participants 
predicted that students would need to be ready to change jobs frequently, in what Tony 
Christensen characterized as “free agency kind of employment.” In fact, there may not be 
jobs waiting for students when they graduate, requiring them to innovate and create their 
own job. As another research executive proclaimed: “Everyone needs to learn to make a 
job, not take a job. That’s increasingly going to be the future.”  
 Innovation was perceived as necessary not only to create jobs, but also to ensure 
America’s comparative advantage in global trade. There was a persistent belief among 
interview participants that, in the face of declining national competitiveness, the United 
States needed to concentrate on what it does better than any other country: innovate. 
Travis Campbell-Green explained this idea as follows: “If you don’t have a price 
advantage in labor like China or Vietnam or India, and you don’t have a resource 
advantage, what is your advantage? It’s got to be innovation. It’s got to be the creation 
and utilization of new knowledge.” The reason that innovating in the use of knowledge 
was seen as a comparative advantage was because of America’s universities. Don 
Roberts exemplified this advantage: “Fortunately, the biggest thing we have is our higher 
education system. Of the top 100 universities, probably sixty are from the United States.” 
Still, he commented, countries like Israel and South Korea have also “figured it out,” 
meaning “you can never rest on our laurels.” An academic executive, T. Y. Patel, among 





immigration policies in the United States, which have allowed “literally thousands upon 
thousands of brains to converge here.” In this way, the logic of many university leaders is 
that the economy has changed in ways that prioritize knowledge-based goods over 
manufactured goods. Therefore, America’s comparative advantage lies in its universities 
and their ability to spur innovation through the production and application of new 
knowledge.  
The attention university leaders paid to the position of the United States in a 
global system of trade and fears related to declining national competitiveness reveals the 
extent to which the political-economic environment is shaped by global interconnections. 
Only a few interview participants explicitly stated that Tidewater viewed itself in a global 
versus national context, but the changes to the economy that they saw as a central 
pressure guiding their work are not unique to the United States. The perceived shift to a 
knowledge-based economy amongst interview participants, for example, demonstrates 
the ways in which universities are enmeshed in discourses of globalization and 
concomitant flows of ideas about how to best bolster economic growth. 
 Cross-cutting this treatment of economic transformation in America was the 
theme of mutual benefit: the knowledge-based economy benefited from universities, and 
universities benefited from the notion of an economy whose prized capital is stored in the 
brains of its best, often university-based, thinkers. Hence, universities and the people 
leading them have a vested interest in promoting the knowledge-based economy, 
displaying their role in perpetuating discourses surrounding the importance of innovation 
and the disappearance of manufacturing. For this reason, the story of economic change 





in “fields of the future” like cybersecurity and bioengineering. Simply put, universities 
are seen as more vital in an economy that relies upon advanced knowledge products than 
an economy that needs large numbers of semi-skilled workers in the manufacturing 
sector. It is possible university leaders saw in the knowledge-based economy a discourse 
that helped justify funding their institution and could stem the decades-long hemorrhage 
in state appropriations.  
 The red threat: government disinvestment in higher education. Diversifying 
funding sources, or rethinking the university’s beleaguered financial “model,” was a 
common refrain during interviews with academic exevcutives. When this model was 
mentioned, it almost always referred to how the university paid for its various functions 
and the share of the total coming from public versus private sources. Nicholas Johnson 
shared that TU is “developing a more diverse funding model,” by trying to become less 
reliant upon the federal government for research funding and state appropriations for its 
operational budget. This creates some unease in certain parts of the university “because 
when you try to diversify, you don’t know exactly which of the new parts of the portfolio 
are actually going to succeed.” For Tony Christensen, diversification was an imperative: 
“We have to diversify our funding sources. There’s no other option.” This imperative was 
largely due to cuts in state funding, which, in the words of one dean, prompted Tidewater 
to “start building our own new financial model, so we would provide a high quality 
experience for every undergraduate and at the same time be able to support the 
infrastructure.” For virtually all interview participants, there was a sense that state 





was recognition that Tidewater had fared better than universities in states where cuts 
were even more severe. 
 Interview participants were acutely aware of the fact that state appropriations had 
been in decline for many years. Some interview participants emphasized a general 
decline in state funding, and others conveyed that the share of the university’s budget 
from the state had declined only as other revenue sources—like grant money—increased. 
For example, Travis Campbell-Green, who had spent over twenty years at the university, 
reported: 
One thing that I’m told but have less personal experience with is that state support 
for higher education has decreased quite dramatically over the years. So, maybe 
when I came, much more than half of the budget was provided by the state. In 
fact, I think it was about half. And now that’s about twenty percent.  
Nicholas Johnson was of the opinion that cuts in state funding have been “pretty 
minimal” and that “[state] money has actually gone up, it’s just that the rest of our 
business has grown.” Former president William Pierson and one of TU’s budget 
executives, Dorothy Winters, clarified the trends in state funding for the university. 
Pierson reflected that during his administration, from 1998 to 2010, there “was a 
continuation of the downslide of public [government] support for universities.” He noted 
that “state support in one way was very generous; that is, the facilities support, which 
comes out of a capital budget in the state…was well supported, but the operating budget 
was not well supported.” I asked Dorothy Winters whether the reductions in state support 
have been in absolute terms or relative to the growth of other sources of revenue. She 





research budget and so forth, the state share has gone down a little, and then it is through 
several years of basically a frozen budget with costs going up…the whole numbers 
declined a bit.” In recent years, decreases in funding have been at both the state and 
federal levels. 
   During his state of the campus address for the academic year 2012-13, President 
Pryor called uncertainty surrounding the federal government’s budget this generation’s 
“red threat.” As entitlement programs increase the national debt, Tidewater and other 
research universities must deal with reductions in available federal grant money. This is 
acutely troubling for TU, which, according to Nicholas Johnson, has become dependent 
on money from the federal government: “About eighty percent of the grant money that 
comes into this university comes from the federal government. That’s particularly high, 
compared to other institutions, because we’ve adapted to the environment that we’re in, 
in this federal enclave here.” Likening Tidewater’s reliance on federal money to “a single 
industry economy,” Johnson argued the university needs to prepare for an unstable future 
and even harness opportunities that arise in that uncertainty because “a crisis is a terrible 
thing to waste.” It is not just research projects that are affected by reduced availability of 
federal funding. The university’s operating budget is indirectly bolstered by research 
grants, which currently have a “tax rate” of 52 percent. Thus, 52 cents of every research 
grant dollar goes to the institution. As Dorothy Winters related, “[T]hat’s a very 
important revenue stream, and we’re starting to see that decline because there’s less grant 
money out there right now.” Although many university leaders felt fortunate that 
Tidewater was in a better situation than universities in states that have drastically cut 





dwindling resources from traditional fonts of support. The alarm caused by this trend 
suggests that dependence upon state resources is alive and well at TU. 
 Many of the views of university leaders are consistent with those of leaders across 
the country. In a 2014 survey of 342 chief academic officers at colleges and universities 
nationwide, Inside Higher Education reported that, even though 91 percent believed their 
institution was “academically healthy,” just 11 percent thought that the financial situation 
had improved in the last year. Less than a quarter of survey respondents felt as though the 
economic crises that began in 2008 were effectively over at their institution. As a result 
of this situation, 71 percent of chief academic officers predicted they would cut under-
performing academic programs this year, and 60 percent said they will be looking into 
dismissing under-performing faculty. In general, then, survey respondents are 
“continuing to emphasize a variety of cost cutting practices to maximize their budgets 
and streamline operations,” not only by evaluation programs and faculty, but also by 
collaborating with other institutions (87 percent) and expanding online programs (80 
percent) (p. 10). Efforts at reducing costs and increasing collaboration at Tidewater are 
not simply byproducts of the budget—they are also expected and, in some cases, 
demanded by the state. 
 Elevated accountability expectations from the state. In response to reduced 
state appropriations, interview participants remarked that peer institutions simply raised 
tuition. That was not an option for Tidewater between 2007 and 2010. Don Roberts 
recalled, “We had a governor who wanted to reduce costs for higher education and 
therefore make it affordable for…students, which I think has been a noble endeavor.” 





university leaders feeling especially hamstrung. As Chancellor Hofbauer put it: “One of 
the…challenges we’ve faced in the state is we’ve had a political structure that has been 
very resistant to tuition increases and for understandable reasons. The good news is that 
we haven’t lost the money that other states have, but in return for that we’ve had to 
accept some restrictions on the rate of increase in tuition.” This meant that Tidewater had 
to pursue greater efficiencies and private money, remarked William Pierson: “[the 
university] just buckled down, reduced services and is more thinly staffed in places, so 
you have fewer staff, staff work harder. [We] tried to raise private money to support 
programs and services.” The tuition freeze, for Pierson, necessitated that the university be 
more entrepreneurial in its operations. At the same time, the state also elevated 
accountability expectations and added to the university’s responsibilities. In this way, the 
state looked to exert greater control over the university. 
 William Pierson elucidated that “what’s happened is a combination of increasing 
regulations and increasing responsibilities given to higher education for activities outside 
basic teaching and research, which have taken more and more revenues away.” Several 
interview participants brought up that there is more state oversight than in the past, 
requiring myriad reporting mechanisms on everything from faculty activities and 
performance to graduation rates and the number of startup companies. It was the case that 
many interview participants did not object to accountability requirements. As one 
academic executive observed: “we have to have good oversight; any good democracy 
should have that. But we have to be very careful as to what constitutes good oversight.” 
His worry, which was echoed by several other university leaders, was that, in the process 





of “throwing the baby out with the bathwater,” meaning that the university might 
surrender the autonomy and creativity that made it “one of the most successful 
enterprises in the history of humankind.” Additionally, state accountability expectations 
were sometimes viewed as costly. Another academic executive claimed that at a nearby 
institution, the “cost of compliance with state regulations and rules” exceeds the amount 
of funding it receives from the state.  
One of the responsibilities that was not new but received renewed emphasis in 
recent years contributing to the state’s economic development agenda. In the view of 
former provost Nancy Martin: “I think today we are expected to do much more. Maybe 
it’s just the…state that we’re in, but within our state certainly we’re looked upon for 
economic development, not only through bringing in research dollars…but also to 
stimulate the economy through our knowledge transfer into businesses.” This expectation 
became more pronounced during economic hardship. “When things go bad in the 
economy, which has happened more and more frequently it seems, the state looks over at 
the university and says, ‘What are you going to do about it?’” In addition to contributing 
to economic development, Tidewater must ensure that no more than a quarter of its in-
coming students are out-of-state, a requirement which the dean for undergraduate studies 
believed is not imposed on other public universities. Furthermore, Chancellor Hofbauer 
mentioned the state’s “very ambitious goal” for the university system of “having fifty-
five percent of the adult population with a two or four-year degree”—a goal which has 
not been accompanied by additional resources. These responsibilities signal the state’s 





However, this recognition co-exists with critique of how universities operate and the 
relevance of what they teach. 
 Increasing critique of the costs and value of a college degree. A small but 
perceptible element of the political-economic context raised by several interview 
participants was that, like never before, higher education’s cost and value was subject to 
critique by some observers.
6
 This critique was often baffling to university leaders. Travis 
Campbell-Green indicated that there has been increasing criticism of higher education, 
mainly with respect to cost, which he felt “just puzzled by.” In his eyes, America’s 
universities “have been tremendously productive…by any measure.” Although costs have 
been rising, he believed that tuition at Tidewater was still affordable and “just from a 
cost-benefit point of view, your return on investment is definitely worth it.” Though 
criticism was not completely unwarranted, he questioned whether moneyed interests were 
behind the scrutiny: “There certainly is a business aspect of this. Venture capital isn’t 
pouring money in for no reason, so I think some people must see an opportunity to make 
a lot of money by offering a degree a lot cheaper. So, that might be one source of the 
criticism of traditional university education.” The interest in disrupting the higher 
education market among venture capitalists indicates that its value and remains strong 
from an investment standpoint. However, some university leaders suggested that there is 
a current of critique that questions the importance of a college education at all. 
One dean acknowledged that she has heard talk of the irrelevance of higher 
education. She dismissed the notion that a college degree is not necessary: “There are 
some people who think you don’t need a college education. I think a whole lot of us 
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economic future has been stressed by many politicians, resulting in initiatives to increase access, retention, 





know that you do.” However, she was more sympathetic towards the opinion that a 
residential college experience can be complemented by online alternatives. “I think the 
other side of [the critique] is people who have started to conclude you can buy your 
education online. Stay in your own room at home. You don’t need to have this building, 
those beautiful grounds, all that stuff. There’s a conversation there.” This was not, she 
emphasized, a prevalent opinion at Tidewater, where students and their parents “value 
education in a community.” When she asked students on her undergraduate advisory 
council whether they would prefer living-learning programs or online-based learning 
communities, “They all said in unison, ‘living-learning programs’…. Our students are 
still there, valuing the residential experience. Even as we’re moving to do more things 
online, when we surveyed our students last year, they resisted it.” Consequently, although 
she was aware of critique surrounding higher education, this dean indicated that 
undergraduate students at the university desired a residential college experience. 
 For one interviewee, the critique of higher education concentrated on the entire 
enterprise and its reason for being. In her 42 years at Tidewater, former provost Nancy 
Martin witnessed a remarkable amount of change. One change she found particularly 
disheartening was “how negative society is towards universities.” She recalled visiting 
her home state of Texas several years ago and was surprised by the opinions there: 
I opened the local newspaper, and there was an editorial about how useless higher 
education was. Instead of funding universities, we should just be giving every 
high school graduate $5,000 and telling them to go out and make a business. I was 
just stunned because it’s so foreign to everything that I think. How could someone 





Martin’s story was unique in the interview data and does not seem reflective of a trend. 
However, it demonstrates the sense, repeated among others, that higher education is 
under siege. “We really have to justify our existence,” she noted, “in ways that we never 
did before.” She traced some of the recent critique to the increasingly widespread idea 
that a college degree is an entitlement or simply “a commodity—with an end,” by which 
she meant “education for itself is not as valuable as education for a job. And we have 
never been job training.” Rather, she was motivated each day by the conviction that her 
work “trains you for a life of learning” that “raises your general knowledge about how 
the world operates because we believe that’s the underpinnings of a great democracy.” 
Martin was not alone in picking up on the influence of student-consumer purchasing 
power as state funding declined and tuition dollars became vital to Tidewater’s 
operations. 
 The field of play: heightened institutional competition. Amidst critique of the 
value of higher education, university leaders resoundingly conveyed that Tidewater was a 
star among public universities whose rise could be mapped back to the presidency of 
William Pierson. Using “excellence” as his guiding principle, Pierson set out in 1998 to 
“help the university understand what an important place it is” and “change the 
university’s perception of itself.” This entailed immediately changing the university’s 
peer group because “it compared itself against places that weren’t research universities at 
all.” Thus, Pierson required that “every request [he] saw be benchmarked against great 
places.” He referred to this tactic as “establishing the bar,” explaining, “Excellent places 
establish a bar that’s probably higher than you are, and that should be the bar you’re 





were beneficial, as Tidewater “has improved significantly, especially in undergraduate 
education.” When he came to the institution, he remembered it being not very selective, 
but “it’s become a lot more selective.” Moreover, research became more heavily 
emphasized. Nancy Martin noted that while “research was always important because 
university faculty are expected to have a life of the mind,” the emphasis “was not as 
extensively on research as it is today.” A former academic executive described this 
process as “living up to the label of being a research one university.” The increasing 
stress on research was intended to signal and bolster the university’s improving 
reputation, thereby helping it to secure more grants. As one college dean understood it, 
Tidewater has been responding to current challenges “by being as aggressive as possible 
to build up our research reputation so we can keep the grant money coming in.” These 
efforts have undoubtedly resulted in more prestige, as evinced by better rankings, and 
heightened competition. 
 The consequences of Tidewater’s striving for prestige since the administration of 
William Pierson have been clear to one dean. She explained: 
With [Pierson] especially, about 15 years ago, the university just really put the 
steam on in terms of raising standards and doing all sorts of things to raise the 
rankings. It’s very important work that was done to move [Tidewater] into the 
upper ranks, and we became a top twenty public research [university]. That’s a 
very special group to be in. 
Accompanying this privileged status, nonetheless, is the presence of constant 
competition. “It’s very competitive to try and stay in the top twenty,” the dean continued, 





assessment, remarking that higher education “has become more and more competitive,” 
which has “translated into…competition for faculty, for infrastructure, and so on.” As the 
university’s rankings have improved, it has entered a new echelon of institutions. This 
means, according to one dean, that “if you’re ranked with other universities at the top, all 
the things that put them at the top you’re competing for—the competition is very tough.” 
In order to remain competitive, many interview participants relied upon peer comparison. 
 The university leaders I interviewed all confided that they spent significant time 
determining what peer institutions are doing in a variety of areas. Chancellor Hofbauer 
summarized the sentiments expressed by many interview participants: “Institutions have 
goals they’re supposed to achieve on graduation rates, research funding, economic 
development, patents, licenses, startups, major awards for faculty, rankings. So, yes, 
we’re constantly benchmarking performance…against national peers.” Competition, in 
some respects, was viewed as part and parcel of higher education, producing Nobel 
laureates and breakthroughs in science unparalleled in other systems. One of the more 
interesting developments was that competition among institutions has transformed due to 
alliances. An academic executive remarked:  
in the old days, it was just competition. You just moved your pieces hoping that 
you made the right moves and that you were better than competitors. What I have 
observed…is that now, of course, competition won’t go away, but there are also 
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Attracting and retaining a shrinking pool of talented, tuition-paying students was one of 
the primary areas of competition, according to university leaders. 
 Purchasing power: intensifying student-consumer demands. Prior to my 
interview with her, Dorothy Winters attended a conference for university budget officers. 
She related that “in terms of national demographics of college-aged students, we will 
bottom out in 2014, and then we will start to see a slight improvement in 2015.” Even 
then, the students coming to universities will be non-traditional: “they’re far more likely 
to be first generation, low-income, underrepresented. So, those kids will come, in a sense, 
much needier. They’ll need more financial aid, they’ll need more support.” Competition 
for more “traditional,” high-achieving students has become fierce, as they are an 
increasingly crucial component in Tidewater’s reputation-seeking and financial models. It 
is through the provision of services—amenities, as they are sometimes called—that 
Tidewater and other public universities have sought to attract these students. Former 
president William Pierson explained this as follows: 
The students also demand a lot of services now, which they didn’t before 
probably because they didn’t think they could get them before… But now, the 
process of identifying places that will give good services is a major part of the 
students’ process of selecting a university to go to. They all go for their tour, they 
tour the laboratories, they speak to the students, speak to the faculty, and see what 
kind of gym they’ve got. All this stuff goes on, which is really a way of looking 
at, well, what is this university giving to me? … So, in effect, as universities have 
responded in wanting to be attractive to better students, they’ve then provided 





The services that Pierson listed were athletic facilities, student unions, and luxury 
residence halls. Escalating costs associated with these amenities, over time, created what 
Pierson called “a train wreck that you couldn’t get off of.” He elaborated, “universities 
want to recruit good students, students want to go to places that serve their needs, 
understandably so. Even though you can see that this is going in a bad direction…there’s 
not much you can do about it unless you just drop out entirely.”  
 Part of the reason that Tidewater sought to respond to student demands is that 
students were paying more for their education and, consequently, expecting more out of 
their experience. As one dean commented: “the administrative infrastructure has 
translated into the need for higher tuition revenues, and that has translated into higher 
expectations of the students.” Nancy Martin confirmed that “students expect more. You 
write an email as a student to a faculty member, you expect it to be answered, right? We 
used to have office hours, now we’re on call 24/7.” She linked these expectations to a 
shift in thinking, such that a college education was considered a private good. “The idea 
of being a public good and, therefore, worthy of public funds just because we educated 
large numbers of undergraduates,” she claimed, “is no longer a value so clearly held 
outside the university.” Instead, “many people in the larger world see [higher education] 
as a commodity…You pay your money, pull the knob, out comes an education. It’s not a 
process, it’s a candy bar.” Like Nancy Martin, an academic executive was displeased 
with the view that higher education is a commodity whose returns are primarily private. 
He noticed “a general change in philosophy” that students should pay more for tuition 
“because [they] are the beneficiaries of the education,” which he considered “a pretty 





reality of the university’s situation was that it received fewer funds from the state yet 
wanted to continue its trajectory of improved reputation, which, in turn, incurred higher 
costs for the institution, necessitating a greater reliance upon tuition dollars and the 
student-consumer expectations that came with them.  
 Although there have certainly been changes in higher education’s political-
economic context since the publication of the Post-Land Grant University, university 
leaders echoed many of the challenges outlined in the report. In this way, it is important 
to note that the environment in which Tidewater operates did not recently or quickly 
materialize. Instead, it is tied to trends that began in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The 
viewpoints of university leaders detailed above support the framing of Slaughter and 
Rhoades’ (2004) theory of academic capitalism. More specifically, the steadfast belief in 
economic change away from assembly-line manufacturing and towards the capitalization 
of knowledge products through innovations in information technology aligns with 
Slaughter and Rhoades’ conceptualization of the new economy. This economic 
assemblage owes its existence, in part, to the neoliberal state, which in the theory of 
academic capitalism led to initiatives aimed at the roll-back of state support, rising user 
fees, and new forms of regulation that compromise institutional autonomy. Nevertheless, 
based upon interview data collected for this dissertation, I argue that the theory of 
academic capitalism failed to sufficiently take into account the mechanisms of control 
and continued dependency that university leaders believed to define the relationship 
between Tidewater and the government. Somewhat paradoxically, there was a clear sense 
that the university’s obligations to the state had increased even as its public funding had 





obligations lest it loose more state support, all the while seeking to maintain its position 
in a highly competitive race. I demonstrate in the next section that innovation and 
entrepreneurship at Tidewater was not simply about shifting resource dependencies, but 
also about the idea of fulfilling a tradition of institutional public service.  
Another point that is under-emphasized in the theory of academic capitalism is 
that the search for new resources is not, in the end, about those resources, but rather how 
those resources are put to use in the never-ending quest for greater prestige. Thus, while 
it is true that many of the factors giving shape to the context in which university leaders 
position Tidewater ultimately derive from the question of resources, placing too much 
stress on revenue can eclipse other motivations for adopting the innovation and 
entrepreneurship ethos. Giving fuller consideration to factors like accountability, 
tradition, and prestige reveals that the encroaching profit motive at the heart of the theory 
of academic capitalism is not the sole explanation for the innovation and entrepreneurship 
ethos. 
Beyond Money: Explanations for the Ethos 
 In the previous chapter, I showed that, for many interview participants, 
entrepreneurship in an academic setting like TU was “not about the money.” In the case 
of the ethos, this is not entirely true nor completely false. The motivation for initiating 
and supporting an ethos that attributes great importance to innovation and 
entrepreneurship is about money. However, it is not exclusively about money, and 
presently, the generation of net revenue from entrepreneurship remains more of an 
aspiration than a reality. In this second part of the chapter, I examine four explanations 





resources. Building upon significant factors of the political-economic environment, I 
show how the ethos relates to a duty and desire to serve the state as part of a land-grant 
tradition. Furthermore, I articulate the role of innovation and entrepreneurship in 
Tidewater’s jockeying for position in a competitive higher education field, highlighting 
the role of legitimacy and prestige in creating the ethos. These three explanations, I 
contend, are the most important in understanding the adoption of the ethos, far 
outweighing a fourth explanation: that innovation and entrepreneurship is necessary to 
make TU attractive to undergraduate students and faculty members. The interview data 
on which this treatment of motivations is based supports several of the theoretical 
propositions offered in previous chapters, giving reason to not wholesale reject the theory 
of academic capitalism, but rather refine it. 
 Striking it big? Revenues and entrepreneurship. Developing new revenue 
streams—or, diversifying the university’s funding portfolio—was one explanation for the 
innovation and entrepreneurship ethos that emerged throughout interviews with 
university leaders. In the early days of entrepreneurship on campus, following the 
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, there was the expectation that universities would 
make a great deal of money from licensing technology to the private sector. Tidewater 
has learned since the creation of its office of technology transfer that this dream has not 
come to fruition. “If you look at the data,” explained Tony Christensen, “there are only 
ten or fifteen universities in the United States making a lot of money. Almost all of them 
are from some sort of drug or pharmaceutical…. And then there’s everyone else.” The 
director of TideVentures, Bradley McDowell, similarly noted that “probably ten percent 





year—in licensing revenues.” Both individuals said Tidewater was among the institutions 
not making substantial money from technology transfer activities. Dorothy Winters 
reported that the only revenue she saw coming into university coffers from 
entrepreneurship was the creation of professional degree programs that “basically charge 
what the market will bear,” yielding around $60 million in total annual revenue for their 
academic units. This money remains in the hands of the units, unless the president 
intervenes. 
In the area of technology licensing and startups, TTEC director Tom Park 
confided that the idea of revenue tied to entrepreneurship programs is “a tough one.”  
This is not a clear answer…. We’re [TTEC] revenue neutral, if that. What we 
bring in, we spend. I’ve got fifty people to keep employed; all the money goes to 
keep them employed…. So, it’s not like we’re turning a profit here.”  
The vice president for industry relations more optimistically suggested that the university 
“makes a little bit more than [it] spends.” However, the director of TideVentures was less 
sanguine in response to the assertion that the university was making money on 
technology transfer efforts. He went so far as to say that the notion of entrepreneurship 
activities being revenue neutral was “a generous portrayal right now.” Currently, the 
university  
spends more money on tech transfer than it brings in…, which is the case of most 
universities.… Between [the two campuses in TideVentures] we brought in about 
$2.5 million dollars from tech transfer activities, direct licensing revenues, and 





research funding we’ve brought in. So, that is actually less money than we spend 
on tech transfer right now.   
When the full range of activities related to entrepreneurship is considered, there is clear 
reason to argue that profit-taking is difficult. Apart from the costs of protecting 
intellectual property, there are numerous costs related to the faculty and staff who run 
entrepreneurship programs and teach courses. Tidewater generally does not see any direct 
revenues from fostering student entrepreneurship, as it does not lay claim to student 
intellectual property, provided the student is not a university employee. One staff member 
indicated that this may be a purposeful strategy to secure donations from successful 
graduates turned entrepreneurs down the road:  
From a development standpoint, it has been shown that giving that support 
upfront, both financial and in regards to resources, yields more for the university 
later. You have…potentially successful entrepreneurs who are more emotionally 
indebted to the university for what assistance and support that they’ve gotten than 
financially indebted.  
Even though entrepreneurship has not yet produced much in the way of revenues, there is 
still the hope of money, whether it is made directly or indirectly, in the future. 
 Indeed, the initiation and support of innovation and entrepreneurship is motivated 
by a hope to strike it big—to enable the commercial development of a faculty invention 
that produces large sums of money for the institution. As the director for TTEC asserted, 
the university “certainly would like to generate revenues,” and their “goal is in the next 
five years to really break through so that we are in a position where we’re bringing back 





be very disappointing if in three to five years we don’t see that this is starting to 
produce.” It is important to note that revenues may come to fruition in the future, which 
still provides a vital motive for the ethos. The university is searching for an equivalent to 
Gatorade, which has resulted in over $150 million in royalty payments to the University 
of Florida. She commented, “Everybody wants something to get invented that will create 
this significant stream of money. But that’s a real long shot. We’ve certainly seen some 
modest success and we hope to see more.” Recognizing the odds of striking it big were 
not favorable, the organizer of a business model pitch competition, nevertheless, gave 
voice to the main thrust of the revenue rationalization: “the overwhelming majority of 
these startups are not going to explode to Facebook or Twitter proportions, but some are 
and, much like the lotto, the sentiment is if you don’t play, you can’t win.”  
Thus, after thirty years of spending money in the hopes of one day making 
money, it seems unlikely that the rise of the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos can be 
explained by a profit-seeking motive alone. Of course, the pursuit of new resources is 
involved in the decision to initiate and support the ethos, but when net revenues remain 
“a twinkle in our eye,” as Dorothy Winters put it, questions surface related to the 
centrality of money. This argument is strengthened by the political-economic context 
which university leaders described. When asked whether Tidewater benefited from 
making innovation and entrepreneurship a strategic priority, William Pierson 
admonished: “Well, wait a minute. How does the university benefit? The university is not 
here to benefit. The university is here to serve.” 
 The land-grant legacy: serving the present through recourse to the past. 





university, intricately bound to a narrative of pushing the frontiers of knowledge in the 
name of progress. Newness permeates the conceptualizations of innovation and 
entrepreneurship in the previous chapter, yet explanations for why these concepts have 
become so important at Tidewater were grounded in a particular part of the university’s 
past. That is, innovation and entrepreneurship were believed by many interviewees to be 
manifestations of the university’s identity as a land-grant institution and, crucially, what 
this identity means for TU’s role in society. Many university leaders drew a line from the 
innovation and entrepreneurship ethos on campus to a re-invigorated tradition of serving 
the state and nation.  
 Chancellor Hofbauer, when asked what the guiding values of Tidewater were, 
began by emphasizing that “as a land-grant university, it is service to the needs of the 
state and our nation.” Passed in 1862, the Morrill Land Grant Act established a prolonged 
relationship with states that incentivized the sale of underutilized Western lands for 
educational purposes. The proceeds from land sales were designed to fund advanced 
education in the “practical arts” of agriculture, mechanics, mining, and military tactics—
the so-called “A&M” fields (Thelin, 2004). The legacy of the Morrill Act was the idea 
that reconstructing and unifying a nation torn apart by civil war required federal support 
for “the accessible state college and university, characterized by a curriculum that was 
broad and utilitarian” (Thelin, p. 76). Such investment by the federal government in 
higher education became a pattern throughout the twentieth century. “In the name of state 
building, national leaders tapped higher education” to spur economic growth and “shape 
citizens’ political commitments” (Loss, 2012, p. 3). The logic of many university leaders 





funding, it has an obligation to serve state and national interests. As one professor in th4e 
sciences remarked, a “core value [of the university], partly because of the background as 
a land-grant institution, is serve to the state and society in general.” The service of which 
most interview participants spoke principally dealt with economic growth and job 
creation as part of a 21
st
 century reboot of the land-grant legacy. 
 Much like Malcolm Moos in his report at the outset of the 1980s, Don Roberts 
asked during his interview, after “150 plus years, what is the new mission of the land-
grant institution?” His answer: “it looks like it’s moving towards economic development 
and innovation and entrepreneurship. That’s where our president wants to move and 
that’s where a lot of presidents are trying to move for public land-grants.” Roberts called 
this the president’s “new land-grant mission,” or what the dean for undergraduate studies 
called President Pryor’s concept of “the land-grant university of the 21
st
 century.”  
But not all interview participants were so sure that Tidewater’s land-grant legacy 
mattered much in the present. Having just returned from a meeting of other academic 
administrators in Tidewater’s new athletic conference, a professor in the sciences 
observed that the idea of the land-grant university is “not as important [at TU] as at some 
land-grant institutions.” He concluded, “I don’t sense that that is something that is 
embraced generally by the faculty.” Even more skeptically, Travis Campbell-Green 
called allusions to Tidewater’s land-grant history “a distraction.” Aside from the extreme 
decline in agriculture in the state, he remembered that  
there’s been a lot of talk about how the new vision for a land-grant…is diffusion 
of knowledge more generally. But that’s just a way of using this historical artifact 





aren’t land-grant universities that are trying just as hard in the innovation and 
entrepreneurship and technology transfer front. So, I think it’s just a marketing 
thing to say this is what it means to be a new land grant. 
In other words, framing innovation and entrepreneurship as an extension of Tidewater’s 
land-grant pedigree serves a symbolic purpose. 
 Higher education historian John Thelin (2004) has argued, “Colleges and 
universities are historical institutions. They may suffer amnesia or may have selective 
recall, but ultimately heritage is the lifeblood of our campuses” (p. xiii). I maintain that 
this heritage is, in fact, a novel cultural product, following Kershenblatt-Gimblett’s 
(1998) observation that “heritage produces something new in the present with recourse to 
the past” (p. 149). Efforts to repurpose the land-grant mission represent precisely this 
process of producing heritage. Innovation and entrepreneurship as they are made manifest 
at Tidewater are a far cry from the mainstays of the original land-grant mission. It is 
difficult to draw similarities between instruction in agriculture and mining for military 
cadets and cultivating biotechnology firms or developing the next highly lucrative social 
media application. However, by suggesting that innovation and entrepreneurship are 
connected to this glorified past—by trying to seamlessly transform A&M into I&E—
university leaders ensure that the cause is painted in a thick veneer of legitimacy. As 
Hobsbawn and Ranger (1983) first theorized, traditions that develop to express heritage, 
many of them invented, often serve such symbolic purposes as legitimation and 
socialization. In this way, referencing Tidewater’s land-grant legacy in the same breath as 





values and its activities into rituals. Despite its unequivocal future orientation, the 
innovation and entrepreneurship ethos is explained through references to a usable past. 
 At the same time that this symbolic project is enacted, interview data showed that 
university leaders held a deep commitment to serving the state and nation. Irrespective of 
discourse related to Tidewater’s repurposed land-grant identity, many interviewees saw 
themselves as public servants and the university as “an instrument of society…here to 
serve society,” to borrow from William Pierson. One research executive underscored 
Tidewater’s status as a “public corporation” and not a state agency “like the department 
of motor vehicles.” Still, he believed, “we have an obligation to the state. And a lot of our 
economic development programs and a lot of our tech transfer programs are focused on 
growing and trying to retain companies in [the state].” Although generating revenue is an 
aspiration, the director of TideVentures intimated that “first and foremost [the goal] is to 
have a positive impact on the economy.” The state, he observed, was “much less focused 
on creating a revenue stream for the university” than investing in the university to 
promote economic development and the creation of jobs. This line of thought resonated 
with one dean, who remarked, “you tend to see that a little more at state universities, 
where they think, ‘What can we do for our state? How can we propel the growth of the 
economy? How can we promote social justice?’” For Amy Curtis, professor in the 
humanities, serving the state was important, even though it provided less funding to the 
university than in the past: “We see ourselves as public servants…. And I really do 
believe in trying to contribute to the common wealth…so, I take our service to the state 






Just a nuance, you said, “pressure from the state to do,” and, of course, to some 
extent there is pressure from the state, but I also think this is internally driven. We 
are in the public university system…and we’re supposed to be attentive to and 
addressing the needs of the state. 
As this line of thought goes, what the state and society more broadly needs is innovation 
and entrepreneurship. According to William Pierson, “to not do it is almost criminal 
because essentially it relegates us to a declining future as a society.”  
 Evidence of the desire to serve the state can be found in the data collected by 
university offices, as well as the board of trustees. In addition to revenue, TideVentures, 
for example, tracked the number of companies it helped establish in the state and number 
of jobs created. Its director explained, “Ultimately, we want successful startup 
companies. So, we don’t want to just create startup companies for the sake of creating 
them, but having more [state-based] startup companies coming out of the university 
would be another key metric.” However, these were not the only metrics collected with 
respect to entrepreneurship. There was a concerted effort to collect data that would be 
submitted to publications that rank universities, such as The Princeton Review. 
Consequently, ascribing the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos only to the search for 
resources or the duty-cum-desire to serve the state would be inadequate. A third 
motivation is to compete with other institutions who are involved in the entrepreneurship 
“game,” as it was frequently called. 
 A player in the game: keeping pace in the institutional field. There were 
recurring statements during interviews signaling that university leaders were aware that 





benevolent effort to serve the needs of society, innovation and entrepreneurship was seen 
as a point of comparison and vector of competition with peer institutions. As is frequently 
the case with institutional striving, the universities often used for purposes of comparison 
were among the most prestigious in the nation: Stanford University and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Therefore, one of the motivations of the 
innovation and entrepreneurship ethos was to be a player in the game and, in so doing, 
garner the legitimacy and prestige that comes with operating and appearing like highly 
regarded institutions. The success of competitive positioning through innovation and 
entrepreneurship was the subject of some debate, with some believing Tidewater to be 
ahead of the curve and others questioning whether it should turn its opportunistic sights 
elsewhere. 
 When the Institute for Innovation and Entrepreneurship was launched in 2013, 
one of its first activities was to compile a packet for publications that rank universities 
based on their entrepreneurship offerings, including The Princeton Review and 
Entrepreneur Magazine. As one staff member recalled, “The [Institute] was put in charge 
of aggregating all of this information for each and every one of the schools and colleges 
at [Tidewater] to try and get a full spectrum picture of what’s going on here.” The 
resultant twenty-two page packet lists entrepreneurship courses, 
entrepreneurship/innovation competitions, clubs and organizations, as well as 
distinguishing and non-traditional features of entrepreneurship on campus. In the 2013 
rankings, this placed Tidewater among the top twenty schools in the country for 
undergraduate entrepreneurship experiences. Many interview participants were aware of 





efforts to improve performance. For instance, Samantha Stone, the Institute’s director of 
development, related, “What we found in our latest rankings is that we’re number fifteen 
in the country in undergraduate…entrepreneurship. We’re number two in out of the 
classroom experiences.” Further developing these out of the classroom experiences were 
believed to be what would differentiate Tidewater and allow it to out-compete other 
institutions. In fact, expanding course offerings and even developing an entrepreneurship 
major were viewed as essential to “get to the next level in the rankings.” The institution 
par excellence was Babson College, a private business school ranked first in the country 
for entrepreneurship. As the director of an entrepreneurship living-learning program 
bluntly averred: “We’re not a Babson.” Despite being remarkably different institutions, 
Babson College, as one top-ranked school, set a standard toward which Tidewater 
strived. 
 Beyond rankings for undergraduate entrepreneurship opportunities, university 
leaders also engaged in institutional comparison relative to technology transfer. The two 
institutions that were frequently cited in conversations about technology transfer were 
Stanford and MIT. In the eyes of TTEC director Tom Park, Stanford and MIT “are the 
gold standard in entrepreneurship history.” This history, according to Nicholas Johnson, 
stretches back to 1937, when David Packard and William Hewlett, with encouragement 
from their professor, launched what would become Hewlett-Packard from their garage. 
“Twenty years later, [Hewlett and Packard] donated a big building back to Stanford. So, 
Stanford was in this game of innovation and entrepreneurship before anyone else was, 
and to some extent MIT as well.” Part of the reason that Stanford and MIT were the “gold 





Tom Park related that Tidewater collected equity from companies that participates in its 
incubator, but “it never cashes it in for anything.” By contrast, “if you’re Stanford or 
MIT, that equity stream has paid off in some cases,” largely because they have staff to 
manage it. However, Travis Campbell-Green ventured, “Even for the most successful 
universities, for MIT and Stanford, [entrepreneurship] is still a pretty small fraction of 
their revenue.” What sets these schools apart is “the prestige. I’m sure a lot of people go 
to Stanford because they know a lot of successful entrepreneurs came out of” the 
university.  
Acknowledging the strength of the programs at Stanford and MIT, several 
interview participants admitted that Tidewater was not in the same league. For Keith 
Meyers, director of one of the entrepreneurship living-learning programs, it was simply 
too early for comparison: “I think it’s a bit immature to look at a Stanford or an MIT and 
try to replicate things when the ecosystem that they’re in and the ecosystem you’re in are 
very different.” Similarly, the Institute for Innovation and Entrepreneurship’s director of 
development flatly stated, “[Tidewater]…is not MIT and Stanford.” Still, she was proud 
that “our reputation has grown exponentially just from this entrepreneurship,” and one of 
the university’s programs “was getting attention from Stanford, MIT, and places that you 
always aspire to.” At the pinnacle of the institutional field were Stanford and MIT, two 
institutions that were in many ways far ahead of TU yet still guiding lights and objects of 
emulation. 
 Tidewater did not want to get left behind as other institutions in its comparative 
gaze began to develop entrepreneurship programs. “[Tidewater] was late in getting into 





entrepreneurship initiatives all over the country. We had not made this move, and in 
doing it, President [Pryor] wanted us to catch up very fast.” The feeling of being behind 
other institutions was shared by Nicholas Johnson, who opined: “we’re coming in a little 
late to the game;” however, the university was still ahead of “others that haven’t gotten 
there yet.” For Chancellor Hofbauer, the amount of recent attention Tidewater has given 
innovation and entrepreneurship could help it compete. “Being so explicit about it could 
be a competitive advantage. In some ways, [Tidewater] is…an early mover in that regard, 
by putting some much attention and focus” on innovation and entrepreneurship. At the 
same time, several interview participants believed that, because virtually all schools were 
trying to stimulate entrepreneurship in some way, several university leaders wondered if 
this was truly a space where TU could shine. As an academic executive put it: 
I worry that we were sort of late to the game. That we noticed something that 
other universities, especially Stanford, were doing and doing well…. And I think 
that some universities are going to be very successful at it, especially the more 
commercial aspects of it…. Are we going to be one of them? I don’t know. 
There is potential for Tidewater “to be so much better than anyone else in this space,” 
said Danielle Ramirez, but it means doing more to enable faculty. The risk is that 
Tidewater is “going to look like every other university because there is not a single 
university that I have looked at that does not talk about entrepreneurship and innovation 
as an important pillar…. This is not a truly competitive positioning.” Thus, 
complementing the search for future sources of revenue and service to the state, an 
important explanation for the ethos was striving to keep pace within an institutional field 





In this sense, “the game” was not about a final destination or outcome, but rather 
seeking a position among a roster of highly-regarded peers because of the prestige 
derived from association. The worry was that Tidewater would not be considered among 
other top-ranked research universities or sacrifice reputation by not competing for a 
strong position when it comes to entrepreneurship. One dean adeptly understood 
innovation and entrepreneurship in these terms:  
When we talk about reputation and rankings, ultimately it is the prestige factor 
that we think is important. You know, we don’t want to trip over ourselves just 
for a ranking, as that makes no sense. But rankings are, or prestige more 
generally, is fundamentally important to any institution because we are a 
knowledge-based business or organization, and we’re nothing if we don’t have the 
best students and the best faculty. 
For some university leaders, failing to play the game compromised Tidewater’s ability to 
attract and retain faculty members and students. 
 Responding to student and faculty demand. The final explanation provided for 
why university leaders initiated and supported the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos 
was that students and faculty members expected, or even demanded, it. Therefore, the 
development of programs and decision to promote innovation and entrepreneurship was 
responsive in nature, as university leaders sought to attract and retain the talented 
students and faculty members that sustained its reputation. Analysis of interview data 
demonstrates that this motivation was not nearly as significant as the previous three. 
Apart from the fact that it was less frequently mentioned during interviews, data raises 





and retain faculty and students. I conclude this section by detailing both the claim and the 
questions surrounding it, before connecting the arguments of this chapter to the 
theoretical propositions. The sum of the evidence supporting the theoretical propositions 
suggests the need to refine the theory of academic capitalism to account for additional 
factors in the decision at Tidewater and many other institutions to push innovation and 
entrepreneurship as strategic priorities. 
 Starting first with student demand, several interview participants suggested that 
entrepreneurship is popular with students. Tom Park, the director of TTEC, claimed “it’s 
a popular thing to do right now. It is of interest to a lot of students. They want to be 
entrepreneurs.” The associate director of Tidewater’s center for philanthropy likewise 
believed that “students are really craving the ability to have these skills. They want to go 
out and start their own initiative, or to make an immediate impact.” As a result of 
increased interest, in fact, TTEC was in the process of doubling the size of its incubator 
for student startups. One dean went so far as to say that “it’s a generation of students 
which is different from mine in terms of how people learn, how people interact, the speed 
with which they both and learn and want to implement things, and so if we don’t provide 
education in entrepreneurship, I think we’ll be less attractive to students.” It is difficult to 
ascertain if admissions would be adversely affected by not offering entrepreneurial 
opportunities. An admissions executive claimed that only small pockets of students in her 
experience expressed interest in entrepreneurial opportunities: “It's certainly not the case 
for the majority, but there are some students who have already had some success with 





It is true that entrepreneurship programs have been popular with students once 
they arrive on campus. One program director reported that their entrepreneurship living-
learning program “typically has way too many students who want in compared to the 
number of seats.” Furthermore, two entrepreneurship center directors stressed that they 
developed social entrepreneurship courses and programs specifically because their 
students told them they were interested in the content. Another interview participant, 
however, cautioned that the success of entrepreneurship programs must be put into proper 
perspective. In terms of student participation in courses, for instance, he estimated that 
only six to seven percent of the undergraduate student population took an 
entrepreneurship course in the past year. Thus, it may be the case that innovation and 
entrepreneurship are important in attracting and retaining students, but the programs 
currently engage a small numbers of students—small enough to question the extent to 
which university leaders were responding to student demand as they selected innovation 
and entrepreneurship to guide the institution. 
 The same argument about recruiting students was likewise proffered for faculty 
members. According to the director of TideVentures, providing resources for technology 
transfer is an important factor in a faculty member’s decision to join the university and 
remain there: 
Increasingly, great faculty or good teachers and researchers and leaders in their 
field also want to be entrepreneurs. So to bring those people in, and keep them at 
the university,  having a strong tech transfer office actually becomes part of what 





here…. It becomes part of what a leading research university needs to do to attract 
the best faculty and students. 
After suggesting that TU makes little to no net revenue from its entrepreneurship 
activities, a research executive said, “You may ask why do we do it? Well, I mean, 
because faculty expect it. It’s a service. Young faculty want to start their own company.” 
As was true with student demand, the claim that faculty expect resources to help them 
launch a company is questionable. Although self-interest is certainly present in faculty 
careers and often leads to a high degree of productivity, professors are not professionally 
rewarded for entrepreneurial self-interest, unless it means securing grants. The next 
chapter chronicles efforts to change this at Tidewater. It is sometimes the case that 
faculty are not interested in entrepreneurship, nor motivated by the prospect of material 
wealth. While it is likely that faculty in certain disciplines expect some university 
services to help translate their research to industry, such expectations do not sufficiently 
explain the decision to initiate and support a campus-wide ethos that revolves around 
innovation and entrepreneurship. Accordingly, I argue that student and faculty demand, 
though perhaps a small consideration in crafting the ethos, was not among the driving 
forces behind its inception and dissemination. 
 This dissertation began, in part, to better understand the motivations through 
which academic capitalist norms and values, such as those comprising Tidewater’s 
innovation and entrepreneurship ethos, are created and transmitted to university actors. 
University leaders confirmed three explanatory variables underlying the ethos, which 
collectively may help to provide a comprehensive view of university change. First, as 





universities depend have eroded, and a new regime related to the uses of knowledge has 
surfaced as new dependences take root. Interview data shows an increasing hope that 
entrepreneurship will result in substantial revenue through technology transfer or through 
attracting entrepreneurially-minded students who will one day give back to their alma 
matter. Additionally, the ethos was selected to purposefully interface with a land-grant 
tradition of serving state and society. This demonstrates that one motivation for initiating 
and supporting innovation and entrepreneurship was not just to guide TU into the future, 
but also to harness the legitimacy that comes with linking to a useable past. Like 
tradition, prestige represented another important non-monetary currency in the decision 
to promote innovation and entrepreneurship. As university leaders noted, most 
universities were involved in the innovation and entrepreneurship “game,” and 
Tidewater’s decision to participate was partially based upon a desire to “keep up with the 
Stanfords.” Being the only public research university not trying to be innovative and 
entrepreneurial seemed like too risky of an option. Thus, Tidewater decided that if it was 
going to be a player, it was going to be a major player, turning innovation and 
entrepreneurship into an institutional ethos that colored virtually many facets of life on 
campus, from research to curriculum development to instruction. 
Connecting Emerging Developments to Theory 
 The main contribution of this chapter was to provide a set of answers to the 
question: why, out of a vast universe of possible concepts, did Tidewater’s leadership 
make innovation and entrepreneurship its guiding principles and foundation for an 
institutional ethos? The environment in which university leaders positioned TU was 





They grappled not only with the question of how to pay for a high-quality university, but 
also what it meant to be a public, land-grant institution in an era rich in equal parts 
expectations and critique. In many ways, interview participants gave voice to some of the 
structural changes to higher education since the late 1970s that precipitated the theory of 
academic capitalism and its constructs. There is little doubt that at Tidewater, in the face 
of reductions in state appropriations, concerns about the stability of federal grant money, 
and elevated competition for tuition from students, innovation and entrepreneurship was 
seen as a possible revenue source. The market, faculty inventors, and corporate financiers 
can seemingly become more important than the state or the public good in this quest for 
resource independence. Nevertheless, this chapter revealed that other motivations are at 
play, thereby providing empirical evidence of several theoretical propositions regarding 
the nature of change in higher education. 
 One means of understanding the adoption of innovation and entrepreneurship as 
institutional ethos is Schugurensky’s (1994, 2006) heteronomous model of university 
change. Whereas autonomy is the “quality or state of being independent, free, and self-
directed,” heteronomy refers to “subjection to external controls—subordination to the law 
or domination of another” (p. 306). The heteronomous university results from a 
combination of two seemingly contradictory dimensions: the globalization of free-market 
capitalism and state interventionism. Importantly, change in the direction of this model is 
not a “smooth, linear, and consensual process welcomed by all” (p. 307). This chapter 
uncovered many aspects of the heteronomous university model at work at Tidewater. On 
the commercial side of the heteronomous university, interview participants pointed to the 





in the form of tuition that is decreasingly subsidized by state appropriations. Talk of the 
need to diversify the university’s portfolio, the pursuit of cost recovery mechanisms, and 
catering to student-consumer demand is evidence of corporate rationality, which is also 
part of the change Schugurensky tied to market demands conditioning universities. 
However, trends cannot be solely attributed to competition in the marketplace. There is 
also a strong dynamic of state control, occasioned by cutbacks in funding, appropriations 
with conditions attached, and institutional coordination to improve state-wide 
collaboration and competition. As Tidewater became more commercialized, it also 
navigated an increasing set of responsibilities to the state. The tone of interview 
participants was not always that of a willing partner with the state. Indeed, at times 
responsibilities to the state were sometimes seen as mandates imposed from above and 
beyond, with little recognition of the organizational complexity of a research university 
or the services it already provided.  
 Although university leaders understood the need for accountability and many 
welcomed the role of the university in serving the state’s economy, there was still some 
tension that emerged over commercialization and control. It was not the case that 
interview participants believed TU had wholesale sacrificed its autonomy, but data 
supported the feeling that “space is being reduced by external powers increasingly 
capable of imposing their own logic and interests” and that the university “is losing 
capacity to promote the common good or even to pursue knowledge and truth in an 
autonomous way” (p. 302). One prominent worry voiced by interview participants was 
that Tidewater was becoming a service university, where workplace and professional 





contributing to economic growth and striving for relevance is equated with service to 
society—a conflation that, according to Schugurensky, is not infrequent in neoliberal 
discourse. As follows, the traditional research university becomes transformed by a 
market-based utilitarianism and “research and teaching are re-oriented towards a dynamic 
relationship with industry and the job market” (Schugurensky, 1994, p. 34).  
Whereas much scholarship has argued that this reorientation reflects the 
privatization of higher education, based upon the data collected for this dissertation, I 
agree with Schugurensky that it is necessary to pay close attention to the role the state has 
taken as an evaluator and regulator, not just a passive funder. Therefore, consistent with 
the third theoretical proposition, interview data supports the claim that values and norms 
of the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime, like those expressed in 
Tidewater’s institutional ethos, can only be partially explained by an increasing reliance 
upon external, private resources. The state’s reach has expanded and its grip has 
tightened, leading TU’s leadership to respond accordingly. 
 It is worth considering how the heteronomous university is packaged at TU. 
Schugurensky contended that underlying the model based on the twin burdens of 
commercialization and control is the need to address real social and financial pressures. 
However, support for the model requires appealing to a variety of constituents, often 
through rhetorical exercises. References to Tidewater’s land-grant legacy constitute an 
effort to package the ways in which the university is responding to commercialization 
and control as part of an acceptable and relatively non-controversial tradition. Innovation 
and entrepreneurship become a natural extension of the university’s history as a public 





is the fact that the state is no longer upholding its end of the contract. That is, the 
university continues to serve the state, despite decades of declining appropriations. Some 
interview participants suggested that this is the case because, regardless of how much 
money the state provides, the university’s identity is predicated on service to the state. 
Alternatively, Tidewater could be desperately attempting to reverse its fortunes by 
showing the state how vital the institution is to its future, based upon discourses of the 
knowledge-based economy. The question that remains is how long university leadership 
is willing to base a central element of its strategy on contributing to the state without 
receiving additional resources. In time, Tidewater’s land-grant heritage could be de-
emphasized as the university comes to terms with its demanding relationship with the 
state and seeks greater autonomy. 
 Another important theoretical question posed by this chapter is what else the 
university may receive in the way of organizational benefits from innovation and 
entrepreneurship, aside from the prospect of making money. If it is the case that many 
universities, including Tidewater, make little to no net revenue as a result of 
entrepreneurship, there is reason to explore motivations to complement the aspirational 
pursuit of profit. The theoretical framing of this dissertation offered another explanation 
from scholarship on new institutionalism. An important feature of new institutionalism is 
that there is convergence around certain behaviors and ideas of successful institutions, 
yielding a cultural script defined by the government, professional associations, and—of 
critical importance to this study—the most prestigious institutions. Thus, Tidewater is 
part of a competitive institutional field wherein practices are rationalized and, 





from an organizational perspective, but rather help to legitimize institutions and garner 
prestige through emulation of successful cases. There was much evidence in the 
preceding discussion to suggest that innovation and entrepreneurship were practices that 
had become valuable in the institutional field and generated legitimacy amidst heightened 
scrutiny of higher education. The decision to support and initiate an institutional ethos 
that attributes great importance to innovation and entrepreneurship is, according to 
interview data, influenced by perceptions of legitimacy and prestige in the higher 
education field, thereby lending weight to the second theoretical proposition. 
 The clearest example of this influence is apparent in how sensitive university 
leaders were to the entrepreneurial activities of other institutions, collectively referred to 
as “the game.” Playing the game meant keeping pace with institutional peers and using as 
points of comparison and emulation those that seemed to be at the top of the competition. 
In this case, Stanford and MIT were the most prestigious institutions identified, and their 
interest and investment in innovation and entrepreneurship defined what was appropriate 
and worthwhile for those institutions like Tidewater striving for relevance. Performance 
is measured through ranking systems, and interview data demonstrated that university 
leaders spent a great deal of time thinking about how to improve in rankings, both for the 
institution as a whole and for its entrepreneurship programs. In the long run, it is possible 
that innovation and entrepreneurship will be organizationally efficacious for Tidewater. 
Administratively, the university may become more efficient and effective, and 
improvements in reputation signaled by rising in the ranks may produce more grant 
money and similar resources. The idea of innovation and entrepreneurship may be 





pathway to employment for their children. Nonetheless, these possible outcomes were not 
mentioned during interviews as often as Tidewater simply entering the field and whether 
it did so before or after other universities. In other words, playing the game was more 
important than its ultimate results. Even if the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos 
generates no net revenue for TU at present, it was seen as symbolically worthwhile for 
the institution to become meaningfully involved. 
 This chapter illustrates the ways in which responding to state expectations, both 
by law and by tradition, and striving for legitimacy and prestige were additional 
rationales behind the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos at Tidewater. In developing 
and translating the ethos, university leaders often mentioned the knowledge-based 
economy as one of the exigencies to which they were responding. It remains unclear in 
the data whether the knowledge-based economy is, as Slaughter and Rhoades assumed, a 
structural reality or a discourse designed to coordinate educational institutions in ways 
that amplify their contributions to economic growth. Interview data did not verify 
whether the knowledge-based economy is “more important and realistic as a set of 
assumptions and culture claims than it is as an actual depiction of the mundane social 
order” (Meyer, Ramierez, Frank, and Schofer, 2007, p. 204). However, it certainly 
confirmed that university leaders appropriated language of the knowledge-based 
economy, as suggested by the second theoretical proposition. By developing strategic 
priorities and even academic programs with the belief that U.S. competitiveness and 
economic growth in the future depends upon the creation and application of new 
knowledge, Tidewater may be helping to move the knowledge-based economy from 






 While the previous chapter was devoted to the development of the innovation and 
entrepreneurship ethos, the purpose of this chapter was to explain why university leaders 
initiated and supported it as a strategic priority. In providing a set of rationales for the 
ethos, university leaders shed light on a multitude of challenges presently affecting the 
operations of the university. These challenges indicate that there are gaps in the theory of 
academic capitalism, notably related to the significance of state service and the role of 
legitimacy and prestige. In total, this chapter presented six factors in higher education’s 
political-economic landscape that intersect with the decision to make innovation and 




  Dramatic transformations in the American economy including the perceived 
advent of the knowledge-based economy, disappearance of manufacturing jobs, 
and the need to rediscover the country’s comparative advantage in global trade 
through innovation. 
 Government disinvestment in higher education at both the state and federal 
levels. 
 Elevated expectations from state in terms of the university’s contribution to 
economic development and reporting how the university is making use of public 
funds. 
 Increasing critique of the cost and value of a college degree. 
 Heightened institutional competition and constant comparison to peers. 
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 It should also be noted that the political-economic environment I described closely resembles a 





 Intensifying student-consumer demands as tuition became an increasingly 
important revenue stream for the institution. 
As a consequence of this political-economic environment, many university leaders 
echoed the question raised by Malcolm Moos in his 1981 study of Tidewater: what is the 
role of the land-grant university in today’s challenging circumstances? The response was 
that the university needed to be innovative and entrepreneurial, but for reasons that 
extend beyond resources. By placing so much stress on resource dependence, the theory 
of academic capitalism does not account for the full range of challenges implicated in 
university leaders’ decision-making process. Therefore, I argue that a more 
comprehensive consideration of higher education’s political-economic context warrants a 
refinement of the theory of academic capitalism. 
 More specifically, this chapter detailed four explanations for the innovation and 
entrepreneurship ethos. The search for new revenue streams was undoubtedly part of the 
conversation, even though at the time of writing, none of Tidewater’s entrepreneurial 
activities had yielded substantial money for the institution. In the midst of heightened 
competition and intense scrutiny of higher education, I argued that symbolic forms of 
currency in higher education, such as tradition and prestige, are of vital importance. 
Interview data presented in this chapter demonstrated that the decision to initiate and 
support the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos was linked to a land-grant tradition of 
serving the state. I suggested that this legacy was a novel cultural product, repurposing 
the past to address the needs of the present. A third significant explanation for the ethos 
was attempting to increase legitimacy and, by extension, prestige in a higher education 





motivations—the hope of future income, the tradition of state service, and the pursuit of 
prestige—were most commonly used to justify the choice of innovation and 
entrepreneurship over other strategic priorities. Indeed, these three explanations were far 
more convincing than a less frequently cited fourth motivation, which was the desire to 
attract and retain faculty and students. Interview data failed to adequately substantiate 
this rationale and raised several questions about its validity. 
 Chapter six shifts the discussion from explaining Tidewater’s institutional ethos to 
delving further into the third question, which centers upon how the ethos was translated 
into incentives for faculty and academic opportunities for undergraduate students. In this 
chapter, I explore the extent to which the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos has so 
far affected the way faculty members go about their work and are rewarded at TU. 
Additionally, I investigate how the creation of academic opportunities around innovation 
and entrepreneurship is shaping the subjectivities of students and for what eventual 
purpose. In this way, I attempt to flesh out one of the ways in which higher education 













CHAPTER SIX: TRANSLATING THE ETHOS INTO 
INCENTIVES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
 
Honestly, there’s not a lot that can be done at the president’s or provost’s level that’s 
going to make the faculty do anything. I think it’s really more about how we make it more 
attractive or more enticing to start…courses or other entrepreneurial activities. 
-Entrepreneurship program director 
 
The university definitely sugar coats [entrepreneurship]…You have to be able to say that 
9 out of 10 of you will not have a business…For every Steve Jobs, there’s a million 
people that fail, that lost all their money, that went bankrupt. And we need to tell those 
stories just as much as the success stories. 
-Student manager of a startup incubator 
 
Introduction 
 A vital element of an institutional ethos, as it is defined in this dissertation, is the 
utilization of values to coordinate and normalize the activities of constituents to some 
desired end. In this chapter, I examine efforts on the part of university leaders to 
encourage faculty members and undergraduate students to think and behave as 
entrepreneurs through the creation of incentives and sanctioning of knowledge via 
academic opportunities. Accordingly, my interest lies not only in how the ethos is 
translated into conduct-shaping mechanisms, but also in determining what the ultimate 
objective is of such measures. Importantly, the data collected for this study does not 
adequately illuminate the extent to which values of the innovation and entrepreneurship 
ethos have been internalized by actors at Tidewater. However, it does show numerous 
efforts to make the ethos manifest in the lives of faculty members and undergraduate 
students. There is reason to argue, based on the evidence presented below, that the 
attempted transmission of the ethos has a greater effect on students and the subjectivities 





 In part one of the chapter, I provide an account of attempts to incorporate the 
innovation and entrepreneurship ethos into the university’s faculty reward structure. 
More specifically, I explore two mechanisms of translating the ethos: expanding the 
criteria for promotion and tenure (P&T) and creating awards related to innovation and 
entrepreneurship. I begin by discussing the criteria on which faculty members are 
evaluated, based upon current policies at Tidewater and interview data. A few interview 
participants—most of whom are involved in academic entrepreneurship—indicated a 
desire to see entrepreneurship included as an activity that is rewarded in promotion 
decisions. In fact, the provost and university senate jointly convened a task force to revise 
the guidelines for P&T at TU and included specific instructions to consider ways of 
recognizing innovation and entrepreneurship. I shed light on the work of this task force 
using data from interviews, observation, and documents produced by committee 
members. Furthermore, I identify the creation of awards related to innovation and 
entrepreneurship, demonstrating that they currently cater to faculty in the science and 
technology field. In the end, I argue that efforts to translate the ethos into incentives for 
faculty members have not drastically altered their thinking or behavior about what 
comprises professorial success. Nevertheless, data pointed to several issues connected to 
even minimally encouraging academic entrepreneurship at Tidewater. 
 Part two of the chapter shifts to undergraduate students and the development of 
academic opportunities that reflect Tidewater’s push for innovation and entrepreneurship. 
Building upon my treatment of the entrepreneurial mindset in chapter four, I use 
interview data and course syllabi to recount the skills and knowledge students are 





and normalized through a variety of academic programs, many of them newly offered, 
including courses, modules in design thinking, business model pitch competitions, and 
minor degree programs. Although many of these programs are voluntary, interview 
participants were interested in including innovation and entrepreneurship in the general 
education curriculum. I argue that the desire to increase entrepreneurial learning 
opportunities, in keeping with the president’s strategic priority, overshadowed 
consideration of the possible pitfalls. In particular, I look at four issues that emerged from 
the data related to how the entrepreneurial mindset is taught to undergraduate students: 1) 
an under-appreciation of the high probability of failure; 2) a fostering of a prize-based 
culture; 3) a celebration of team versus individual thinking; and 4) a lack of training in 
ethics. Given the cultural cache of entrepreneurship and celebrity status of entrepreneurs, 
these academic programs have the potential to sway college student subjectivities in 
potentially harmful ways, which I demonstrate through the case of one student-launched 
“social venture.”   
At the end of the chapter, I relate these emerging findings on the translation of the 
ethos to theory on governmentality outlined in proposition four and the extent to which 
the university has become a transmission locale for the social relations of contemporary 
capitalism. In other words, I consider whether the transmission of entrepreneurial values 
is perhaps the ultimate expression of the deepening relationship between universities and 
the preparation of neoliberal capitalists, which serves to reproduce the system’s 
hegemony. Because the ethos remains a project under construction, these connections are 
by necessity tentative, and its findings will require further evaluation with empirical 





doorway to future research. The next section introduces the two mechanisms by which 
the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos is translated into incentives for faculty 
members, before discussing both the traditional criteria of P&T and beliefs surrounding 
potential alterations that reward innovation and entrepreneurship. 
Faculty Incentives Related to Innovation and Entrepreneurship 
 The translation of an institutional ethos at a complex organization like Tidewater 
takes shape in myriad ways. In this part of the chapter, I approximate a holistic view of 
how the ethos is translated and what it means for faculty members by focusing on a few 
indicative objects of study and sites of data collection. In the realm of faculty incentives, 
I concentrate upon changes to the university’s promotion and tenure (P&T) criteria. 
Much of this section centers upon the work of a task force charged with revising the P&T 
guidelines at TU. Analysis of data shows that entrepreneurship was a source of confusion 
and some discomfort in task force deliberations, and its role in the tenure and promotion 
process was recognized but made rather minimal in the committee’s final 
recommendations. I also briefly highlight the creation of a small number of awards for 
faculty members related to innovation and entrepreneurship and illustrate the work of two 
faculty members who were honored for launching a company based upon their research. 
Although efforts to incentivize academic entrepreneurship are patent at the university, I 
contend that these efforts do little to disrupt the prevailing principles linked to faculty 
success. Nevertheless, attempts to turn the ethos into incentives are not without 
implications, three of which I consider in this part of the chapter: the need for clear 
policies on conflicts of interest and commitment, redefined expectations of academic 





 The fourth leg: expanding promotion and tenure criteria. According to policy 
established by the Board of Trustees, promotion to a tenured faculty rank within the state 
university system is based upon three criteria: “1) teaching effectiveness, including 
student advising; 2) research, scholarship, and, in appropriate areas, creative activities or 
other activities that result in the generation and application of intellectual property 
through technology transfer; and 3) relevant service to the community, profession, and 
institution” (Policies and Procedures of the Board of Trustees, II.1.00, p. 9). The 
inclusion of the phrase “generation and application of intellectual property through 
technology transfer” was recently added to this policy. Chancellor Hofbauer 
characterized the policy change as “pretty straightforward” because it “encourages 
faculty to use their talents to generate new ideas that have value to society.” Although he 
believed some faculty members have been “engaged in this type of activity before,” he 
concluded that “it’s beneficial to the university and the state if we stimulate even more 
activity in this regard…, and the kind of activity people have in mind is creating 
intellectual property that has some economic value or value to the quality of life in the 
state or America.” Each institution in the system must ensure that their P&T polices are 
consistent with this change. Former provost Nancy Martin recalled the policy change 
being less than straightforward: “There was a lot of discussion. It took months and 
months, maybe half a year to get the wording correct. Once the wording was correct, it 
didn’t require it; it just said it could be recognized.” Tidewater’s P&T policy included no 
such language, simply referring to “performance in research, scholarship, and creative 





These three criteria were described as the pillars of the academic profession, 
which was sometimes figuratively called a “three-legged stool.” Tony Christensen 
equated these three pillars to “the university’s traditional roles” of teaching, research, and 
service. In the view of Nicholas Johnson, these three pillars represented the “status quo 
ante” of the academic profession: “If you look at the tenure criteria, look at the promotion 
criteria, it says you have to research, you have to be able to teach, and you have to do 
service.” These three legs of the stool were not equally emphasized. That is, each 
department and college was able to set its own specific tenure criteria and how much 
weight should be assigned to research, teaching, and service, respectively. However, in 
general at Tidewater, the prevailing custom was to place the most weight on research, 
followed by teaching and then service when it came to tenure decisions. Teaching has 
become an increasingly important part of the P&T review process, as one professor 
related: “I do think [Tidewater] has moved forward a little bit on the teaching…. The 
provost before the current one, [Nancy Martin], actually kind of put out the message that 
you really had to have good teaching for promotion and tenure.” Still, this increasing 
emphasis on a strong teaching record has not unseated “research and reputation and 
getting grants and stuff” as the top criterion. Service and research were the two pillars 
that interview participants believed could be enhanced by entrepreneurship. At the same 
time, some advocates of academic entrepreneurship believed entrepreneurship should 
constitute its own pillar.  
 “The third role,” Tony Christensen explained of the university, “was always 
called service, but no one knew what that meant.” With respect to faculty work, in 





in a practical sense. It’s service to program committees for academic conferences …. In 
other words, it’s service to the priesthood, not to the people.” Whereas Tony Christensen 
suggested that service had slowly been replaced by entrepreneurship and economic 
development as core roles of the university, Nicholas Johnson opined that it was 
becoming a fourth pillar of the academic profession. “We’re in the process of modifying 
our tenure criteria to add a fourth thing; that is, the commercialization of technology.” 
These two university leaders were joined by others who believed that the P&T review 
process needed to recognize entrepreneurship. For example, the director of the Tidewater 
Technology Enterprise Collaborative (TTEC), Tom Park, argued, “There is no 
mechanism in place by which faculty can actually get brownie points for doing this. If 
you want them to do it, find a way to reward them for it.” He elaborated this point, 
saying, “In today’s system, [faculty] aren’t penalized for it, but they’re not rewarded. It 
doesn’t help you get full professor that you formed a company on the side.” Park believed 
that this recognition should absolutely happen and was optimistic it would because “there 
is talk that it should change.” This “talk” is a reference to a promotion and tenure 
guidelines task force convened jointly by the university senate and provost. The make-up 
of this committee was more reflective of the diverse viewpoints on campus, and their 
deliberations demonstrated less comfort with the place of entrepreneurship in P&T 
decision processes than these three advocates. 
Despite Nicholas Johnson’s perception that Tidewater “was in the process of 
modifying” tenure criteria, the charge of the P&T guidelines task force was, strictly 
speaking, to “review the [Tidewater University] guidelines for Appointment, Promotion, 





policies on which P&T criteria are based amounted to less of a concern than the structure 
of review processes. Among the fourteen items the committee was asked to assess in the 
charge document was: 
how varying facets of scholarly activity such as innovation and 
 entrepreneurship (including social entrepreneurship), application of intellectual 
 property through technology transfer, interdisciplinary/collaborative research, and 
 the application of research to solve existing problems in society, should be 
 evaluated as part of the [P&T] review process. 
The committee consisted of associate and full professors representing almost all 
of the colleges at Tidewater, many of whom had extensive experience serving on 
promotion committees at various levels. It also included the director of the university 
senate to advise procedural matters and employees of the office of faculty affairs. The 
issue of whether and how to recognize innovation and entrepreneurship fell to a 
subcommittee headed by a professor in the sciences, Lee Nguyen. Subcommittees were 
similarly formed for other content areas mentioned in the task force charge, with the goal 
of determining what present policy at the university was, what was happening at peer 
institutions regarding the issue at hand, and what changes were recommended to the 
guidelines. Each subcommittee wrote a report and had time during meetings to present 
their findings and recommendations, which were then discussed by the entire committee. 
 Prior to the innovation and entrepreneurship subcommittee’s presentation, the 
entire task force met with Nicholas Johnson to clarify what was meant by “innovation” 
and “entrepreneurship.” During previous meetings of the task force, several committee 





understand these concepts or how they might relate to P&T. One member of the 
committee, a professor in the humanities, reflected that until this meeting with Nicholas 
Johnson, she “would have thought that it’s about making money.” However, as a result of 
hearing Johnson’s definition of entrepreneurship (see page 156), she learned 
“entrepreneurship can be a variety of things, and in some ways, it might be moving 
toward something productive and kind of breaking down a monolithic model of what 
research means.” When I interviewed the chair of the innovation and entrepreneurship 
subcommittee, he confided that “you see how very strong faculty across the campus feel 
when they get together and they hear innovation and entrepreneurship.” I asked what they 
feel, and Nguyen suggested: 
 I don’t know that you’re going to see too much about innovation in the guidelines. 
 That’s my guess. You may see entrepreneurship, you might see engaged research. 
 And so far, where the discussion seems to be going is that these types of things 
 can support a tenure case if you have publications in high quality research …. It’s 
 not going to substitute the traditional things. 
These sentiments were reflected in the subcommittee’s report and presentation, and the 
deliberations over the report signaled discomfort around entrepreneurship in academe.  
 In preparation for the subcommittee’s report and presentation, the chair sought out 
the state system’s policy on entrepreneurship as it relates to P&T. It was determined that 
the policy only referenced technology transfer as part of the research criterion, as noted 
above. This language was not directly adopted by the subcommittee. Instead, they 





 Full recognition in the tenure process should be given to the broad range of 
 entrepreneurial, public engagement, and creative activities in which faculty 
 engage. These activities may enhance the academic merit of the candidate in any 
 of the categories listed above. As with all other activities of teaching, service, and 
 research, scholarship, and artistic creativity, there should be no intellectual 
 compromises. These activities should be rigorously evaluated for high quality 
 and distinction. 
This language was designed to address several of the concerns raised during task force 
meetings. The report noted that, despite speaking with Nicholas Johnson, “there was not 
agreement about the definition of entrepreneurship.” Moreover, the report averred that 
entrepreneurial activities should enhance the three main pillars of P&T, not constitute a 
fourth pillar. In other words, entrepreneurial activities could represent just one piece of 
evidence in a faculty member’s record within the categories of research, teaching, and 
service. A few committee members, and one professor in the social sciences, in 
particular, were concerned that faculty members who formed companies spent too much 
time growing their businesses and not enough time in other areas of the job. In response 
to this concern, the report suggested that “entrepreneurial activities should in all instances 
be consistent with [TU] policies on conflict of interest and conflict of commitment.” 
Lastly, some committee members expressed worry that there were few concrete 
indicators of entrepreneurship, and those that existed, such as patents, were not subject to 
peer review. Indeed, some committee members felt that the decision to award a patent 
was sometimes made according to potential for commercial success and the availability 





entrepreneurial activities should “be evaluated based upon the unit’s criteria for 
excellence, innovation, significance, and impact.” In sum, entrepreneurship should 
enhance a promotion and tenure case, but it should not by itself be a criterion.  
 The entrepreneurship subcommittee’s report will form but one section in a larger 
document presented to the university senate, and, in the end, it merely lists 
recommendations for the provost to consider. Interpreting the deliberations of committee 
members and analyzing the subcommittee report, there is reason to believe the 
recommended language around innovation and entrepreneurship signifies a concession. 
The committee was charged with addressing whether and how innovation and 
entrepreneurship should be recognized in the P&T review process, and it was included in 
the deliberations for this reason. The overarching principle the subcommittee pursued 
was to broaden the scholarship that could be recognized as part of P&T, such as digital 
media and publicly-engaged research. Widening the umbrella to include newly emerging 
forms of scholarship and under-appreciated types of research was of recurring interest to 
committee members, while several individuals acknowledged that innovation and 
entrepreneurship would not have been talked about were it not part of the task force 
charge. Therefore, the attention afforded to innovation and entrepreneurship in the P&T 
guidelines task force is minimal. Efforts to incentivize innovation and entrepreneurship 
and incorporate values of the ethos through expanding P&T criteria did little to disrupt 
the prevailing notions of success in the academic profession. In other words, for the P&T 
guidelines task force, the “stool” that symbolized professorial success remained 





 Faculty awards for innovation and entrepreneurship. At least two awards 
were created—or newly renamed—in the past several years to honor faculty members 
who are deemed innovative and entrepreneurial. The first award is conferred by the 
Board of Trustees and was formerly called the Award for Efficiency and Effectiveness. In 
2012, the award was renamed to the Award for Innovation, with two categories: 
Academic Transformation or Administrative Transformation. The former award goes to a 
faculty member who "improved teaching with minimum cost savings of $10,000,” and 
the latter award recognizes “improved effectiveness and efficiency resulting in minimum 
cost savings of $10,000.” The winner of each award receives a plaque and a monetary 
gift of $1,000. One of the faculty members that Tidewater nominated for this distinction 
was an engineer who taught a series of courses on energy audits. This experiential course 
required that students undertake a final project in which they conduct an energy audit of a 
campus office. Based upon this course and project, TU’s office of information technology 
approached the faculty member to do a similar audit of their database facilities. As a 
result of the analysis he did with students, he recommended changes that could save the 
university hundreds of thousands of dollars in energy costs. Therefore, from the 
perspective of the Board of Trustees and state university system, the type of innovation 
they would like to see from faculty members involves saving their institutions money. 
 A year after the renaming of the Award for Efficiency and Effectiveness, the state 
university system announced the winners of the inaugural Board of Trustees Entrepreneur 
of the Year Award. This award we created to support the fulfillment of one of the 
objectives outlined in the Board’s “Strategic Plan 2020,” namely the creation of 325 new 





professors of computer and electrical engineering, who with $20,000 from a business 
plan competition launched a company around their thin film batteries. The company now 
employs fifteen scientists and engineers and provides internships to over a dozen TU 
undergraduate students. In a press release for the award, a member of the Board of 
Trustees stated, “We are delighted to recognize these three outstanding entrepreneurs. 
Their innovative work, and the establishment of this annual event, reflects so well on the 
opportunities before us as the [state university system] makes technology 
commercialization a priority throughout our institutions.” If faculty innovation was 
equated with cost savings according to the Board of Trustees, faculty entrepreneurship 
was linked to technology commercialization and launching a company. These two awards 
are not the only ones for which Tidewater faculty are eligible that recognizes innovation 
and entrepreneurship. However, they both garner press attention and carry distinction. 
The question that remains is whether these awards truly incentivize faculty members and 
whether they apply equally to faculty members of all disciplines. 
 It is possible that many faculty—and the departments in which they work—are 
not aware of these awards or write them off because their scholarship will never result in 
substantial cost savings or easily commercializable knowledge. In this way, the creation 
of awards related to innovation and entrepreneurship intersects with only a small 
subsection of faculty at TU, namely those in the sciences, technology, and engineering. 
Among those that are eligible, it is possible that the prestige associated with awards will 
sufficiently motivate them to begin thinking about how to be more innovative and 
entrepreneurial. As Nicholas Johnson intoned, “faculty are not intrinsically interested in 





structure in ways that allow faculty members to advance their careers by engaging in 
entrepreneurship. The development of such incentives creates an environment in which 
faculty self-interest can be harnessed to the benefit of the university and state. Nicholas 
Johnson put this idea in rather Darwinian terms: “That’s a stimulating environment, to 
have to hunt a little bit for your food.” It should be noted, nonetheless, that the awards for 
innovation and entrepreneurship were recently created and are few in number. Hence, 
even if they help faculty attain prestige or aid in career advancement, these incentives are 
currently limited in terms of impact. 
 Tidewater is making a concerted effort to translate the innovation and 
entrepreneurship ethos into incentives for faculty members. Some interview participants 
related that they were aware that university leaders wanted them to be more innovative 
and entrepreneurial. The current faculty ombudsperson observed, “I think there’s a push 
to do this, and it takes time to build it and recognize it.” Similarly, Amy Curtis, a 
professor in the humanities, reflected, “Yeah, we’re encouraged to be innovative and 
entrepreneurial. And, you know, go out and get grant money or raise money somehow for 
some project.” This comment raises an important point, which is that, while many faculty 
members feel pressure to be innovative and entrepreneurial, the meanings of the concepts 
in practice vary by field. For Curtis, being innovative and entrepreneurial refers to 
securing grant money more so than starting a company. Nicholas Johnson clarified that 
the expectation was not that all faculty become entrepreneurs “because if ten percent of 
faculty were to go off and start business, the whole academic enterprise would collapse.” 
However, he suggested that the university wants them doing more commercialization of 





The development of incentives on the part of the Board of Trustees and university 
leaders may be in response to the perception that faculty are unwilling to take risks. 
Nicholas Johnson claimed: “Professors tend to be very risk averse. They think they’re 
innovative, but they tend not to be entrepreneurial by nature because they always 
conformed to the system coming up.” Because these incentives do not drastically alter the 
criteria on which faculty are promoted and speak to only certain forms of scholarship, I 
argue that the translation of the ethos has at present affected only those faculty members 
whose disciplines supported entrepreneurship or whose graduate socialization was 
amenable to entrepreneurship will continue pursue the commercial opportunities of their 
research. Additionally, some faculty, motivated by the desire to financially benefit, will 
engage in entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, it will be an activity of a small number of 
individuals. In the words of Lee Nguyen: “I’m smart enough to know that it’s not going 
to be case that huge numbers of faculty are going to start forming companies. It’s just not 
going to happen. The administration can say whatever it wants. I don’t think that we’re 
going to have that much of that going on percentage-wise.” 
Implications of Faculty Incentives 
 Although incentives for faculty members may only mobilize those in certain 
disciplines to become entrepreneurs or continue their entrepreneurial ventures, efforts to 
translate the ethos yield several implications the merit further consideration. The first 
implication is that, regardless of the number of faculty members who decide to pursue 
entrepreneurship and the disciplines they represent, the university may need to revisit its 
policies on conflict of interest and conflict of commitment. Several interview participants 





committed to the responsibilities for which they were hired and are free from undue 
corporate influence are not widely disseminated nor adequately clear. Chancellor 
Hofbauer acknowledged: 
It’s a huge issue. No question about it. There’s an upside to this, but there’s also a 
dark side. A lot of…faculty have gotten into difficulties that have compromised 
the integrity of institutions. So, part in parcel with this kind of policy is there have 
to be rigorous policies on conflict of interest and conflict of commitment, and 
they have to be adhered to. 
According to Lee Nguyen, there are “significant barriers” to forming companies “that 
have to do with conflict of interest and conflict of commitment that are not well 
formulated or understood.” For one academic executive, such dark sides of 
entrepreneurship stand out most in her memory: “When I heard about [entrepreneurship], 
it was more as a problem rather than as a mission.” She elaborated on this idea, recalling, 
“So, you have somebody who’s going out, particularly in the college of engineering, and 
they’re doing startup companies. Should they be doing this? How much time should they 
be giving to that?” These questions, and the challenges posed in answering them, 
prompted an academic executive for faculty to organize an informal group to examine 
policies around faculty conflict of interest and commitment. 
  The work of this group was viewed as especially important to Lee Nguyen. 
During his time as chair, he remembered that “there was a tendency by some faculty to 
play it a little fast and loose with the students…. And I saw situations where it was clear 
that the students’ publications were being delayed because the student was working with 





rules preventing faculty members from securing grants for research that benefited their 
company. He looked to guidance from MIT and Stanford on how they handle such 
situations, but in the end decided “the university could be a lot clearer…about what’s 
okay, what’s not okay, what actually protects the faculty member.” An academic 
executive for faculty hoped that the group would provide such clarity: “the reason that I 
put together [the group] is that I didn’t want to give ad hoc answers. What I’m finding is 
that it is very difficult to come up with agreed upon conditions.” In attempting to “play 
catch up with our own individuals [faculty members],” Tidewater was not unlike other 
institutions: “the problem is even more severe in some of our peers…. It is not like 
anybody else has a much better answer.” The group’s draft report begins by suggesting 
that “present-day higher education faces a tension,” consisting of “increasing demand and 
incentive for faculty to be innovative and entrepreneurial” and the need as a public 
university to reflect “transparency and accountability and traditional academic values.” 
Much like the point I make here regarding conflicts of interest and commitment, the 
report declared that such tensions “need not be negative if they are recognized, 
understood and managed.”  
 A second implication is that, by simply mentioning innovation and 
entrepreneurship in conjunction with promotion and tenure, university leaders send a 
message to faculty members that it is expected of them. One of the themes that emerged 
during the deliberations of the P&T guidelines task force is that “folklore” frequently 
reigns over and above policy documents when it comes to faculty understanding of what 
is required of them to attain tenure. Lee Nguyen voiced this issue as follows: “when 





first gut reaction of a lot of people is, ‘Does that mean it’s required? Everybody has to do 
it?” Indeed, his foremost concern was that “if you start pushing this so much, new 
assistant professors might think they should start forming companies.” In his opinion, that 
is “the worst thing that could happen…in terms of their getting tenure.” Although he 
reiterated that the task force “is going to be sure to say that’s not the message,” he 
cautioned that “it’s a problem with initiatives from the highest levels; it sort of feels like 
the rest of what people are doing is maybe not so important.” The fact that the ethos has 
so far received limited buy-in from faculty implies that there is not much folklore 
surrounding entrepreneurship, outside of those disciplines where it is already customary 
to include it in P&T review materials. It remains possible, however, that attaching 
innovation and entrepreneurship to conversations about the future of tenure sends 
messages to faculty members about what constitutes academic attainment at the 
university. 
 The final implication connects to an argument proffered in chapter four, which 
posited that the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos was crafted and most widely 
circulated in the colleges of business and engineering, to the exclusion of other parts of 
campus, mainly the humanities. The translation of the ethos into incentives thus far 
continues to favor faculty members in certain disciplines, where it is easier to 
commercialize research or achieve according to extant indicators of entrepreneurship, 
such as patents. The faculty ombudsperson succinctly made this point in a series of 
questions: “There is the issue of, okay, there’s entrepreneurship and innovation as we’ve 
defined it. What does that do to disciplines where that’s not central to what they do? And 





humanities are very concerned.” It is possible that faculty in the arts and humanities 
already feel as though there is a hierarchy of value at the university, dominated by the 
sciences and engineering. For instance, one professor in the humanities explained 
Tidewater, “as at all research universities, [follows] a science model. Even if it includes 
the humanities, it’s still modeled on science.” While the three pillars of the academic 
profession and the vast majority of faculty awards are inclusive of scholars coming from 
all disciplines, that same sense of inclusivity does not seem to apply to incentives based 
upon innovation and entrepreneurship. The letter of the law certainly indicates that they 
are designed for all faculty, but in spirit they seem to cater to a select few. 
 The preceding paragraphs sought to reveal how the innovation and 
entrepreneurship ethos was translated into incentives for faculty. Although certainly not 
an exhaustive treatment of faculty reward systems, two mechanisms were examined: 
changes to P&T criteria and the creation of awards related to innovation and 
entrepreneurship. Underlying this discussion was the proposition that such incentives 
possess the capacity to shape faculty conduct—that is, how they work as academic 
professionals and knowledge workers at the university. Analysis of the data demonstrates 
that, at least so far, incentives for faculty members related to entrepreneurship are not 
remarkably strong and do little to sway faculty thinking and behavior regarding what 
comprises professorial success. It remains to be seen whether this argument acquires 
additional validity, especially once the provost acts on the P&T guidelines task force’s 
recommendations. In the next part of the chapter, I shift to how the ethos is translated into 
academic opportunities for undergraduate students. I explore in similar fashion the extent 





 Academic Opportunities for Undergraduate Students 
 Chapter four introduced the mindset as one conceptualization of entrepreneurship 
at TU. In this part of the chapter, I return to this conceptualization and develop it further 
to shed light on the skills and knowledge related to innovation and entrepreneurship that 
undergraduate students are encouraged to master and acquire. Increasingly, such skills 
and knowledge are being incorporated into the academic structure of the university 
through a constellation of opportunities, including courses, modules, workshops, business 
model pitch competitions, and even minor degree programs. I describe in some detail 
each of these opportunities, drawing upon interview data and course syllabi. I argue that, 
amidst efforts to expand entrepreneurial learning opportunities on campus, there has been 
insufficient thought given to its implications, which present several concerns regarding 
the transmission of values that constitute the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos. After 
discussing these implications, I exemplify them through the case of an undergraduate 
student-launched social venture, the Food Rescue Movement.  
 The entrepreneurial mindset in detail. The basic features of the entrepreneurial 
mindset as it was described in chapter four centered upon opportunity recognition and an 
understanding of customer demand in the marketplace. Beyond these basic features, 
interview participants and course syllabi revealed several other skills and types of 
knowledge requisite to think and act like an entrepreneur. Chief among the skills listed 
were the ability to pitch an idea and work on a team, thereby demonstrating mastery of 
interpersonal communication. Additionally, the entrepreneurial mindset necessitated an 
ability to assume risk and iterate upon prototypes, which generally means feeling 





entrepreneur is captured in what one interview participants called “business literacy;” that 
is, an understanding of marketing, accounting, and finance. Opportunities for students to 
learn the entrepreneurial mindset has been increasingly built into the academic structure 
at Tidewater as part of the president’s vision to expose all students to entrepreneurial 
learning opportunities.  
 One of the skills underlying the entrepreneurial mindset that recurred in 
interviews is pitching an idea. Travis Campbell-Green, noted that one of the goals of 
entrepreneurship courses “was to give students skills that would be broadly applicable. 
And I’ll just mention one of these possible skills that they teach in business classes…. It’s 
the pitch, the elevator speech…. How do you explain your idea in thirty seconds so that 
someone would want to hear more?” Christine Neilson, director of the Prince 
Entrepreneurship Center, likewise stated that “almost every job you go to, you have to be 
selling in some way, and it’s a big part of what we do in workshops.” For this reason, she 
said entrepreneurship students are regularly practicing their pitch: “That’s what we do. I 
mean, if you can’t pitch your idea, regardless of whether it’s for a business, you’re never 
going to get people to buy into your idea.” Describing the Honors Entrepreneurship 
House, one program director recalled that “they have a real strong emphasis on personal 
presentation, which is fine…It’s always a little awkward when I walk into their space and 
everybody shakes hands firmly and looks in you in the eye and is dressed well.” Thus, 
one skill that is routinely linked to the entrepreneurial mindset is salesmanship—selling 
an idea, often to those who might be interested in financing it.  
 A second, related skill is predicated upon the development of strong interpersonal 





Entrepreneurs Program believed the entrepreneurial mindset was mainly 
“oriented…towards being opportunistic,” he related that “when you begin to 
decompartamentalize it,” the mindset features “these different elements of self-efficacy 
and confidence and to some extent interpersonal relationship skills and social capital.” 
The director of the Honors Entrepreneurship House agreed with Meyers, suggesting that 
“particularly with kids that are coming in as freshmen,” entrepreneurship “is really a 
means towards self-expression, self-awareness, [and] self-actualization.” The reason that 
these soft skills are prioritized is that many interview participants emphasized the team-
based nature of entrepreneurial work. As the director of the Honors Entrepreneurship 
House put it: “We do a lot of team projects because entrepreneurship is really a team 
sport. You know, innovation is not the lone inventor kind of thing.” In the words of one 
dean, “a lot of the innovation and entrepreneurship…thinking that they talk about 
depends on working with a cross-disciplinary team of people, requires that you have 
people with different backgrounds…because you get a different result. And an enriched 
conversation.” Interestingly, the dean acknowledged that this emphasis on working with a 
group in some ways ran contrary to the online learning promoted by some 
entrepreneurship academic opportunities, as demonstrated below.  
 A final skill that was frequently mentioned by interview participants revolved 
around the assumption of risk and the ability to deal with—and learn from—failure. 
According to Danielle Ramirez of the Center for Social Innovation, “most of the kids 
here [at Tidewater] are not very well versed in failure. Most of them have been very 
successful in their academics and their extracurriculars, or they wouldn’t be here…You 





to “push the envelope” and “get them to take risks.” Dealing with failure by making 
iterative changes was deemed vital to the entrepreneurial mindset. “I think failure’s very 
important,” claimed Samantha Stone of the Institute for Innovation and Entrepreneurship. 
“I mean, fearless ideas, this whole model that we’re trying to energize the campus. Don’t 
be afraid to fail. And entrepreneurs will tell you, you learn more in failure than you learn 
in success.” One of the ways that the Prince Entrepreneurship Center helps students 
assume the risk of entrepreneurship and become comfortable with failure is to “de-risk” 
the process by not telling anyone their ideas are bad. Christine Neilson reported, “We 
don’t tell anyone, ‘You have a bad idea.’ We help them do the research that they need to 
kind of decide how they want to go about it.” As I show below, several interview 
participants, including student entrepreneurs, believed this approach to risk was not 
sufficiently grounded in the difficult realities of a venture failing, and some even claimed 
it was designed to merely increase the number of bodies that walked through the Center’s 
doors. 
 The other side of the entrepreneurial mindset was knowledge of managing a 
business. For example, while the first part of the curriculum offered at the Honors 
Entrepreneurship House focuses on “the basics of ideation, thinking about customers and 
markets,” in the second part students “learn how to develop a business plan and financial 
model.” Thus, the program “looks at innovation first and they tries to put a little bit of a 
business concept around it.” Keith Meyers said his approach to teaching entrepreneurship 
is also to start with innovation and “how to identify opportunities” and then shifts to “the 
product development, the marketing, and the financing—all the various elements of 





literacy,” which will be required as part of a proposed minor degree program. Together 
with opportunity recognition, understanding the market, pitching ideas, working in teams, 
assuming risk, and learning from failure, business literacy represents an important 
component of what undergraduate students are encouraged to learn as the innovation and 
entrepreneurship ethos is translated into academic opportunities. These opportunities are 
gradually being incorporated into the academic structure of the university through 
courses, modules, competitions, and degree programs. I describe each of these 
opportunities in turn, before analyzing them to demonstrate their often overlooked 
implications. 
 Entrepreneurship courses. In Tidewater’s course catalogue for 1980, there is no 
mention of entrepreneurship courses for undergraduate students. By 2013, the Tidewater 
Technology Enterprise Collaborative alone offered nearly twenty courses per year on 
innovation and entrepreneurship and, according to its director, reached over a thousand 
students. Figure 3 shows the growth in courses specifically bearing the word 
entrepreneurship in their title or description since 1980, based upon course catalogues for 
the university. As I argued in previous chapters, the rapid increase in entrepreneurship 
courses began around the time William Pierson started as president in 1998. Although not 
shown in the figure, courses have also been offered in more of the university’s schools 









Figure 2: Growth of Entrepreneurship Courses at Tidewater, 1980-2012 
 
There are now courses on writing for social entrepreneurship offered through the English 
department, courses on bio-entrepreneurship for students studying life sciences, and 
courses in media entrepreneurship in the college of journalism. Based upon the packet 
that the Institute for Innovation and Entrepreneurship produced for The Princeton 
Review, the university has a total of 45
9
 courses that include content in any way related to 
innovation and entrepreneurship (19 of which are in the college of engineering; the 
remaining courses are divided amongst the colleges of humanities [4], agriculture [6], 
public health [1], undergraduate studies [7], journalism [4], natural sciences [2], public 
policy [1], and architecture [1]). As has been previously indicated, the steady increase in 
entrepreneurship courses is consistent with President Henry Pryor’s goal of exposing all 
undergraduate students to entrepreneurial learning opportunities.  
The resistance of the dean to creating a separate general education requirement for 
innovation and entrepreneurship does not mean that entrepreneurship courses are 
                                                 
9
 This figure is higher than my calculation of 21 courses because my search of course catalogues only 
sought courses with entrepreneurship in the title or description. The packet was more liberal in its 
interpretation of courses related to entrepreneurship. 































excluded from curricular obligations all students must fulfill. In fact, several interview 
participants stated that they hoped to develop “I-Signature” courses around 
entrepreneurship. These courses, according the university’s general education website, 
are designed to be “lively and contemporary. They speak to important issues that spark 
the imagination, demand intellect, and inspire innovation.” All Tidewater undergraduates 
are required to take two “I-Signature” courses. Furthermore, several entrepreneurship 
programs offer courses that count towards the “scholarship in practice” requirement of 
the general education curriculum. One dean related that, when asked whether innovation 
and entrepreneurship coursework could be turned into a general education requirement, 
she responded: “We have to find a way to build it into what we have. We had just 
changed the gen ed. That’s why I said, ‘Scholarship in Practice. There you go. Put it in 
there.’” Although courses in innovation and entrepreneurship are not mandatory, they 
have been integrated into the academic program which the university considers essential 
for all undergraduate students to complete in order to receive a Tidewater degree. 
 Many of the entrepreneurship courses currently offered at TU are connected to the 
two previously discussed living-learning programs: the Crandall Entrepreneurs Program, 
which is for upper-class students of all majors, and the Honors Entrepreneurship House, 
which caters to first- and second-year students of all majors. These courses exemplify 
how the entrepreneurial mindset is taught to students at Tidewater. The first course that 
students in the Crandall Entrepreneurs Program are required to take is titled “Advanced 
Entrepreneurial Opportunity Analysis in Technology Ventures.” According to the 
syllabus, this course “is an informed and interesting exploration of entrepreneurial 





student technology entrepreneurs.” Assignments for the course include a paper on 
psychological traits of successful entrepreneurs, a paper on developing an innovation-
based concept, and a business model design group project. In the Honors 
Entrepreneurship House, students do not develop a business plan until the second year. 
The introductory course’s objectives cover “developing an entrepreneurial mind for an 
entrepreneurial world,” “cultivating a business in diverse, global environments,” “leading 
and collaborating in a competitive world,” and “industry dynamics of technological 
innovation.” Required assignments for the course ask students to attend TTEC’s 
“intensive workshop and networking event on how to launch ventures” and write two 
papers that assess “entrepreneurial thinking and written communication skills.” One of 
the more interesting assignments is called the “Gumball Challenge.” Teams of students 
are given twenty-seven dollars and twenty-seven gumballs and tasked with “creating as 
much value as possible.” Thus, students are taught to both demonstrate certain cognitive 
and communication skills and to put their business literacy to practice through 
simulations and business plan competitions. 
 The main impediment to the continued growth of entrepreneurship courses, in the 
eyes of two interview participants, is qualified faculty to teach them. As Keith Meyers 
observed: 
 for the university to have a commitment to entrepreneurship education, I think it’s 
 going to come with hiring a lot more faculty that can teach it. Because it’s one 
 thing to say, ‘Wouldn’t it be nice to get to 24,000 [enrolled students]?’ but you 





In the same vein, Danielle Ramirez of the Center for Social Innovation worries that 
courses are being created without any true learning objectives or faculty with training in 
entrepreneurship: “What I can easily see happening is someone has a course and they try 
to adapt a few words to make it more entrepreneurship-related, but at the end of the day it 
was the same thing that they were always doing. And then we count that and say, ‘Look 
at how many more courses we have!’” Ramirez would like to see the university more 
systematically define learning objectives around entrepreneurship to ensure that the right 
content is being transmitted under the banner of entrepreneurship. While courses 
represent one of the primary ways in which the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos is 
translated into academic opportunities for undergraduate students, questions remain about 
its growth and the control of quality. 
 Design thinking modules. As a way of incorporating more entrepreneurial 
learning opportunities into the academic structure of the university without necessarily 
launching new courses, the Institute for Innovation and Entrepreneurship developed 
modules around design thinking. These modules vary in length and are taught by a 
lecturer who previously taught at Stanford’s design institute. In an interview, the lecturer 
defined design thinking as:  
an innovation process, a way for people to methodically come up with a wild, new 
innovation. It doesn’t have to be just a product. Like I said, it could be new 
services, systems, policies, intangible stuff as well…. The idea is that it’s human-
centered, so you start with the people are going to be affected by whatever it is 
you’re designing. And then you go out and spend a lot of time with them, really 





it’s a lot of brainstorming. Coming up with wild ideas, then picking some to 
prototype. By prototype, I mean you’re building a really low-resolution, really 
cheap model of your solution to hand to somebody and then have them use it…. 
And then constantly iterating until you come up with your solution, you keep 
increasing the resolution of your solution. 
The desired outcome of the design thinking modules is that if students are “dropped into 
any really tough, existing problem,” they could devise an innovative solution. “It’s 
making all these students innovators and getting them to question how things are now and 
push things forward in any discipline.” The emphasis of the modules is on innovation, 
while the creation of companies is viewed as simply on means of bringing a solution to 
fruition. Nevertheless, design thinking modules constitute an important vehicle for the 
teaching of several facets of the entrepreneurial mindset, such as understanding what 
customers in the marketplace seek and iterating upon failed prototypes. The design 
thinking lecturer even noted that the idea of design thinking is to “fail early and fail 
often” as part of a “culture that celebrates failure. We don’t want students to be 
perfectionists and to be afraid of going after something big.” 
To date, design thinking modules have been used extensively in Tidewater’s 
honors program and courses for first-year students in a selective residential program. In 
the fall of 2013, over 600 students took part in a design thinking module. Samantha Stone 
intimated that the decision to build modules around design thinking was purposeful: “one 
of the reasons we led with design thinking and not the lean launchpad methodology is 
that [it] is for everyone. It’s how to problem-solve.” The provost recently included design 





courses. Another content area suggested in the request for Fearless Thinking course 
proposals was “entrepreneurship tailored to a specific field of study, for example – the 
arts, agriculture or non-profits.” As the name implies, Fearless Thinking courses should, 
according to the provost, “challenge students to take risks” and “foster collaborative 
teams.” Faculty whose Fearless Thinking course proposals are accepted will be expected 
to teach the courses three semesters, for which they will receive a monetary award. 
Additionally, participating faculty will be named Distinguished Institute for Innovation 
and Entrepreneurship Faculty Fellows. Rather than create separate design thinking 
courses, it is believed that modules will be built into many Fearless Thinking courses. As 
I discuss further as part of the implications of efforts to translate the innovation and 
entrepreneurship ethos into academic opportunities for students, there may be an 
overemphasis on risk-taking and occasionally valid reasons for fear. 
 Business model pitch competitions. Arguably the most visible entrepreneurial 
learning opportunities at TU—attracting the largest number of students—is competitions, 
most of which require or revolve around a business model and pitch. The Institute for 
Innovation and Entrepreneurship calculated that there were sixteen innovation and 
entrepreneurship competitions at Tidewater in 2013. One of the competitions is open to 
university students across the country, and another is international, bringing together TU 
students and students from Peking University to compete for money to launch a business 
that is either based in China or leverages China’s resources. Nine of the competitions are 
organized by either entrepreneurship programs in the college of business or TTEC. By far 
the largest competition is the Bull’s-Eye Cup, which is run by the Prince 





athletic apparel company, student companies who have been in operation less than five 
years and have revenues in excess of $5,000 can compete for up to $70,000 in cash and 
prizes. I observed the 2013 Bull’s-Eye Cup, which took place in Tidewater’s largest 
performing arts theater. Thousands of spectators filled virtually every available seat in the 
theater. Each team had an opportunity to pitch their business to a panel of judges, putting 
into practice the salesmanship touted as part of the entrepreneurial mindset. The pitch 
consisted of one member of each team—all of whom were male this particular year—
explaining through a PowerPoint presentation how their product or service filled a niche 
in the market and showed the greatest promise for profitability. The team that won the 
Cup in 2013 was selling a biodegradable mat that facilitated gardening for novices in 
urban areas. 
 These observations of the Bull’s-Eye Cup were less revealing than an interview 
with the organizer of a new business model pitch competition in the college of social 
sciences, Steven Walker. The initial idea to create the competition came from the 
college’s board of visitors, which Walker described as comprising many entrepreneurs 
and “serial entrepreneurs.” Receiving logistical support from the Prince Entrepreneurship 
Center, Walker sought “a format that was proven to work” and would “not force the 
immediate appearance of entrepreneurship in our culture.” The goal was to create an 
opportunity for students to “take their great idea and turn it into a startup or at least a 
pitch for one” and, therefore, become involved in an area that has been dominated by 
business and engineering students. Walker wanted the competition to send a message to 
the “UMD entrepreneurial community” that the social sciences were also innovative: 





 and your organization. We have the research, we have the anthropology, we have 
 the psychology and sociology behind your student behavior, we have the 
 understanding of satellite imaging, and global position networks and things like 
 that that can drive what’s going on.  
In this way, students studying the social sciences could be seen as attractive to already 
entrepreneurial students as they launched their startups.  
 The most important output that each team must prepare is a business model using 
a canvas, or guide, provided by the competition. “Because we appreciate the fact that our 
students, especially at [the college of social sciences] are not going to be familiar with 
your business plan,” explained Walker, the business model canvas “takes the main 
building blocks of any business plan or executive summary and allows you to approach 
them block by block.” In addition to preparing the business model, teams must also write 
a written summary of their idea and a series of PowerPoint slides, which will serve as the 
basis for their pitch if they are selected as semifinalists. The final piece that teams submit 
for consideration consists of “quotes from potential customers,” the assumption being 
that “if your business is going to be consumer-driven, you need to understand what it is 
your customer wants.” Since all of the teams must submit customer quotes, all of their 
ideas are expected to be consumer-driven. Throughout this process, teams are required to 
attend a certain number of workshops and pitch practice sessions with “individuals at the 
[Prince] Center, as well as our…alumni board of visitors.” Prizes are awarded to the best 
two semi-finalist teams, as well as the team that has best utilized the available resources 
to help them develop their idea. This is to prevent students from being discouraged if they 





competition in 2013: “A fledgling entrepreneur who’s never done this before will be able 
to show more improvement, more knowledge gaining, and more progress than a so-called 
competition shark, who’s already well-established.” For Walker, the whole point of the 
competition is to introduce students to what he sees as crucial skills: “To get [students] 
in, get the thinking creatively, working with others across campus…And no matter what 
they do, if they never get into another entrepreneurship-focused program in their lives, 
those are things that they will undoubtedly take with them.”  
 What sets business model pitch competitions apart from other entrepreneurial 
learning opportunities is that it awards money to students in order to launch a startup or 
further refine their idea. For many competitions, cash prizes are considered “seed 
money,” or just a few thousand dollars to help them continue the development process. 
The possibility of winning money and other prizes is heavily marketed by the organizers 
of competitions, signifying a recognition that the process is not truly just about learning. 
Nevertheless, the belief that learning is a central rationale for the competitions has 
prompted some to consider how to award credit for students that participate. For 
example, the associate director of the philanthropy center on campus noted that they 
created a course for which students could register as they put together competition 
materials: “we need to support students who want to do this and we need to structure that 
support to give them credit for it.” Such flexibility with credits may prove to be 
particularly important with student entrepreneurs, as two undergraduate managers of the 
student startup incubator confided that many students who are working on a venture 
struggle with their courses. Their point was not that there is a higher risk of attrition 





elected to leave college early. Instead, the suggestion is that, much like academic 
entrepreneurs, students attempting to launch a venture face conflicts of commitment. 
 Entrepreneurship minor degree programs. Several interview participants were 
not open to the possibility that entrepreneurship could develop into a major degree 
program at Tidewater. Although they cited the existence of a field of study devoted to 
entrepreneurship, there was a recurring sentiment that entrepreneurship is an approach 
that complements other courses of study. As the director of the Honors Entrepreneurship 
House phrased it: “Part of me thinks you need to do this in conjunction with something 
else…For me, entrepreneurship is an approach. So, the question becomes an approach to 
what? It could be an approach to engineering, it could be an approach to doing business, 
an approach to linguistics, art, any of these things. It pairs well.” He favored offering 
entrepreneurship as a minor, which could then enhance a student’s major degree program. 
Currently, Tidewater has one minor degree program in Technology Entrepreneurship, and 
there is another minor in entrepreneurship being developed. The minor in Technology 
Entrepreneurship is managed by TTEC and is described as helping “technology-creating 
students” acquire “a firm grasp of the entrepreneurial process and mind-set.” Once 
“armed” with this mind-set, students involved in the minor “drive economic growth by 
launching successful ventures and bringing life-changing products and services to 
market.” The fifteen-credit program includes nine courses from which students can 
choose, all of which are taught by TTEC employees. Course topics in the minor include: 
“entrepreneurial opportunity analysis, marketing high-technology products, strategies for 
managing innovation, and international innovation and entrepreneurship.” Its curriculum, 





 A second minor degree program is in the proposal stage at the time of this writing, 
and its focus extends beyond technology entrepreneurship. Although the faculty member 
currently writing the proposal declined to share the document with me until it was ready 
for dissemination, Christine Neilson of the Prince Entrepreneurship Center mentioned a 
few of its features. “It will be very unique in that it’s significantly online, a blended 
structure,” explained Neilson. The core modules devoted to “business literacy” will be 
almost entirely online and combined with “some sort of experiential component, be it an 
internship or a project.” There will be several tracks within the minor, such as corporate 
entrepreneurship, small business management, or technology commercialization. The 
idea behind the minor, according to Neilson, is that the university “can’t necessarily just 
talk about entrepreneurship without having something that is a little bit [deeper] and 
gives these kids experiences that they can get credit for.” It remains to be seen whether 
the proposal is accepted, although it is difficult to envision its dismissal on a campus 
whose ethos has increasingly assigned great important to innovation and 
entrepreneurship. The creation of minor degree programs—credentials that are 
recognized outside of the university—effectively validates and structures entrepreneurial 
ways of thinking and behaving. The conferment of a credential provides some motivation 
for students to continue taking courses in entrepreneurship and recognizes that effort as 
the acquisition of important knowledge. Many students, of course, will elect to not pursue 
a minor in entrepreneurship; nevertheless, the development of these programs, with 
curricula and learning outcomes, is designed to encourage students to master and acquire 





 There is nothing to signal that the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos will be 
translated into requirements that all undergraduate students are obligated to fulfill. 
Instead, Tidewater has created a number of different academic opportunities for students 
to learn the entrepreneurial mindset and put it into practice in such a way that they might 
feel empowered to launch a successful venture. These opportunities, from courses to 
business model pitch competitions, have been growing in number as a reflection of the 
university’s penchant for all things innovation and entrepreneurship. I argue that, amidst 
the expansion of opportunities that encourage undergraduate students to think and act like 
entrepreneurs, there has been undue consideration of the implications of translating the 
ethos. I examine four of these implications and attempt to give them fuller expression 
through the example of the Food Rescue Movement.  
Implications of Academic Opportunities for Undergraduate Students 
 One of the themes that surfaced as interview participants described the 
entrepreneurial mindset and how it is taught to students is learning from failure and 
making incremental improvements to “prototypes.” Iteration is, naturally, a part of the 
research process in many disciplines. However, the case can be made that there is an 
under-appreciation of the high probability of failure in entrepreneurship, leading to a lack 
of conversations that prepare students for the true hardships that can accompany a failed 
venture. The reality surrounding startups was not foreign to Travis Campbell-Green: 
“People focus on the big success stories, the Sergiy Brins, the Googles. These are almost 
miraculous events when they happen. They depend on a lot of luck, on a lot of things 
being present at the same time. It’s just not going to happen to a lot of people. Most new 





entrepreneurial ventures resonated with one program director, who reflected: “what’s 
missing sometimes in the conversation is an awareness of fortune or luck.” He concluded 
that “the culture of accepting failures is ascendant right now” in reference to American 
culture. These were the only two interview participants who were concerned about the 
high probability of failure in entrepreneurship. The remaining interview participants who 
brought up failure celebrated it as an essential part of the entrepreneurial process. They 
did not dwell on the details of failure, such as the potential for job loss, bankruptcy, or 
strained personal relationships. By contrast, failure was an abstract concept and largely 
overshadowed by perceived benefits of the entrepreneurial process to solve problems and 
spur economic growth. 
 As a consequence of this overshadowing, many interview participants admitted 
that students who took part in entrepreneurial learning opportunities were not truly 
prepared for failure and what that meant in the real world of business compared the 
simulated world of competitions. Danielle Ramirez of the Center for Social Innovation 
reported, “in my social entrepreneurship course, I do a lot of talking about what works. 
And we probably don’t do enough talking about what fails, and how you build resiliency 
to failure and learn from it and move on.” She agreed that “we do present a bit of a rose-
colored glasses by which people might view entrepreneurship,” but believed failure was 
less of a problem because “we’re teaching about a mindset, rather than an execution 
issue.” One solution, she jokingly added, was a whole course on failure: “How to Fail at 
Entrepreneurship! That would be a really cool [I-Signature] course perhaps.” Tom Parks, 





 I don’t know if we adequately prepare them for that [failure]. It’s easy when 
 you’re a student to have stars in your eyes and go, ‘Yeah, I’ve heard those 
 numbers. Everybody hears those numbers, but it won’t happen to us. They 
 probably are not adequately prepared for that realization. 
Yet, he countered that now was the time for students for try and fail: “when you’re 
young. And you don’t have financial ties. You don’t have a mortgage to pay, and a 
spouse and kids. That’s when you do it. Because you can absorb the failure.” As things 
stand, many students are taught to believe that entrepreneurship can solve difficult 
problems, drive economic growth, and even allow them to be their own boss. The 
narrative of startup success is not sufficiently tempered by startup failure, leaving many 
students vulnerable to the harsh realities of the market. A student entrepreneur who helps 
to run a startup incubator stated that “as soon you put these things into a program, they 
treat you like you’re very fragile. Like they don’t want to break you. And that’s good for 
their numbers. But it’s not nice out there. Business is not nice.”  
 One entrepreneurial learning opportunity in which it is possible for undergraduate 
students to experience failure is business model pitch competitions. In the words of one 
program director, “in this prize-based culture [of competitions], certainly it does have 
most of the students failing.” This remark revealed a second implication of the translation 
of the ethos into academic opportunities for undergraduate students: fostering winner-
takes-all competition and a prize-based culture. By the time undergraduate students reach 
Tidewater, they are well-acquainted with competition. Many of the opportunities to learn 
the entrepreneurial mindset build upon and continue this competitive streak, turning the 





provost Nancy Martin, into a game in which the most profitable idea is deemed an 
innovative solution and awarded with cash. As an example of this culture, one program 
director described the Honors Entrepreneurship House as follows: 
 They immediately invested some of their money in competitions for the students. 
 So, it’s a prize-base culture, as opposed to something else. And in a prize-based 
 culture, you’re trying to get everybody to work and most of the people don’t get 
 paid. There’s some luck guy who gets all the money. That’s roughly how prizes 
 work. And so they…live it. And I thought, ick…. And, of course, students are 
 well armed for that kind of activity. 
There are few, if any, stipulations attached to the money that students win in business 
model pitch competitions. Although the hope is that they use it to launch businesses that 
create jobs, it is possible the money is used in entirely unproductive ways. If learning is, 
indeed, the ultimate goal—and not starting companies—one must carefully consider the 
principles being transmitted when public university spaces are converted into microcosms 
of the market, where lucrative ideas receive cash and ideas whose commercial value is 
not apparent or non-existent lose out. 
 A third implication of academic opportunities that develop as a result of the ethos 
might be referred to as the tyranny of the group or team. Many of the assignments in 
entrepreneurship courses are group projects, and all of the competitions require teams of 
students, with an emphasis on interdisciplinary collaboration. An academic executive 
voiced concern with that he called “all this emphasis on teamwork” connected to 





 I’m a little worried because some people work well in teams, and some things go 
 well in teams, but not everything. Some of the greatest thinkers in history never 
 collaborated with anybody. Forcing them into a team to brainstorm or whatever 
 would have been stifling.  
While their example may not be one to emulate, many of the heroes of entrepreneurship 
cited by interview participants were not known for their collaboration. In fact, many of 
them were autodidacts who worked tirelessly on their ideas alone, at times when no one 
else saw its value. The fact that Mark Zuckerburg and Bill Gates never finished college 
was not lost several interview participants, including one dean, who said: “We need 
brilliant people who never finish their degree.” These were seen as anomalous situations 
that do not really capture how innovation happens. There was little willingness to 
consider that the stress placed on groups or teams in entrepreneurship may inhibit, rather 
than engender, innovative ideas. 
 Because entrepreneurship was so widely believed to be a source of solutions, 
most interview participants paid short shrift the problems it may cause. After all, 
entrepreneurship in a free market system is not new, meaning some of the difficult 
problems of the 21
st
 century cannot be divorced from the dealings of entrepreneurs past. 
It is even the case that entrepreneurs simultaneously solve one problem, but in the 
process plant the seeds for another. For example, John D. Rockefeller was certainly an 
entrepreneur who revolutionized the petroleum industry and redefined the shape of 
modern corporations. In the process, however, he formed a massive trust responsible for 
controlling the prices of transportation that ultimately caused innumerous small 





business model pitch competition organizers was there mention of the trade-offs that 
inherently accompany entrepreneurship, or that students still need a moral compass. One 
of the concerns that a program director expressed with respect to the Honors 
Entrepreneurship House was that “the curriculum that was originally proposed did not 
have an ethics component to it.” Lost amidst the promotion of entrepreneurship was that 
the process does not naturally lead to positive outcomes for all people in all situations. 
 A student-launched venture called the Food Rescue Movement (FRM) 
exemplifies the influence of the entrepreneurial mindset, as well as the implications of 
translating the ethos. Officially founded in 2011, FRM was formed by a group of students 
led by Nate Gallagher. According to Gallagher, “we noticed good food going to waste in 
the dining halls…and we set up a program to donate this food instead of throwing it out.” 
The first chapter of the organization was soon joined by a chapter founded by one of 
Gallagher’s friends at Brown University. “Within a few weeks,” recalled Gallagher, “we 
had already donated 500 pounds of food, so it really validated super early on that this 
something that could scale and should be at every college in America.” FRM became 
regular competitors in business model pitch competitions at TU, and they “cleaned 
house,” to borrow from one interview participant. The first competition they entered was 
offered by the Prince Entrepreneurship Center, and Gallagher laughingly remembered: 
“We didn’t win Pitch [Prince], which was kind of funny because it was the smallest pitch 
competition we’ve ever been in.” Soon thereafter, however, FRM won $5,000 in a 
competition, followed by $16,000 in another. Gallagher noted, “We just continued to win 
awesome prizes and grow our impact.” When asked what made FRM an entrepreneurial 





That’s a great question. Because we’re a 51(c)(3) [non-profit], and we currently 
really don’t generate income from our income models…. For me, it has to do with 
the scalability of it. That it’s scalable and it is sustainable. Even though it’s not 
earning our own income, we almost see foundations and individual donors as our 
customers…. And so just the scalability, the efficiency, that we’re using business 
principles, and entrepreneurship principles in starting it. 
The “earned income models” refers to selling food rescue certifications to local 
restaurants and grocery stores, as well as providing training in food rescue.  
 In total, FRM calculates that it has won close to $45,000 in competitions, and it 
has received additional resources from the university. These resources include free office 
space at the Institute for Innovation and Entrepreneurship. Although TU has given a great 
deal to FRM, the university has also benefited from the organization. As Gallagher put it: 
“our brand is tied to the university’s brand now, about Fearless [Thinking]. And they put 
us on the side of a bus, and like, apparently, we were just in a commercial on ESPN. 
They really like to take ownership of us.” Gallagher saw this as reason to continue the 
relationship between Tidewater and FRM into the future. Because of this relationship, 
several interview participants referred to FRM—and its charismatic leader—as the 
“poster child” of Tidewater’s innovation and entrepreneurship push. In addition to money 
from competitions and resources from the university, FRM received money from 
foundations. Its biggest donor is the Sodexo Foundation, which is the charitable arm of 
the Sodexo Corporation (formerly Sodexo-Marriott), a multinational firm that manages 
university dining facilities. The corporation has a checkered track record with employees 





poor treatment and pay of workers. Salaries for the leadership team of FRM come out of 
the $150,000 donated by Sodexo. Gallagher has committed so much time to FRM that he 
sometimes struggled academically. Currently a sixth-year senior, the young CEO takes 
courses in non-profit management through the school of public policy, but also receives 
some credit for his work with FRM.  
 There is little doubt that the Food Rescue Movement has developed a service that 
prevents waste and helps feed people in need. The leader of the organization clearly 
echoed what many entrepreneurship educators say is important for an entrepreneurial 
venture, including scalability and sustainability. Rather than consider FRM a non-profit 
organization, Gallagher called it a “social venture,” pointing to their use of 
entrepreneurial principles and “earned income models.” The organization largely owes its 
existence to help in its early stages from cash prizes won as a result of selling their ideas 
in repeated business model pitch competitions. The university has been quick to shine the 
spotlight on FRM as an example of what the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos can 
produce in undergraduate students. There is perhaps no better example at Tidewater than 
FRM of the ways in which student thinking and behavior has been shaped by the 
institutional emphasis on innovation and entrepreneurship. While this organization was 
repeatedly cited as an example of undergraduate student entrepreneurship, the number of 
academic opportunities and fanfare surrounding FRM suggests that others will soon 
follow. 
Connecting Emerging Developments to Theory 
 Evidence throughout this chapter shows that Tidewater created various 





the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos. There are no policies in place and no 
requirements that force either group of actors to think and behave as entrepreneurs. 
Instead, the university has sought to incentivize academic entrepreneurship by building it 
into the faculty reward system and to structure opportunities for undergraduate students 
to learn the entrepreneurial mindset. Assuming the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos 
continues its present trajectory, it is seems probable that the number of academic 
opportunities for undergraduate students will continue to swell. As follows, the 
translation of the ethos closely resembles Walters’ (2012) definition of governance, 
which eschews brute coercion in favor of “individuals and groups seeking to shape their 
own conduct or the conduct of others” (p. 11). The creation of rationalities tied to 
entrepreneurship—as a panacea for intractable problems or a requirement for 
employability, for example—as well as incentives replace outright compulsion and are 
designed to shape actors into subjects. Therefore, data supports the assertion that the 
translation of the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos constitutes a form of what 
Foucault termed “governmentality,” or striving to shape conduct by teaching and 
rewarding means of self-management. 
 The particular subjectivity that is shaped at Tidewater could be quite different 
from that which is presently produced at Tidewater. For instance, the subjectivity could 
be based upon public service or nationalism, which was the case during Tidewater’s early 
years as a land-grant institution, when cadets were trained in military tactics and 
citizenship (McClure, 2012). The type of subject molded at TU due to the innovation and 
entrepreneurship ethos, on the other hand, is a version of homo economicus, the much 





sensitive to costs and benefits. Such benefits, though slow to develop for the institution, 
can be substantial for individuals who entrepreneurial venture finds success with 
investors and consumers. University actors have become so accustomed to applying 
economic analysis to every detail of their lives and treating all phenomena in terms of 
competition in the market that the entrepreneurial mindset becomes rather banal. In many 
ways, this version of homo economicus is perfectly suited to an economy and political 
structure beholden to neoliberalism. As the government retreats and laissez-faire 
approaches reign supreme, citizens are induced to self-manage in ways that perpetuate 
the capitalist system and permits the government to roll back its presence. One lens to 
analyze the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos, then, is that it transmits values to 
university actors which encourage precisely the type conduct required by neoliberal 
capitalism. Undergraduate students, in particular, are increasingly and actively taught 
what advocates call the “entrepreneurial mindset” and critics might label a “neoliberal 
state of mind,” accepting both responsibility for privately funding their education and 
individually creating their own employment upon graduation.  Although the evidence on 
which this interpretation is made is limited to one case, the innovation and 
entrepreneurship ethos, as one manifestation of the academic capitalist 
knowledge/learning regime, sheds light on the role of universities in reflecting and 
reproducing the social relations of the present iteration of capitalism, consistent with the 
first theoretical proposition.  
 Some may argue that there have always been ties binding academe and 
capitalism. It is true that wealthy industrial magnates used their wealth to establish some 





higher education, encouraging fierce competition. In fact, several interview participants 
claimed that U.S. higher education’s model based upon survival of the fittest has allowed 
it to attain excellence. Although I do not dispute that there is a long history between 
universities and capitalism, the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos illustrates how the 
relationship has profoundly changed in recent decades. I submit that the desire to teach 
students how to solve problems by launching companies and to encourage faculty to 
better serve society by commercializing their research suggests that universities have 
been co-opted to fulfill purposes and enrich interests which previously would have been 
alien to educational institutions, certainly those that are publicly supported and not-for-
profit.  
Conspicuously, in thirty interviews with individuals across Tidewater, the word 
“capitalism” was never once uttered. Despite the irrefutable link between 
entrepreneurship and an economic system built around private entities accumulating 
capital and competing in a free market, academic capitalism has become so normal, so 
ingrained in what students and faculty experience, it is virtually invisible. As a result of 
this invisibility, there is little space to question or explore alternatives to neoliberal 
understandings of economy and society. In lieu of being a site that foments change and 
provides some check to the power of private industry influence, the university may be a 
site of reproduction, ensuring that subsequent generations continue the project of 
“liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade 






 This chapter sought to uncover how the emerging innovation and 
entrepreneurship ethos at Tidewater intersected with the lives of faculty members and 
undergraduate students. More than a billboard slogan, innovation and entrepreneurship 
has been translated into incentives and academic opportunities in order to stimulate 
academic entrepreneurship and teach the entrepreneurial mindset. I argued in this chapter 
that the incentives designed for faculty members, including expanding P&T criteria and 
creating awards, have not yet altered the foundations of professorial success. 
Entrepreneurship was seen as something that could enhance the traditional pillars of the 
academic profession, provided there were concrete metrics that were subject to the same 
rigorous evaluation as other areas. Furthermore, newly created awards for innovation and 
entrepreneurship are few in number and cater to specific disciplines, especially those with 
faculty members whose research saves the university money or can be successfully 
commercialized. Accordingly, these awards are not inclusive of all areas of campus. 
Academic opportunities for undergraduate students to acquire and master skills and 
knowledge associated with the entrepreneurial mindset are plentiful and expanding. With 
the goal of exposing all students to entrepreneurial learning opportunities, the academic 
programs look to be far more influential in changing student thinking and behavior than 
incentives for faculty members. This conclusion requires further investigation, but its 
plausibility is reinforced by student acknowledgement of the celebrity status of 
entrepreneurs in America today.  
An important contribution of this chapter was to show that Tidewater’s efforts to 





members and undergraduate students is not without implications. Accompanying any 
future institutional benefits accrued as a result of the innovation and entrepreneurship 
ethos are a set of possible consequences that may irreparably harm the academic 
profession and college student experience. From the creation of faculty free-agents with 
little loyalty to the institution to the gamification of student learning—complete with 
hefty cash prizes—the galvanization of innovation and entrepreneurship as institutional 
ethos could transform a public research university like TU further away from the public 
good knowledge/learning regime. Evolution, of course, is the inevitable path of any 
educational institution, but the nature of this evolution is not pre-destined. This chapter 
raises a set of difficult questions for Tidewater’s leadership to consider related to the 
viability and advantages of innovation and entrepreneurship as they guide the institution 
into an uncertain future.  














CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
Introduction 
 Since the late 1970s, public universities have contended with a steadily shifting 
political-economic landscape. Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) theorized that one outcome 
of this shifting landscape has been a movement away from the “public good 
knowledge/learning regime” and toward an emerging “academic capitalist 
knowledge/learning regime.” This latter regime prioritizes profit taking and the 
privatization of knowledge as networks of actors intersect with what Slaughter and 
Rhoades conceptualized as the new economy. The strength of this theorization lies in its 
constant reference to structural trends in American postsecondary education, namely the 
reduction of funds from the government and the increasing dependence upon private, 
external sources of money. Additionally, Slaughter and Rhoades effectively captured in 
this regime many of the behavioral manifestations of academic capitalism, such as 
institutions establishing revenue-generating professional degree programs, fostering 
student consumerism, and encouraging faculty to commercialize their research. Questions 
remained, however, regarding how academic capitalism is catalyzed into values and 
norms that shape the lived experience of faculty members, students, and staff. Studies 
have started to address these questions (e.g., Mendoza, 2012), and this dissertation builds 
upon this scholarship.  
This dissertation sought, in some measure, to re-envision the theory of academic 
capitalism as multi-level process at one institution. It focused upon the means and 
motivations through which the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime was 





Specifically, I studied the case of Tidewater University (TU), and its emerging innovation 
and entrepreneurship ethos between 1998 and 2013. As a conclusion to this study, I 
present in abbreviated form the main findings revealed in chapters four through six. 
These arguments are informed by a set of theoretical propositions that were designed to 
develop a more complete picture of why a public university like TU adopted values and 
norms of the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime. The theoretical propositions 
also shed light on the processes through which university leaders introduced these values 
and norms into the institution and its ethos.  
I summarize in this chapter the ways in which the data supports these theoretical 
propositions, leading to the initial development of a revision to the theory of academic 
capitalism. In the final part of the chapter, I discuss two unresolved issues and consider 
what this project means for policy and practice. Accordingly, I attempt to show how the 
empirical results of this study can inform the work of people who, like the interviewees 
whose views are reflected in the preceding pages, care deeply about the future of public 
higher education. Because this is a singular case study on a large topic, I present several 
avenues of future research that surfaced in the process of completing this project. 
Main Findings of the Dissertation 
 Question one. Tidewater University has actively attempted to construct an 
institutional ethos that assigns great importance to innovation and entrepreneurship. 
Based upon the data collected for this project, the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos 
consists of at least five values. The first value is that innovation and entrepreneurship are 
not the exclusive domain of the sciences, engineering, or business. Rather, the ethos 





administrative offices across the campus. Second, the ethos positioned innovation and 
entrepreneurship as a highly effective means of solving problems in the 21
st
 century. In 
fact, innovation and entrepreneurship were seen as a way to address problems that the 
government and academics had thus far failed to fix. Third, according to the values of the 
ethos, the impact of research was defined so that true impact became synonymous with 
commercializing research or ensuring that it somehow has worth outside of academe. 
Fourth, innovation and entrepreneurship was not simply about faculty members or 
students seeking out new discoveries. Indeed, the ethos also applied to how the university 
itself operates, with an emphasis on finding methods to cut costs and enhance 
performance. The fifth and final value of the ethos at Tidewater University is the belief 
that there is a rather natural relationship between innovation and entrepreneurship and 
this generation of students, which is accustomed to immediate results and putting digital 
technologies to use in the resolution of major issues.  
 These values became clear as interview participants described the meanings of 
innovation and entrepreneurship, separately and in tandem, at the university. Importantly, 
there was a wide array of understandings of innovation and entrepreneurship operational 
among those I interviewed. Despite this diversity, one of the patterns that emerged in the 
data was a preponderance of language and examples derived from the for-profit sector. 
There was a clear bias in the meanings ascribed to innovation and entrepreneurship 
toward company formation as an intended outcome, and most of the examples of 
entrepreneurial success came from technology-based corporations. Although interview 
participants believed that the university’s leadership wanted to make innovation and 





either because they did believe it was on equal footing with other values, such as 
knowledge production or public service, or because they viewed it as rhetoric and, thus, 
inherently partial. Additionally, it was not uncommon for interviewees to suggest that 
innovation and entrepreneurship constituted a marketing scheme, or simply a passing fad 
that would be soon replaced by other rhetoric. Most of the skeptics were faculty 
members, and several of them opposed the emphasis placed on innovation and 
entrepreneurship at the university, believing it to either demean their lifelong dedication 
to advancing knowledge or viewing it as at odds with the purposes of a public university. 
For this reason, I argued that the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos remains a project 
under construction, and its future place at Tidewater is far from certain. 
 The origins of entrepreneurship at the university can be clearly traced back to the 
colleges of engineering and business, and the influence of these colleges is still strong. 
Recently, the offices of the president and provost have been actively involved in 
expanding the reach of innovation and entrepreneurship as it has become a central feature 
of President Henry Pryor’s strategic priorities for the university. Much of this expansion 
has been in the area of undergraduate education, as more and more academic 
opportunities have been created to teach the entrepreneurial mindset. I demonstrate that 
the story of the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos is linked to a core group of central 
administrators, especially presidents and provosts. There was little to suggest that the 
promotion of innovation and entrepreneurship was in response to a groundswell of 
support from faculty members or students. Thus, the vision of a university devoted to 
innovation and entrepreneurship was most devoutly championed by top administrators at 





found greatest traction is where it was absent. I contend that, even as university leaders 
declared the universal applicability of innovation and entrepreneurship, the humanities 
were largely on the margins of the conversation, more so than the social sciences, either 
by choice or because the message did not resonate with equal force among all disciplines.  
 Question two. The decision to initiate and support an ethos built around 
innovation and entrepreneurship was made in an environment marked by structural and 
symbolic challenges. University leaders who shared their views as part of this study 
clearly situated Tidewater in a changing globalized economy, one that required university 
knowledge production and advanced training in order to ensure that the United States 
could compete. Contributing to economic growth was seen as one of many mounting 
expectations placed upon higher education institutions by the government. However, 
these expectations were not accompanied by additional funds. In fact, university leaders 
unanimously acknowledged that the university operated in an era of declining funds from 
the state and federal governments. These structural pressures were joined by the 
perceived barrage of critique from some legislators and consumers related to the costs 
and value of a college degree. Catering to the demands of consumers has become an ever-
increasing consideration among university leaders, especially because of the institution’s 
reliance upon tuition dollars. Competing for students who can pay tuition and will 
increase the university’s reputation is but one aspect of the highly competitive field in 
which Tidewater plays. As a university striving for prestige, university leaders paid close 
attention to other institutions, particularly those they believed to be more prestigious. The 





complicated than the search for new sources of revenue, which forms the basis of the 
theory of academic capitalism.  
 In light of this dynamic context, the reasons cited for initiating and supporting the 
innovation and entrepreneurship ethos addressed both monetary and non-monetary 
concerns. It was certainly the case that university leaders were interested in creating a 
campus culture in which it was possible to generate revenue for the institution. To date, 
the evidence suggests that Tidewater’s entrepreneurial efforts have not resulted in much, 
if any, net income for the university. Nevertheless, there is a persistent desire to earn 
money down the road, either from student entrepreneurs who give back to their alma 
matter or through the commercialization of faculty research that, like Gatorade, becomes 
a reliable source of revenue. In addition to the desire to make money, university leaders 
were motivated to initiate and support the ethos because they believed it to be part of a 
long tradition of serving the state’s economy. They linked the ethos to Tidewater’s 
identity as a land-grant institution, thereby attempting to forge an unbroken chain that 
binds the university’s aspirations to a glorified past. Interestingly, the third significant 
rationale proposed by university leaders was that other institutions were involved in the 
entrepreneurship “game.” There was a sense during many interviews that Tidewater did 
not want to be left behind as other university’s developed programs designed to spur 
entrepreneurship. For interview participants, Tidewater had an opportunity to get ahead 
of other schools, while others believed it was already too late. In general, data indicated 
that, regardless of what the outcome was of the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos, it 
was symbolically important for TU to be a player. The final reason why university 





retain faculty members and students. I demonstrated that this final motivation was less 
convincing than those based upon the pursuit of revenue, heritage, and prestige. 
 Question three. In order to explore how the values of the innovation and 
entrepreneurship ethos are transmitted to university actors, I elected to investigate faculty 
reward systems and academic opportunities for undergraduate students. In the fall of 
2013, a task force was convened to review the university’s promotion and tenure (P&T) 
guidelines. The task force’s charge explicitly included consideration of how to recognize 
innovation and entrepreneurship in the P&T process. After interviewing members of the 
task force, including the chair of the innovation and entrepreneurship subcommittee, and 
analyzing several documents, I concluded that there were a number of concerns about the 
place of innovation and entrepreneurship as indicators of professorial success at the 
university.  
The predominant goal of the task force was to recognize a fuller range of 
activities in which faculty members engage, especially given changes to academic 
publishing and non-traditional means of sharing research. In the end, the task force 
recommended that entrepreneurship could enhance a faculty member’s record as a part of 
the three pillars of the profession: research, teaching, and service. However, it should not 
constitute its own pillar, and should be evaluated with the same degree of rigor as other 
pieces of evidence used to determine tenure and promotion at the university. In addition 
to the work of this task force, I also highlighted the recent creation of awards for faculty 
members related to innovation and entrepreneurship. Although these awards represent 
one way the ethos is translated into incentives for faculty members, I argue that their 





often based upon faculty members saving the institution money or successfully 
commercializing their research, the awards are more applicable to the sciences and 
engineering. It should come as no surprise, then, that the winners of innovation and 
entrepreneurship faculty awards have mainly come from these disciplines. 
 The translation of the ethos into academic opportunities for students has been 
more widespread and influential, seeking to inculcate the entrepreneurial mindset in all 
undergraduate students at the university. To this end, Tidewater has steadily increased the 
number of courses that teach the entrepreneurial mindset, and there has been a strident 
effort to incorporate these courses into the general education curriculum. Furthermore, 
the Institute for Innovation and Entrepreneurship created modules in design thinking, 
which teach an entrepreneurial problem-solving process. These modules have been built 
into courses offered through two of the university’s largest residential and scholarship-
based programs, reaching thousands of first- and second-year students. One of the most 
widely publicized means of translating the ethos has been the creation of business model 
pitch competitions, where students receive feedback for their ideas and can win seed 
money to launch their ventures. The final academic opportunity I detailed was the 
development of minor degree programs, reflecting the ways in which teaching 
entrepreneurship has been integrated into Tidewater’s academic structure. Although the 
university is far from reaching its goal of exposing all students to entrepreneurial learning 
opportunities, the trend has been one of exponential growth in programs that teach the 






 The translation of the ethos into incentives for faculty members and academic 
opportunities for undergraduate students is not without implications. For faculty 
incentives, there is the need to ensure that the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos is 
accompanied by comprehensive and clearly articulated policies to reduce the incidence of 
conflicts of interest and commitment. The mere mention of innovation and 
entrepreneurship in conjunction with promotion and tenure may inadvertently send the 
message to young faculty members that it is expected of them, which is a second 
implication. Given that the humanities are on the margins of the innovation and 
entrepreneurship ethos, and that awards currently favor faculty members in the sciences 
and engineering, a final implication of the translation of the ethos is that it further 
exacerbates the creation of a two-tier faculty hierarchy.  
For undergraduate student opportunities, one of the main implications of 
translating the ethos is encouraging risk-taking without properly communicating what the 
risks entail or adequately preparing students for the high probability of failure. That is not 
to say that students do not experience failure. Many of them fail as a consequence of the 
prize-based culture celebrated in business model pitch competitions. Another implication 
of teaching the mindset is that it places too much emphasis on working and thinking in 
groups, thereby giving undue consideration to the valuable contributions of innovators 
who prefer to work alone. Lastly, as the university pushed for more students to become 
entrepreneurs, it has not sufficiently developed learning opportunities on the ethics of the 
process. Indeed, students learn that entrepreneurship is a means of problem-solving, 





issues in society. I exemplified some of these implications of translating the ethos 
through a social venture started by students at Tidewater, Food Rescue Movement.  
In summary, innovation and entrepreneurship carried diverse meanings, but the 
one recurring meaning of the concepts revolved around creating value through the 
creation of a product and founding of a company. The origins of innovation and 
entrepreneurship at Tidewater can be traced to the colleges of business of engineering, 
but the inclusion of these concepts into the values of the institution is largely the work of 
central administrators, especially presidents and provosts. In selecting innovation and 
entrepreneurship as Tidewater’s institutional ethos, university leaders sought to respond 
to many challenges and satisfy several masters. The motivations for supporting values 
and norms clearly connected to the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime 
centered upon possible revenue in the future, continuing a tradition of state service, and 
pursuing prestige in a competitive higher education field. Two of the ways that the ethos 
has been translated in ways that affect the lived experience of faculty members and 
undergraduate students is to develop incentives and create academic opportunities. Many 
of the efforts to incentivize faculty entrepreneurship involve only certain disciplines and 
have not drastically altered notions of what constitutes professorial success. However, the 
influence of the ethos on the undergraduate student experience is easier to discern, as the 
number of academic opportunities swells. 
Ultimately, the actors interviewed for this dissertation all want Tidewater 
University to continue its trajectory of excellence and effectively navigate the choppy 
waters of higher education today. Many of them saw innovation and entrepreneurship as 





As follows, the prevailing opinion was not to pursue innovation and entrepreneurship in 
order to enrich individuals or the institution. This outcome, of course, is conceivable at 
TU, but it has long been possible for faculty members to commercialize their research 
and for universities to explore diverse means of replenishing their coffers. The questions 
raised throughout this dissertation deal not with whether innovation and entrepreneurship 
as institutional ethos is a good or bad development at a public university like Tidewater. 
Instead, they have dealt with the nature of change in American higher education, the 
relationship between postsecondary institutions and society, and the subjectivities crafted 
at universities. While the answers to these questions are under-developed, I believe the 
data collected for this dissertation points to potentially harmful effects in transmitting 
values of the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime to university actors. These 
effects include compromising institutional autonomy; transforming universities into little 
more than sites of job training; re-orienting academic research to serve economic growth 
above all else; and training students as individual, mobile, flexible worker-entrepreneurs 
instead of citizens committed to the public good. 
Contributions to Theory 
 The empirical evidence demonstrated unequivocally that the academic capitalist 
knowledge/learning regime exists at Tidewater University. Interview participants 
discussed the university in the terms of a for-profit enterprise that must link with 
corporations to address funding shortfalls and capitalize on market opportunities. 
Knowledge was seen by some interview participants as a raw material, emphasizing that 
its value was predicated upon the extent to which it could produce external funds. 





entrepreneurs as part of an orientation to economic relevance and growth in the 
knowledge-based economy. Additionally, the origins of the innovation and 
entrepreneurship ethos confirmed one of the theory of academic capitalism’s constructs: 
interstitial organizational emergence. Several organizations were established at 
Tidewater, including the Office of Technology Transfer, TTEC, and TideVentures to 
bridge the divide between the university, corporations, and the state. Moreover, given the 
role of central administrators, especially presidents and provosts, in initiating the 
innovation and entrepreneurship ethos, data supports Slaughter and Rhoades’ claim that 
the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime assigns greater authority to top-level 
university leaders.  
However, the findings of this project suggest the need to think differently about 
academic capitalism in order to fully explain how and why Tidewater pushed innovation 
and entrepreneurship as guiding values and behavioral norms. In light of the gaps I saw in 
the theory prior to undertaking data collection, I developed a set of five theoretical 
propositions. These theoretical propositions guided the analysis of data and spoke to 1) 
the place of universities in a powerfully symbolic field; 2) the role of universities in not 
simply reflecting the context in which they sit, but also constructing the world as we 
know it; and 3) the contributions of educational institutions to shaping subjectivities. 
Table 11 summarizes the five propositions and lists which chapters present data that 







Table 11: Review of Five Theoretical Propositions 
Theoretical Basis Proposition 
Cultural dimensions of the political 
economy of education  
Proposition 1: Public universities align 
their activities with discourses of the 
knowledge-based economy and reproduce 
the social relations of capitalism. 
(Chapters 5 and 6) 
 
New institutionalism Proposition 2: The development and 
translation of an institutional ethos is 
influenced by perceptions of legitimacy 
and prestige in the higher education field. 
(Chapter 5)  
 
Heteronomous model of university change Proposition 3: Accompanying the 
marketization of public universities is 
increasing responsibilities to the state, 
creating dual external controls closely tied 
to globalization. (Chapter 5) 
 
Governmentality Proposition 4: The translation of an 
institutional ethos into incentives for 
faculty members and academic 
opportunities for undergraduate students 
represents a form of governmentality.  
(Chapter 6) 
New sociology of knowledge Proposition 5: Public universities wield 
power in validating certain ways of 
thinking and being in society through its 
knowledge-processing functions. 
(Chapters 4 and 6) 
 
 






The first theoretical proposition is that public universities align their activities 
with discourses of the knowledge-based economy and (re)produce the social relations of 
capitalism. Chapter five demonstrated that university leaders believed that the American 
economy had become knowledge-based, and they justified the importance of university 
innovation and entrepreneurship because of this transformation. I suggested that 
Tidewater’s alignment with the knowledge-based economy is understandable, as public 
universities are rendered more relevant in an economy structured around knowledge. It 
did not matter that Tidewater’s leaders could not cite what, precisely, made the U.S. 
economy knowledge-based. Rather, interview participants emphasized the necessity of 
the university’s evolution based upon knowledge economy discourses. Chapter six 
demonstrated that by investing in training students to be entrepreneurs—to embody the 
entrepreneurial mindset—Tidewater helped to create subjectivities perfectly suited to the 
current iteration of capitalism, characterized by a high faith in the ability of the market to 
solve problems. Consequently, academic capitalism is not merely about higher education 
institutions and their search for revenue streams. It is also about the ways in which 
universities help to bring the capitalist economy into being and reproduce its social 
relations. 
The second theoretical proposition, which is inspired by new institutionalism, 
posits that the development and translation of an institutional ethos is influenced by 
perceptions of legitimacy and prestige in the higher education field.  
The basic idea underlying this proposition is that not all organizational behavior is 
efficacious. Some practices are rationalized in an organizational field and 





economically to survive. They must establish and maintain legitimacy in order to 
compete in the market and garner prestige. Chapter five showed that part of the reason 
why innovation and entrepreneurship have become central to Tidewater’s ethos is that 
other institutions in TU’s field of play are active in these areas. Indeed, the university’s 
leaders were keenly aware of how Tidewater was situated relative to peers and 
prestigious institutions when it came to innovation and entrepreneurship. In order to keep 
pace with other universities, appear normal in the eyes of stakeholders, and emulate 
prestigious schools, Tidewater began to develop programs dedicated to innovation and 
entrepreneurship. Although there was hope that entrepreneurship might one day pay off 
for the university, the immediate benefit of the ethos appeared to be symbolic just as 
much as financial. 
 Chapter five also validated the third theoretical proposition, based upon 
Schugurensky’s (1994, 2006) heteronomous university model. Proposition three contends 
that accompanying the marketization of public universities is increasing responsibilities 
to the state, creating dual external controls closely tied to globalization. The main point of 
this proposition is that public universities must answer to state expectations, particularly 
related to economic development and job training. One of the recurring motivations that 
university leaders cited for initiating and supporting the innovation and entrepreneurship 
ethos was that TU has an obligation to serve the state, and this obligation constitutes a 
tradition that is weaved into the institution’s identity. While the contributions the 
university makes to the state economy in terms of graduating students and launching 
companies is quite real and quantifiable, the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos was 





present through recourse to the past. Driving some interview participants to support the 
ethos, then, was the belief that it was consistent with Tidewater’s longstanding role as a 
state institution whose contributions are necessary, regardless of how much money it 
receives in appropriations.  
 The methods by which innovation and entrepreneurship were transmitted to 
university actors is the addressed by the fourth proposition. This proposition suggests that 
universities are engaged in the micro-exercise of power, shaping the conduct of 
individuals through governance. Rather than force faculty members and students to be 
more entrepreneurial, Tidewater developed conduct-shaping techniques, such as creating 
or revising incentives or integrating ideas into the academic structure of the institution. 
As the fourth proposition maintains, such methods of transmission constitute a form of 
governmentality, whereby university actors are made into particular kinds of subjects 
through the integration of values and norms into their modes of thought. For Foucault, 
governmentality was a particularly useful way of showing how neoliberal capitalism 
persisted, as it induced individuals to learn means of self-management. Chapter six 
detailed how Tidewater attempted to shape faculty member and student conduct. The 
evidence questions the extent to which these efforts were successful among faculty 
members. However, there is perhaps no better confirmation of neoliberal governmentality 
than the desire at TU to inculcate an entrepreneurial mindset among undergraduate 
students. The university applied governance in order to craft a student subjectivity based 
upon opportunism, private sector problem-solving, and a sense of self and society viewed 





The fifth theoretical proposition extends the idea that public universities wield 
power to the societal level. It argues that public universities validate certain ways of 
thinking and being in society through its knowledge-processing functions. This 
proposition found the least explicit support in the data. However, this dissertation showed 
how entrepreneurship emerged as a field of study at Tidewater, especially after 1998. 
Whereas students could find no courses on entrepreneurship in 1980, by 2013 the 
university was brimming with options. The creation of academic opportunities elaborated 
in chapter six speaks to TU’s role in validating entrepreneurship as something worth 
learning. The fact that this field of study was driven more by the initiatives of university 
leaders suggests that Tidewater was not merely responding to constituent demand. It was 
creating and endorsing specific patterns of thought and action in society. 
Taken together, these theoretical propositions highlight three conclusions and 
central contributions of this study to theory building: 
1. Higher education is intricately connected to the neoliberal capitalist system, 
replicating and responding to its discourses and reproducing the social 
relations on which it depends for continued hegemony. 
2. The nature of change in higher education since the 1970s is derived from a 
combination of structural (policy, resources, demographics) and symbolic 
(tradition, legitimacy, prestige) challenges, which have in turn required 
strategies that service structural and symbolic purposes (innovation and 
entrepreneurship).  
3. The theory of academic capitalism inadequately accounts for the two 





is to think of it as a process that higher education institutions undergo. This 
process operates at several levels. The micro-level of the process includes how 
academic capitalism shapes the subjectivities of undergraduate students and 
faculty members. The meso-level of the process influences the actions of 
departments and campus units as they seek to fund their operations. Lastly, the 
macro-level of the process informs the strategic priorities of the entire 
institution. This conceptualization allows for a more comprehensive 
explanation for the nature of change in higher education. 
With this in mind, the theoretical revision I suggest recognizes that the rise of the 
academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime can be traced shifting resource 
dependencies, as well as the obligation and desire to serve state economic growth and 
enhance legitimacy and prestige during an era of heightened scrutiny of higher education. 
The means by which academic capitalist norms and values are transmitted to university 
actor include governmentality, or employing techniques of governing designed to shape 
particular subjectivities. The result of this transmission is that public universities become 
instrumental in reproducing the social relations of neoliberal capitalism.  
Unresolved Issues 
 There are at least two major issues that remain unresolved in this study, mainly 
due to insufficiencies in the data. Nevertheless, these issues are relevant to the discussion 
and merit some consideration. The first issue is that, despite the fact that interview 
participants often spoke of rationales driving the innovation and entrepreneurship ethos at 
Tidewater as separate, and they emphasized those that they believed to be most 





intertwined. As I previously noted, resources may well underlie all of the rationales. As 
an example, the desire to serve the state may relate to a land-grant tradition and self-
identification based upon public service. However, state service is also undoubtedly 
linked to resources. That is, state service may be emphasized by interview participants in 
order to demonstrate Tidewater’s value and curb any government funding reductions. 
Furthermore, tradition is not entirely separate from prestige, as part of what signals 
prestige to parents and students is based upon historic indicators of quality in 
postsecondary education. Lastly, prestige helps institutions to garner additional resources, 
both from the government and private sources. These interconnections are not treated in 
detail in this dissertation, but may be corroborated through additional research. 
 A second unresolved issue revolves around a missing piece of the dissertation’s 
logic about academe and its relationship to capitalism. To a certain degree, the theory of 
academic capitalism and, therefore, this study presupposes that the academic capitalist 
knowledge/learning regime is a novel phenomenon in higher education. A more historical 
approach to these issues could reveal that public universities were purposely structured 
on a Darwinian model of academic meritocracy. This model has been responsible for 
producing some of the fantastic successes attributed to U.S. higher education, attracting 
millions of scholars and students. In this way, it is possible that academic capitalism is an 
expression of a time-old model, perhaps one with few checks since the end of the Cold 
War and the triumph of the free-market system. I do not dispute this possibility and 
believe it to be an important topic of future research, as the scope of this study—and the 
empirical evidence collected—cannot sufficiently begin to untangle the relationship. 





academe is structured, the tone of interview participants, several of whom have worked in 
higher education for 40 years, suggests that something fundamental in the enterprise has 
changed. Academic capitalism—and the arguments advanced in this study—point to this 
notion of transformation, one that is perhaps not entirely new, but submits that the 
Darwinian model of academe has taken on forms and received emphasis not before seen 
in recent history.  
Implications for Policy 
 The primary implication of this study for policy is that there is need to seriously 
consider the outcomes of changes to higher education’s political-economic context since 
the late 1970s. In a time period when assessment is all the rage in education reform 
circles, there is seemingly little interest in taking stock of the degree to which policies 
aimed at harnessing university knowledge production for innovation (e.g., Bayh-Dole) 
and treating a college degree as a private good (financial aid policies) have improved 
institutional equity and quality. For some observers, the changes in academe described by 
the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime represent progress, as public 
universities are finally finding ways to ensure students are well educated for economic 
needs and academic research overcomes the confines of the ivory tower. Others contend 
that the changes are necessary to curb rising costs in higher education. Both of these 
viewpoints require empirical substantiation; however, what this dissertation shows is that 
academic capitalism is dramatically altering public universities in several ways.  
First, the regime assumes that academic research only has value so long as 
someone wants to pay for it, either through funding the process or purchasing a product. 





to human existence, yet may not immediately seem valuable.
10
 Second, the regime argues 
that creating consumer products and launching startup companies from the university 
setting is an effective way to solve problems, denigrating in the process the vital role of 
universities in educating citizens and even fostering activism. Third, the regime positions 
universities as job training sites and engines of economic growth, not critical repositories 
of culture where critical thinking is nurtured. Lastly, the regime undermines the public 
university’s role as social critic and conscience.  
 At minimum, the most important policy change that the findings of this 
dissertation advocate is more generous state and federal funding of higher education and 
basic research. If states elect to continue cutting appropriations, and the federal 
government prioritizes other areas of spending over basic research, I argue that it must 
adjust its expectations, reduce regulatory burdens occasioned by the accountability 
movement, and expect that private contributions to higher education in the form of tuition 
dollars will become increasingly vital to higher education institutions. As things presently 
stand, the government is both cutting funding to public universities and expecting more 
of them, which is an unsustainable situation, fraught with contradictions. Providing more 
funding to public higher education would demonstrate the important role of universities 
in the economy that many government officials believe to be based upon the application 
of new knowledge. This does not mean institutions should be given absolute freedom to 
decide what to do with an infinitely larger sum of money. Some expectations are 
warranted and accountability protects taxpayer money. Nevertheless, such a policy 
change would recognize that the American higher education system achieved a fantastic 
                                                 
10
 It should be noted that there is also reason to critique the notion that research is only valuable if someone 
is willing to publish it in an academic journal. There are many calling for engaged scholarship, whose 





degree of success for much of the post-World War II period. The same cannot be said of 
higher education policy since the late 1970s.   
Implications for Practice 
 The implications for practice developed from this study are more numerous than 
the implications for policy. The first implication is that an institutional ethos that does not 
have the buy-in of faculty members and does not truly welcome all disciplines will 
confront difficulties during implementation. The innovation and entrepreneurship ethos 
was largely created by central administrators, and despite efforts to suggest that the 
concepts are universally applicable, in practice the ethos has favored science, 
engineering, and business disciplines. Because of the lack of buy-in and inclusivity, many 
faculty members oppose the ethos and will chose to ignore it as they go about their lives 
on campus. No matter how much money the president’s and provost’s offices put behind 
innovation and entrepreneurship initiatives, within a system of shared governance, an 
ethos that does not have the support of faculty members will undoubtedly have a rocky 
future. 
 The second implication is that Tidewater needs to conduct a thorough analysis of 
how much it is spending on innovation and entrepreneurship programs compared to the 
current and/or expected benefits. It is clear from this study that university leaders do not 
have a firm sense of the total amount of money that is spent on technology transfer and 
programs aimed at increasing student entrepreneurship. The individual program directors 
with whom I spoke indicated that the university may well be losing money as it pursues 
academic entrepreneurship. The question that emerges is whether this is the best way to 





as TU continues to seek excellence in research and instruction. Another way of putting 
this implication is that it may be the case the innovation and entrepreneurship are not the 
right ingredients of a successful institutional ethos at a public university.  
 The final implication is that entrepreneurship education needs to be radically 
altered. As follows, the teaching of entrepreneurship should be treated with a dose of 
reality, such that students understand the risks, recognize the high probability of failure, 
and see that technology startups cannot solve all of the world’s myriad problems. This 
step can be taken without dissuading students who are interested in creating something 
tangible and making a difference while they are in college. A course in ethics should be 
added to any entrepreneurial academic opportunity. Therefore, students learn that the 
disruption caused by entrepreneurship certainly affects communities in many different 
ways. Lastly, entrepreneurship education should emphasize that entrepreneurship is one 
method among many for solving problems and taking action. Other methods include 
trying to influence policy, becoming a public servant or community volunteer, and even 
resorting to demonstrations against social injustices and abuses of power. In this way, 
students are exposed to a more balanced portrayal of entrepreneurship. 
Avenues for Future Research 
 This dissertation has opened several avenues of future research, some of which 
are evident from its omissions. Admittedly, the relationship between higher education 
and the capitalist system has existed for centuries, and this treatment of the relationship is 
woefully incomplete. There is a need for research that provides a more complete, 
nuanced account of this relationship, showcasing both its positive and negative 





serves as a reason for additional research applying the theoretical propositions to other 
types of institutions, including those whose administration is not so dominated by 
individuals from science, engineering, and technology fields. This research should strive 
to give special attention to patterns that emerge in public opinion of higher education 
during times of economic crisis. The internalization of academic capitalist norms and 
values has been subject to analysis in a small number of studies (e.g., Mendoza, 2012; 
Szelényi, 2013). However, to date there have been few critical studies that venture into 
the classroom or incubator space with students to better understand precisely how 
entrepreneurship education affects their opinions and perceptions. Thus, a natural 
complement to this study would be a critical ethnography of university-based 
entrepreneurship academic opportunities.  
 The study of entrepreneurship in American higher education, including this 
project, has concentrated upon areas on university campus where entrepreneurship 
flourishes. More research is needed in those disciplines that are on the margins of the 
conversation, including the humanities and, to a lesser extent, colleges of education. 
Another omission in this study that warrants a closer treatment is the discourses of 
innovation and entrepreneurship. For example, a discourse analysis of university leaders’ 
speeches and writing could reveal additional insights about the current state of American 
higher education and dynamics of power informing its transformation. The findings of 
this case, including its contributions to theory, need to be further examined through the 
study of additional institutions. Lastly, this study did not analyze the gender dynamics at 
play in innovation and entrepreneurship. As chapter four indicated, the initial homes of 





male dominated. Moreover, I argued that incentives for faculty members, perhaps 
reflecting a trend in entrepreneurial engagement generally, were geared towards science, 
engineering, and technology disciplines. As it is currently structured, entrepreneurship 
may cater to males, and the gendered nature of this topic should be researched in the 
future. 
Conclusion 
 This dissertation sought to empirically explore the means and motivations through 
which academic capitalist values and norms were created and subsequently transmitted to 
university actors at Tidewater University between 1998 and 2013. Using case study 
methodology, I collected and analyzed data in order to address research questions about 
the processes through which Tidewater developed an innovation and entrepreneurship 
institutional ethos, why this ethos was initiated and supported by university leaders, and 
how the ethos was translated into incentives and academic programs. In response to these 
questions, I argue the meanings of innovation and entrepreneurship operational at the 
university are multiple. Innovation is frequently tacked onto entrepreneurship as a means 
of making entrepreneurship more palatable. However, some faculty take issue with the 
recent use of innovation as something new to universities. Entrepreneurship is frequently 
described and exemplified through reference to for-profit entities, especially technology-
based corporations. The institutional ethos related to innovation and entrepreneurship was 
a strategy that can be traced back to a small number of central administrations. In crafting 
the ethos, university leaders were responding to a dynamic political-economic 
environment, shaped by structural and symbolic challenges. The main reasons for 





continuing a tradition of state service, and pursuing legitimacy and prestige. Lastly, I 
contend that efforts to translate the ethos into incentives for faculty members have thus 
far been limited and cater to specific disciplines. By contract, the ethos has penetrated the 
academic experience of undergraduate students, with the potential to powerfully shape 
the subjectivities they form in college. 
 In some ways, innovation and entrepreneurship constitute perhaps the perfect 
strategic priorities for higher education institutions that confront both challenges to their 
relevance and a barrage of neoliberal ideas about public policy. It is for this reason that 
they study of entrepreneurship so clearly fits the present historical moment. To study 
entrepreneurship in U.S. higher education is a window into the nature of change in higher 
education itself. Despite the appropriateness of entrepreneurship in light of the times, this 
dissertation gives reason to pause and reflect—and even take action in opposition to—a 
troubling trajectory. With little sign of a reversal in trends related to higher education 
governance and the power dynamics of reform, the question seems not to be when 
academic capitalism will run its course, but rather how far it will go in transforming 
public colleges and universities before any loyalty to the public good is irrevocably 












Appendix A. Interview Protocol for Stage One 
Thank you very much for agreeing to participate in this study, which explores the 
promotion of innovation and entrepreneurship at a public research university. As I 
mentioned, this interview will be used as part of my dissertation. The project is conducted 
with the supervision of my doctoral advisor, Dr. Nelly Stromquist. There are no direct 
benefits to the participants. However, possible benefits include contributing to 
understanding of higher education in the United States. Your participation is voluntary 
and you can terminate your participation at any time.  
 The interview will last about one hour. Before asking any questions, I will review 
with you information about the purpose of the study, the investigators, the procedure, the 
risks, and contact information. Prior to starting the interview, I will present you with a 
consent form containing this information, which asks for your signature, indicating you 
understand this information and agree to participate.  
 Any potential threat to confidentiality will be minimized by storing data in a 
secure location, i.e. locked file storage and password protected computers. In addition, 
your name will not be identified or linked to the data at any time unless you give your 
express consent to reveal this information. The data you provide through your responses 
will not be shared with your employer. Neither your name nor the data you provide 
through your responses will be shared with other participants. You may be asked to 
volunteer names of other potential participants. Offering names of other participants is 
completely voluntary, and your identity will not be revealed in any subsequent 
interviews. Only the principle and student investigators will have access to the 
participants’ names. If you decide to stop taking part in the study, if you have questions, 
concerns or complaints, or if you need to report an injury related to the research, please 
contact the principle, Dr. Nelly Stromquist. If you have questions about your rights as a 
research participant or wish to report a research-related injury, please contact the 
Institutional Review Board Office. This research has been reviewed according to IRB 
procedures for research involving human subjects. 
 
Do you agree to participate? If yes, please sign the informed consent form. If no, we 
will stop here.  
The interview will last about one hour, and I would like to ask your permission to record 
this interview for accuracy. The recording will be available only to me and your identity 
will be kept confidential. Your identity will not be revealed in any report. If your words 
are included in the results, any identifying information will be removed.  
Do you agree to permit me to record this interview? [If yes, turn on the recorder.] 






a. I see that you have been in this position since [YEAR]. How long have 
you been affiliated with the university? 
b. What previous positions have you held at the university? 
 
2.) Perceptions of the Context 
 
a. I would like to start by asking for your thoughts on higher education in 
general. In what ways have public universities changed while you have 
been at the University? 
b. What are some of the biggest challenges in public higher education today? 
c. Is the University affected by these challenges? 
d. In what ways is the University responding to these challenges? 
e. How do these challenges relate to the work you do at the University? 
 
3.) The Institutional Ethos 
 
a. What do you think are some of the University’s guiding values? 
b. In particular, what values does the University hold concerning research or 
knowledge creation? 
c. What responsibility does the University have to the local or regional 
economy? 
d. How would you describe the University’s ethos? 
e. Are there any behaviors or ways of thinking the University is trying to 
normalize in faculty? In students? 
f. How do innovation and entrepreneurship factor into the University’s 
values and norms? 
 
4.) Innovation and Entrepreneurship 
 
a. Tell me about the current place of innovation and entrepreneurship on 
campus. 
b. Why has innovation and entrepreneurship become important at the 
University? 
[Room for probing expected here about the economy, need for relevance, 
state of higher education finance, peer institutions, etc.] 
c. What does the university gain from supporting innovation and 
entrepreneurship? 
d. Is the support of innovation and entrepreneurship related to or influenced 
by other institutions? 
e. Do you think the promotion of innovation and entrepreneurship is a 
response to critiques of higher education? Do you think these initiatives 
make the University seem legitimate? 
f. What individuals on campus seem to be driving innovation and 
entrepreneurship efforts? 
g. How do you differentiate innovation and entrepreneurship? Why are these 





h. Have you been involved in initiating anything related to innovation and 
entrepreneurship? What are the initiatives? 
i. What are the goals of the abovementioned initiatives? Who are the 
intended participants? Who are the intended beneficiaries?  
j. Why did you start this initiative? Did you receive support from any person 
or office on campus? Outside of campus? 
k. Do you have the option of not supporting innovation and 
entrepreneurship? 
l. How might innovation and entrepreneurship change the lives of students 























Appendix B. Interview Protocol for Stage Two 
Thank you very much for agreeing to participate in this study, which explores the 
promotion of innovation and entrepreneurship at a public research university. As I 
mentioned, this interview will be used as part of my dissertation. The project is conducted 
with the supervision of my doctoral advisor, Dr. Nelly Stromquist. There are no direct 
benefits to the participants. However, possible benefits include contributing to 
understanding of higher education in the United States. Your participation is voluntary 
and you can terminate your participation at any time.  
 The interview will last about one hour. Before asking any questions, I will review 
with you information about the purpose of the study, the investigators, the procedure, the 
risks, and contact information. Prior to starting the interview, I will present you with a 
consent form containing this information, which asks for your signature, indicating you 
understand this information and agree to participate.  
 Any potential threat to confidentiality will be minimized by storing data in a 
secure location, i.e. locked file storage and password protected computers. In addition, 
your name will not be identified or linked to the data at any time unless you give your 
express consent to reveal this information. The data you provide through your responses 
will not be shared with your employer. Neither your name nor the data you provide 
through your responses will be shared with other participants. You may be asked to 
volunteer names of other potential participants. Offering names of other participants is 
completely voluntary, and your identity will not be revealed in any subsequent 
interviews. Only the principle and student investigators will have access to the 
participants’ names. If you decide to stop taking part in the study, if you have questions, 
concerns or complaints, or if you need to report an injury related to the research, please 
contact the principle, Dr. Nelly Stromquist. If you have questions about your rights as a 
research participant or wish to report a research-related injury, please contact the 
Institutional Review Board Office. This research has been reviewed according to IRB 
procedures for research involving human subjects. 
 
Do you agree to participate? If yes, please sign the informed consent form. If no, we 
will stop here.  
The interview will last about one hour, and I would like to ask your permission to record 
this interview for accuracy. The recording will be available only to me and your identity 
will be kept confidential. Your identity will not be revealed in any report. If your words 
are included in the results, any identifying information will be removed.  
Do you agree to permit me to record this interview? [If yes, turn on the recorder.] 
Let us start with the questions.  
1.) Background 
a. Please state your name. 





c. How long have you been in your current role? 
d. What are your main responsibilities in this role? 
e. Have you held other positions at the University? 
f. How many years in total have you been affiliated with the University? 
 
2.) Perceptions of the Ethos 
 
a. What would identify as the University’s core values today? 
b. How are these values communicated? Where have you seen/read/heard 
them? 
c. If there is an ethos on campus, what would be its major features and 
components? 
d. Tell me about the current place of innovation and entrepreneurship on 
campus? 
e. What do think entrepreneurship means? Is this the meaning promoted 
around campus? 
f. In what ways have you noticed innovation and entrepreneurship at the 
University? In marketing, in meetings, in course planning, etc.?  
g. What individuals seem to be driving innovation and entrepreneurship? 
h. Have you felt encouraged or pressured to incorporate innovation and 
entrepreneurship into your work?  
 
3.) Innovation and Entrepreneurship  
 
a. How has innovation and entrepreneurship been encouraged? 
b. Have you changed the work you do in response to the promotion of 
innovation and entrepreneurship? How so? 
c. What initiatives have you developed in response to the innovation and 
entrepreneurship thrust? Why? 
d. What are the objectives of these initiatives? Have you received support 
from any groups or persons? 
e. Do you think the University is trying to develop a certain type of faculty 
member or undergraduate student? How you describe this type of person? 
f. What reasons might you suggest for the recent emphasis on innovation 
and entrepreneurship on campus? 
g. What might be some of the goals of promotion innovation and 
entrepreneurship at the University? 
h. Do you agree with the direction the University is headed with regards to 
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